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Abstract
The persistence of the classic duel between reform and 
bossism as the dominant theme in the literature on American 
urban politics has been subject to increasing criticism in 
recent years. This conflict, it is now argued, provides an 
inadequate framework in helping us to understand the 
complexity of American municipal development. While 
accepting that initiatives suggesting alternative ways of 
viewing urban politics are long overdue, such efforts, in my 
view, can only achieve their purpose if they are based on an 
accurate understanding of the role that the political 
machine has played in the American city. Unfortunately the 
consensus that prevails in the abundant literature on this 
political institution fails to provide just such an 
understanding. In particular the existing literature fails 
to furnish satisfactory answers to such key questions as.
How do we account for the emergence of the political 
machine? What functions did it fulfill in the American 
city? To what extent did so-called "bosses" control party 
organisations and city governments? Which sections of the 
urban population supported the machine and why?
The aim of this thesis is to address these questions using 
the Republican political machine (or "Organisation") in 
Philadelphia as the model for inquiry. The thesis is 
divided into two parts, the first of which shows that, in 
spite of appearances to the contrary, an over-riding
cleavage between well-organised machine and reform forces 
did not dominate party politics in Philadelphia in the 
period prior to 1887. The second half argues that, contrary 
to received wisdom, a fully fledged political machine did 
not emerge as the dominant force in the government and 
politics of the city until the turn of the century. This 
development is attributed not to the influx of poor 
immigrants to the city, but to changes in the organisation 
and structure of Philadelphia's political and economic 
system, and the ability of the new (internally) consolidated 
political machine to overwhelm its (external) electoral 
opponents including its principal opposition the nonpartisan 
reform movement. It is also argued that the machine, rather 
than being the natural functional substitute for government 
that its apologists have traditionally maintained, did in 
fact function as a blight on the system of government in 
Philadelphia.
Contents
List of tables and figures page 6
Acknowledgments 9
Introduction 11
1 A Literature Review of the Urban Political Machine 19
Part A: The Politics of Individualism and Ring Rule in the
Pre-Machine Era, 1867-1887 36
2 The Emergence of the Career Politician 39
3 Ring Rule 66
James McManes and the "Gas Ring" 66
William S. Stokley and the "Buildings Ring" 72
The Limits of Boss Power 84
4 The Politics of Protest and Reform 108
The "Best Men" in Retreat? 109
The "Forward March of Reform"? 124
Part B: The Institutionalisation of a Dominant Machine,
1887-1933 153
5 The Salient Characteristics of Republican Boss Rule
in Philadelphia 157
6 The Centralisation of the Republican "Organisation" 182
of Philadelphia
Quayism and Philadelphia 184
"Iz" Durham and organisational change 190
7 The Electoral Foundations and Functions of the
Republican Machine 213
Robert K. Merton and the Latent Functions of the 
Political Machine 243
One-Party Politics 258
8 The Utility Monopolists 277
9 The Non-Partisan Reform Movement 304
"Corrupt and Contented"? 346
10 Conclusion 347
Appendix 1: The Citizens' Municipal Reform Association 353
Appendix 2: The Committee of One Hundred 359
Notes 370
Bibliography 423
Tables and Figures
Tables
2.1 Union Republican City Executive Committee,
1869-1870 page 49
3.1 The Distribution of Population in
Philadelphia, 1850, 1880 80
3.2 The Society of Mysterious Pilgrims, 1872-75 81
3.3 Presidents of Councils and their Political
Affiliation, 1865-1884 91
3.4 The Jurisdiction of Political Appointments,
1854-1887 99
4.1 Elite Philadelphians and their Political
Activities, 1871-1886 111
4.2 The Republican Party vote in selected City
elections, by Ward, 1877, 1881 135
4.3 City Wards returning a majority for Republican
Mayoral candidates, 1865-1884 138
5.1 Republican Party Leaders in Philadelphia,
1887-1934 159
5.2 City Contracts for the Department of Public Works,
awarded to the "Hog Combine", 1887-1894 165
5.3 Public Contracts awarded to Vare Interests,
1888-1928 168
6.1 The Republican City Committee, 1905 194
7.1 The Republican Party vote in Philadelphia Mayoral
elections, 1887-1931 214
7.2 Population of Philadelphia, 1880-1930 219
7.3 Ethnic Composition of Philadelphia: 1880-1930 220
7.4 Ethnic Groups in Philadelphia, 1880-1920 222
7.5 Ethnicity, Social Class and the Republican Party
vote, Philadelphia Mayoral elections, 1887-1931 224
7.6 The Republican Party vote in Philadelphia Mayoral
elections, by District, 1887-1931 233
7.7 The Republican Party vote in Philadelphia Mayoral
elections, by Ring and Core Wards, 1887-1931 235
7.8 Geographical Distribution of New Immigrant Groups,
1910, 1920 239
7.9 Geographical Distribution of Black population,
1880-1920 241
7.10 Ticket-Splitting in Selected Controlled Wards: A
Comparison of the County Commissioner and Mayoral 
elections of 1923 266
8.1 The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company and its
subsidiaries 293
8.2 The Philadelphia Electric Company of New Jersey
and its subsidiaries 301
9.1 Members of the Board of Management of the
Municipal League of Philadelphia, 1891-1904 315
9.2 The Committee of Seventy, 1905-6 320
9.3 Non-Partisan Reformers who joined the Republican
Nomination League, 1911 345
Figures
2.1 Map of the City and County of Philadelphia,
1854 to the present 47
3.1 Michael Mulhooly (James McManes): His Ancestry,
Education and Portrait 80
3.2 Michael Mulhooly (James McManes): The Supreme
Nabob 103
4.1 Ward Map of the City of Philadelphia, 1875 131
5.1 Philadelphia's Political Contractor System, 1919 173
6.1 The "McNichol Boodlevard" 209
7.1 Ward Map of the City of Philadelphia, 1914 234
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge the many friends, family 
members, colleagues and library administrators who in one 
way or another helped me research, think about, and write 
this thesis. Their suggestions and support were and 
still are much appreciated. I owe a special debt of 
gratitude to Professor Lee Benson of the University of 
Pennsylvania who, in addition to being a source of much 
inspiration, was particularly helpful in advising and 
guiding me through the formative stages of this work.
Special thanks also go to Bill Issel who suggested the topic 
to me in the first place, and to Dennis Clark, President of 
the Samuel Pels Foundation, Maxwell Whiteman, Archivist of 
the Union League of Philadelphia, and Henry Williams, 
Assistant Director of the Philadelphia Social History 
Project, all of whom freely shared their their knowledge of 
the local source materials which form the basis of this 
study.
I am grateful to Professor Esmond Wright and the Idlewild 
Foundation for the financial support which enabled me to 
conduct a preliminary study visit to the city in the summer 
of 1980, and to Professor Jack Reece of the History 
Department of the University of Pennsylvania for a teaching 
fellowship which permitted me to complete the primary 
research for this work during the academic year, 1981-82.
Thanks are due the staffs of the Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, the Free Library of Philadelphia, the Van Pelt 
Library of the University of Pennsylvania, the Urban 
Archives Centre at Temple University, and the Department of 
Records, Philadelphia City Hall. I would particularly like 
to thank City Archivist, Ward J. Child, who did so much to 
fill in the gaps of my knowledge of political corruption in 
Philadelphia, both past and present.
I would also like to thank my supervisor, Jim Potter, for 
his patient counselling over the years, and Mary Morgan, who 
read the entire manuscript and offered valuable suggestions 
for the final revision of the study.
Finally, I want to thank Carol, my wife, for her help and 
encouragement. I have been engaged in full-time employment 
since I first started this research project and it has taken 
a long time to prepare, write and finally submit this 
thesis. I owe her a considerable debt for the whole-hearted 
support she has given me over this period.
10
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to address a number of issues with 
regard to the urban political machine which, in my view, 
have not been satisfactorily resolved in the existing 
literature on the subject. These include such key questions 
as, How do we account for the emergence of this political 
institution? What role did it play in the American city?
Who supported the machine and why? To what extent did so- 
called "bosses" actually boss political parties and city 
governments?
This thesis tackles these questions using as its model of 
inquiry an urban political machine which up to now has not 
been subject to critical examination, that is, the 
Republican machine (or "Organisation" as it was popularly 
known) in Philadelphia.^ Philadelphia provides a 
particularly appropriate setting for such an inquiry not 
just because of its inherent importance as one of the 
nation's largest cities, but also because it achieved 
national notoriety at the turn of the century when the 
muckraker Lincoln Steffens, in his famous investigation of 
municipal corruption, declared the city to be not only "the 
most corrupt and the most contented" but also "the worst 
governed in the country.
The intention of this inquiry is not to chronicle the 
history of party politics in Philadelphia but rather to
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explain how and when the Republican machine emerged as the 
dominant institution in the city's politics; to ascertain 
what distinctions can be made between the various so-called 
"bosses" who, it is alleged, ruled the city between the 
1850's and the 1930's; to determine which sections of the 
local population supported the "Organisation" and why; and 
finally to critically examine the functions that the 
"Organisation" fulfilled in Philadelphia.
This thesis argues that, contrary to received wisdom, a 
fully-fledged political machine did not in fact emerge as 
the central force in the government and politics of 
Philadelphia until the turn of the century. As this 
development -was contingent upon the establishment of a 
reliable system of discipline within the Republican party 
organisation and the ability of the latter to control votes, 
the thesis seeks to explain how power was consolidated 
within the Republican party and how the "Organisation" was 
able to command the support of the electorate on such a 
regular basis.
The Republican "Organisation", it is argued, did not emerge 
as sociologist Robert Merton contends, as a response to 
"needs" and demands which other institutions failed to 
satisfy, nor was it the creation of the immigrant masses.
Its establishment in fact, this thesis suggests, came about 
as a result of a series of innovations initiated by state 
and local party leaders which transformed the way in which 
the Republican party organisation functioned at both the 
state and the city level by the turn of the century. Its
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creation, it is also argued, was in the interest of, and 
apparently supported by, a major segment of the Philadelphia 
business community, namely, a clique of utility 
entrepreneurs keen to reap the benefits that the 
centralisation of local political power would bring to their 
own efforts to consolidate control of the city's public 
utilities industry.
The thesis shows that the "Organisation's" ability to 
command the support of the electorate was attributable to 
the "personal service" it rendered to the individual voter 
(in particular to "new" immigrants who faced the problem of 
adjusting to a new social and economic environment), the 
control it exercised over the election machinery, and its 
successful exploitation of the divisions between, and 
weaknesses, of its electoral opponents the Democratic party 
and the nonpartisan reform movement. Finally it argues that 
the Republican "Organisation" exploited the urban immigrant 
poor as much as it helped them, and that rather than being 
the natural functional substitute for government that 
Merton's theoretical model suggests, the machine's role was, 
if anything, of a dysfunctional nature; that is, it was 
destructive of functioning government for the vast majority 
of immigrants and poor people who needed such government the 
most. Consequently, it is suggested that bosses no longer 
deserve their current "good guy" reputation in the 
literature on urban politics.
With reference to the structure of the thesis, in Chapter 1
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I review the existing literature on the urban political 
machine illustrating in what ways the received wisdom on the 
subject is deficient in terms of its ability to provide a 
fully satisfactory explanation for certain key issues 
concerning machine politics. The remainder of the thesis is 
split into two parts, corresponding with the two periods in 
which, I maintain, it is possible to divide the history of 
party politics in Philadelphia during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The division is based on the number and 
structure of political formations that competed for power in 
the city and the characteristic processes through which the 
struggle among them took place.
Part A begins in 1867 with Simon Cameron's successful 
nomination and election as U.S. Senator for Pennsylvania. 
This victory is generally regarded as the turning point in 
Cameron's efforts to establish a Republican dynasty of party 
bosses, which included his son Donald J. Cameron, Matthew S. 
Quay and Boies Penrose, who were to rule Pennsylvania until 
the letter's death in 1921. In Philadelphia, local politics 
in the immediate post-war years was characterised by the 
exodus of the city's men of wealth from public office and 
their replacement by professional politicians. The section 
ends in 1887 with the fall of James McManes and the "Gas 
Ring", when the Bullitt Bill was adopted as Philadelphia's 
new city charter.
Part A attempts to show, that in spite of appearances to the 
contrary, an over-riding cleavage between well-organised 
machine and reform forces did not dominate party politics in
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Philadelphia. Chapter 2 traces the emergence of the career 
politician in ante-bellum Philadelphia. It also offers an 
explanation why, although the style of boss politics 
flourished in the city from the 1840's onwards (such as for 
example, in the exchange of patronage and favours for 
votes), a well-disciplined and cohesive city-wide political 
machine did not emerge at this time. A description of how 
James McManes and William Stokley were able to establish 
city-wide organisations, as a consequence of their 
respective power bases in the Gas Trust and the Public 
Buildings Commission, is provided in Chapter 3. It is also 
argued in this chapter that, by failing to distinguish 
between the structure and organisation of the Republican 
party and the way that it functioned in the immediate post­
war period, contemporary observers and later historians have 
attributed power and influence to McManes and Stokley that 
they did not possess. Neither party leader, the analysis in 
this chapter suggests, can be categorised as a genuine party 
boss.
Chapter 4 shows that just as there was no cohesive city-wide 
political machine in Philadelphia prior to 1887, nor was 
there a well-organised reform movement. It is argued that, 
contrary to received wisdom, the city's men of wealth 
continued to participate in local affairs, but that since 
political reform was limited to groups that were few in 
number, short-lived and poorly organised, they did not enjoy 
the degree of success against bossism that contemporary 
publicists maintained.
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Part B of the thesis offers an explanation for the gradual 
emergence (or "institutionalisation") of the Republican 
machine as the central force in the government and politics 
of Philadelphia by the turn of the century. This entails an 
analysis along two different lines, on the one hand to 
account for the increased (internal) discipline within the 
Republican party organisation and, on the other, to explain 
the machine's ability to overwhelm its (external) electoral 
opponents to such an extent that a one party system emerged 
in Philadelphia as the Democratic party was reduced to the 
role of a "kept minority"; a subservient auxiliary of the 
dominant Republican "Organisation".
That a reliable system of discipline was indeed gradually 
established within the Republican party organisation is 
demonstrated in Chapter 5 where it is also argued that, as a 
result of this development, successive party leaders David 
Martin, Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare 
brothers can (unlike their predecessors McManes and Stokley) 
be considered to have been genuine city bosses. An 
explanation of how the party leadership consolidated power 
within the Republican party organisation is provided in 
Chapter 6.
The "Organisation's" ability to control votes is examined in 
Chapter 7. A quantitative electoral analysis reveals that 
it was environmental rather than cultural factors which 
induced "new" immigrants, in addition to the city's poor and 
black population, to support the "Organisation" in return
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for the "personal service" that it provided. This finding, 
it contends, should not lead us to conclude, as Merton and 
most other scholars have done, that the bosses were "good 
guys" who served the needs of the urban poor. On the 
contrary, it is suggested that the "Organisation" exploited 
its supporters as much as it helped them. The final section 
of this chapter focuses on the Republican machine's 
extraordinary degree of electoral success between 1887 and 
the re-emergence of a competitive two-party system in 1933; 
a feature of local politics which, it is argued, was 
attributable not so much to public apathy, but to the demise 
of the Democratic party, the local strength of Republican 
partisanship, and the control the "Organisation" exercised 
over the election machinery.
Those who benefitted from, and supported, the establishment 
of a fully fledged political machine, and those who were 
opposed to it, are the subject of the final two chapters. 
Chapter 8 demonstrates that, while the party boss was not 
subservient to business interests as is traditionally 
alleged, one of the main beneficiaries, and apparently 
supporters, of the creation of a centralised political 
structure in Philadelphia, was a significant section of the 
local business community. The relationship between the 
centralisation of political power and the consolidation of 
the public utilities industry at the turn of the century, it 
is suggested, was not just one of coincidence.
Finally, Chapter 9 shows in what ways reform groups after 
1886 differed from their predecessors and offers an
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explanation for the emergence of the nonpartisan reform 
movement as the most serious threat to the "Organisation's" 
hegemony in local affairs. It also examines why the 
nonpartisans were not more successful in challenging the 
"Organisation's" grip on the city's government and its 
politics. Indeed the failure of the reformers to remain 
faithful to the principle of nonpartisanship, it is 
suggested, was yet another factor which not only underpinned 
the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics but also 
explains why "good city government" proved to be such an 
elusive goal in Philadelphia in the early part of this 
century.
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1. A Literature Review of the Urban Political Machine
There has been a growing reaction among scholars in recent 
years against the persistence of the classic duel between 
reform and bossism as the dominant theme in urban politics. 
As Michael Frisch has written this debate, one of the oldest 
arguments in American historiography, "has come to seem to 
so many readers a rather tired circular discussion that 
somehow has never gotten very far away from the original 
dichotomy of Plunkett v. S t e f f e n s . I n  a recent 
historiographical review, Jon Teaford has shown that up 
until the 1980's, this dichotomy provided the framework of 
the leading historical accounts of municipal government in 
America.
Whether the approach was quantitative or 
traditional, urban government of the period 1850 to 
1940 was seen as a clash between upper middle class 
reformers seeking centralised efficient moral rule 
and the political machines dedicated to rewarding 
party loyalists and securing the mass of immigrant 
votes through favours and services.
David Thelen has also noted the distinction between the
analyses of national politics and government and that of the
city by scholars.
While a wide variety of concerns has informed 
analyses of national politics and government the 
city has simply remained the scene for such 
increasingly sophisticated variations on the theme 
of the perpetual struggle between bosses and 
reformers as the dichotomy between local ("bosses") 
and centralised ("reformers") outlooks.
These historians have argued that this scenario is an
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inadequate one to describe the complexity of municipal 
development in the United States because it has ignored 
vital elements in the story of urban rule and diverted 
scholars' attention for far too long from other actors in 
municipal government and other problems vital to urban 
politics. Thelen, for example, reminds us that power in 
American cities meant not just the apportionment of votes 
and offices but also the apportionment of money and profits; 
that the city was the land of opportunity for contractors, 
landlords, bankers, manufacturers and utility companies, and 
their survival and profits depended on their relationship to 
city government.4
It is now opportune then, according to these scholars, to 
recast the central issue of urban politics. As Teaford puts 
it,
during the 1980's it seems possible to rewrite the 
history of urban politics and government along new 
lines that do not neglect the diversity of 
decisionmakers, nor the significance of such areas 
of public policy as sanitation, recreation, public 
safety and public works.^
Thelen is in favour of any model which would "restore rats,
fires, taxes, diseases, schools, jobs, crime, transportation and
utilities to their rightful places as the central realities of
urban life.
While accepting there is considerable merit in the claims of 
these historians and that alternative ways of viewing urban 
politics are long overdue, it is my contention that even 
though there is a consensus among scholars in the abundant 
literature on the political machine, certain key issues have
20
not been satisfactorily resolved.^ The first issue concerns 
the role that the political machine has played in the 
American city, that is, the functions fulfilled by the urban 
political machine.
Until the mid-1950's historical research into the study of 
corruption tended to take its stimulus from a basic 
commitment to reform and most of it was undertaken during 
times when a general concern with reform was fairly high. 
These periods were very productive, yielding rich materials 
in the form of journalism, memoirs of reformers, and 
treatises on "good government" which in their very devotion 
to the overthrow of the "machine" could hardly help 
producing in the course of things a number of insights into 
the nature of this political institution.® However, as much 
of the literature was heavily pejorative, concerned more 
with excoriation than explanation, this one-eyed view quite 
naturally emphasised the worst features of "machine" 
politics - its wastefulness, corruption and illegality. In 
general, the political machine was presented as a sinister 
and somewhat secret association of men who ran politics, 
lived by graft, and were headed by "bosses" who came up from 
the slums and were necessarily evil creatures. Even the 
terms boss, bossism, machine, ring and organisation which 
have been in common use for over a century are morally 
"loaded" so that today they have little precise meaning. 
Essentially the differences between a boss and a leader and 
between a machine and an organisation are normative, and 
exist primarily in the mind of the speaker.
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The last quarter-century however has witnessed a fundamental
shift in this historical research pattern, so much so that
today, according to David Thelen,
we have come close to simply inverting the 
prejudices of the Progressive Era. Steffens and 
company argued that bosses at their worst were 
arrogant amateurs who repeatedly sold out their 
constituents, while reformers at their best gave 
urban residents the chance to control their lives 
by injecting a responsive professionalism into city 
government. Now however, many historians believe 
that bosses were the true professionals who 
understood and served the needs of most city 
dwellers,while reformers were arrogant amateur 
politicians who imposed their centralised 
programmes of efficiency on unwilling majorities.
One of the reasons for this dramatic reversal may well be 
due to the fact that the old-style Boss and his machine have 
been in considerable decline and so have begun to acquire 
some of the fascination of other elements of Americana once 
they were perceived to be vanishing. Whalers and whalemen, 
cattle-towns and cowboys underwent the same process. In 
this age of mass communication media and alleged 
homogenisation of culture, the Boss's rugged individuality - 
and he was an individual no matter what else he may also 
have been - made him an appealing and challenging figure for 
a new generation of historians, social scientists and 
writers. In Edwin O'Connor's, The Last Hurrah, Mayor Frank 
Skeffington tries to persuade his nephew to join him. He 
tells him that all the others like himself are gone. "When 
I join them," he adds, "the old campaign will vanish like 
the Noble Red Man."^^
O'Connor's novel, along with Robert Merton's, Social Theory
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and Social Structure, were instrumental in establishing a 
new stereotype of the boss at a popular and scholarly 
level. O'Connor's story, based on the life and career of 
James M. Curley of Boston, presents a sentimental view, 
depicting Boss Frank Skeffington as a shrewd, very Irish and 
eminently human benefactor. His organised machine was very 
much oriented to serving the needs of the people as 
individuals, reflective of the ethnic make-up of the city 
(although almost tribally Irish overall), and kindly if 
inefficient. Skeffington's political strength came almost 
entirely from the ethnic population, the poor and the 
elderly. O'Connor's insights were incorporated in the 
theoretical model developed by Robert Merton to account for 
the success of the political machine. Merton argued that 
immigrants, the poor, and businessmen in an expanding city 
were likely to support the machine because it served 
functions that were "at the time not adequately fulfilled by
other existing patterns and structures^^
Since the 1950's Merton's functionalist theory has taken 
root and there has been an increasing tendency to see 
machine politics from a new perspective. Elmer Cornwell for
example has argued that the machine operated as virtually
the only agency which facilitated the political and economic 
integration of immigrants into the community. Cornwell 
suggests this was done by soliciting votes with the familiar 
array of machine "services" - food, jobs, intercession with 
the law and so forth - bringing their representatives into 
the organisation, offering a career ladder to some
23
individuals and giving general recognition to them as a 
1 3group.
Seymour Mandelbaum also has suggested that in the fragmented
metropolis of the Tweed era, the "big pay off" was an
essential if not the most efficient way of getting things
done, considering the problems of New York at the time.^^
He argues that in view of the role and aspirations of the
city boss, the influence of entrenched special interest
groups and the rapid urbanisation of the American city,
corruption was almost, if not completely, inevitable. In a
similar vein, Alexander Callow has argued that the boss
exploited the inability of government to supply the demands
of the emerging city:
The machine was not the only mechanism as reformers 
would insist; it was not the most honest or most 
efficient; yet as a response to urban needs it was 
to put it in its simplest terms - a way of getting 
things done. ^
Again Zane Lee Miller, in examining the rise and fall of 
George B. Cox in Cincinnati, is much less concerned with Cox 
the grafter than with Cox the politician and reformer.
Miller fleshes out the so-called Periphery theory initiated 
by Richard Wade, in which it is argued that by the outset of 
the Progressive period the classic conflict of the city 
against the country was replaced by the struggle within the 
city itself. Accordingly, Miller traces the demographic 
spread of Cincinnati into three outlying ("Hilltop") 
sections occupied by the upper and middle class, with the 
poor and newly arrived confined to the central city (the 
"Basin"). The contest was between the inner city and the
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peripheries, and no longer a matter of conquering the inner 
city. If the boss was to sustain his power, as Cox 
realised, he must woo the periphery neighbourhoods, and in 
so doing Cox achieved several reforms. Miller views Boss 
Cox as emerging from a "decade of disorder," and imposing a 
"new order" on the city's politics and government. He was 
able to satisfy not only his party followers and the poor of 
the inner city with patronage and favours, but also 
reformers in the business community and suburbs by 
supporting the secret ballot, changes in voter registration 
and a crackdown on vice and minor graft. On his record of 
reforms he helped to modernise city government, 
professionalise the police and fire departments, and build a 
large and expensive waterworks. Thus Cox was no free- 
booting graft monger like Tweed, exploiting the chaos of 
rapid urbanisation, but rather helped to soothe the cultural 
and racial antagonisms in this mushrooming metropolis.
More recently still John M. Allswang, in attempting to
demonstrate the "symbiotic" relationship between bosses and
urban voters, vigorously insisted that the former better
served the economic and cultural needs of the "dependent"
and "semi-dependent" peoples who inhabited cities, than did 
1 7reformers.
The product of all these recent works has been to establish 
an unusually rosy picture of bossism. Indeed a more 
striking revision of a historical image is difficult to 
imagine. Ironically, while the boss's reputation has been
25
rising that of the reformers has been sinking, due to the
pioneering work of Richard Hofstadter and Samuel Hays which
began to strip reformers of their noble rhetoric to reveal
1 fttheir ulterior motives. Thus the former good guys and bad 
guys of the urban drama have switched roles in the current 
debate on bosses and reformers. Reformers are now seen less 
as paragons of virtue and more as proponents of middle class 
social control, while Tweed and company are now regarded as 
having been a social necessity. The chief factor 
responsible for this fundamental shift in interpretation, 
and which still underpins the prevailing picture of the 
urban boss in the contemporary literature is, as I have 
identified, Robert Merton's seminal work written over thirty 
years ago. Yet, surprisingly, Merton's theoretical model 
has not been subjected to critical examination; perhaps 
because logically immigrants, the poor and businessmen must 
have benefitted from the machine otherwise they would not 
have continued to vote for it. Nonetheless the question 
still remains. How valid is Merton's analysis of the 
relationship between the machine and its supporters? What 
have been the manifest (as opposed to latent) functions of 
the machine?
The second issue not satisfactorily resolved concerns the 
emergence of the political machine in the American city. As 
machine politics emerged as the characteristic form of city 
government in late nineteenth century America, scholars have 
sought the origins of the machine in the peculiarities of 
American culture and politics. They have focused in
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particular on massive immigration and the close association 
of the machine and ethnic politics and have suggested that 
the machine was created by immigrants, a product of 
immigrant culture and ethnic conflict. The most familiar of 
these arguments, for example, appeared in City Politics 
where Edward Banfield and James Wilson, following 
Hofstadter, argued that nineteenth century politics was 
grounded in an immigrant political ethos at variance with 
middle class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant values. They 
suggested that the "individualist" or "private-regarding" 
values of immigrant voters led them to accept patronage, 
corruption and "friendship", while the "unitarist" or 
"public-regarding" values of middle class native Protestant 
voters induced them to insist on honesty and the advancement 
of the public interest.
Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan similarly suggest that the 
attachment of immigrants to the machine was an expression of 
primordial ethnic l o y a l t i e s . T h e y  argue that social norms 
of deference and personal dependence were Irish peasant 
values of lasting vigour that were essential to machine 
building and facilitated Irish political success. In 
contrast, Richard Wade, Oscar Handlin, William Whyte and 
Robert Merton focus upon the post-migration experiences of 
the immigrant and have suggested that the machine can be 
viewed as a political expression of living conditions in 
inner city districts, as a defensive reaction against 
discrimination, and as an outgrowth of the social structure
n  1
of these communities.
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Despite differences of opinion over why immigrants were 
attached to political machines, there is general agreement 
in the literature on what constitutes such an institution. 
Most scholars now agree that political machines had two 
distinguishing characteristics. On the one hand, in terms 
of "structure", they were well-disciplined and cohesive 
city-wide political institutions; party organisations which 
functioned as their centralised and hierarchical structure 
suggested they should, with the party leader (or boss) 
capable of exercising control over subordinates both in 
party office and public office. On the other, in terms of 
"style", they were characterised by what James Scott has 
called the peculiar "organisational cement" (or linkages, 
such as the exchange of patronage and favours for votes), 
which bound machine politicians and their supporters 
together.
The problem with the examples above however is, as Martin 
Shefter has also argued, that the explanation they offer for 
the emergence of the political machine can account only for 
the "style" of machine politics and not its "structure" and 
organisation.23 That is, although they suggest plausible 
(though not necessarily accurate) reasons for the attachment 
of immigrants to the political machine (and the opposition 
of certain social groups to such an institution) they do not 
fully explain how, in Edward Banfield's terminology, this 
form of party organisation was able to "centralise 
influence" within its jurisdiction.24 another way,
conventional wisdom may help us to account for the machine's
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ability to attract (external) electoral support (and 
opposition) but it fails to provide an adequate explanation 
for its (internal) structural cohesiveness.
The inadequacy of conventional theories of the political 
machine is highlighted by their failure to bring about a 
clearer understanding of the terms boss, machine, ring and 
organisation. Early scholars of urban politics such as John 
T. Salter and Harold Zink failed to define the clout of 
party leaders or draw meaningful distinctions between the 
various so-called "bosses". For example, with reference to 
Philadelphia, Salter, writing in the 1930's, referred to 
William Mann, Robert Mackey, James McManes, David Martin, 
Israel Durham, James P. McNichol, Boies Penrose and Edwin 
Vare as the "eight feudal barons" who ruled the city for 
eighty-four y e a r s . ^5 similarly, Zink, in his rather 
superficial, impressionistic, collective biography of 
bosses, continued to refer to them as "feudal barons", 
labelling James McManes "King" and Edwin Vare "Duke" of 
Philadelphia.
Surprisingly in more recent years while Samuel Hays and 
Melvin G. Holli dissected the reform cause into structural 
and social reformers, and other historians such as Gabriel 
Kolko, James Weinstein, John D. Buenker, J. Joseph 
Huthmacher, Robert H. Wiebe and David Thelen have added 
their own increasingly sophisticated analyses of the
o 7
movement, the urban boss has received far less attention.^ 
Instead, historians have continued to lump various party
29
leaders neatly together under the category "boss". For 
example, the term "boss" has been loosely applied to such 
figures as Bill Tweed, Richard Croker, James McManes and 
Israel Durham, but we do not know what differences, if any, 
existed between the Tammany Hall of 1870 and 1900, and the 
Republican party in Philadelphia of 1870 and 1900.
A brief elaboration is sufficient to establish how poorly 
conventional theories help us to explain the emergence of 
the political machine, or enable us to draw significant 
distinctions between various bosses. In Philadelphia, for 
example, the "organisational cement" peculiar to machine
politics was a feature of political life both in the mid­
nineteenth century and also the early twentieth century. In 
describing the emergence of the career politician in ante­
bellum Philadelphia, for instance, Sam Bass Warner Jr. 
suggests that Joel Barlow Sutherland became the city's first 
"boss" when he built a Democratic machine in South 
Philadelphia. Warner draws attention to Sutherland's 
friendship to the workingman, his distribution of patronage 
and favours, and his support for the basic economic
interests of the district.^8
That the exchange of patronage and favours for votes was 
still a crucial aspect of machine politics at the turn of 
the century, can be deduced from David H. Lane's address to 
division (precinct) leaders in his twentieth ward during the 
1901 election campaign. The veteran ward leader explained 
that jobs were not only the "backbone of the Organisation" 
but the heart that kept it going:
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The cohesive power of the Organisation is 
offices. We have 10,000 officeholders and they
are all ours........ The officeholders are the
backbone of the Organisation. We have all of the 
officeholders and we want to keep them. Poles, 
Hungarians, Italians and other foreigners when 
they come here, vote for the Republican ticket. 
Why? Because we have the offices and they 
expect favours from officeholders.
In New York, they vote Tammany for the same 
reason. Our organisation bears the same relation 
that Tammany does to New York. If we would 
keep these votes we must retain control of the 
offices. Foreigners know that they cannot get 
favours except through our organisation.
..... The ownership of the offices means the power
for distributing patronage and for conferring 
favours upon citizens generally, who in return 
will support the Organisation. It is through this 
far-reaching power that the great Republican party 
is given its majority in this city and state. 
Without the offices this great organisation would 
crumble and fall.
Thus both Warner's analysis and Lane's statement fit the 
generally accepted definition of machine politics very well. 
However, although the exchange of patronage and favours for 
votes was a distinguishing feature of machine politics in 
antebellum Philadelphia and at the turn of the century, it 
does not necessarily follow that the structure and 
organisation of machine politics remained constant over this 
period.
For example, it is clear from Warner's own account that 
Sutherland's influence never extended beyond the first 
Pennsylvania Congressional District and that his only source 
of power was the various public offices he himself 
personally occupied. Warner's use of the term "boss" then 
is misleading in the sense that Sutherland never headed a
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city-wide organisation, nor could he reliably control his 
nominal followers. On the other hand, we know that when 
Lane made his election speech in 1901, the Republican 
machine (as will be shown in Part B) had established itself 
as the central force in the government and politics of 
Philadelphia. It was a well-disciplined, city-wide party 
organisation in which control was centralised under "boss" 
Israel W. Durham.
If we are to adequately explain then, when and how the 
city's politics came to be dominated by a political 
machine, it will be necessary to account more for the 
changes that took place in the organisation and stucture of 
local politics over this period than in the style of 
political competition. In particular, the following 
questions will need to be addressed, with regard to the 
various so-called "bosses" who, it is alleged, ruled the 
city between the 1850's and 1930's: To what extent is the
term "boss" actually appropriate to them; that is, to what 
degree did they actually boss? To what extent did they 
control their followers in party office; the distribution of 
patronage; the membership and decisions of the party 
organisation's local units; the party nominations for public 
office; the behaviour of elected officials nominally 
affiliated to them; the passage of legislation through City 
Council; city government?
A final objection to these conventional theories stems from 
the fact that even though these scholars are interested in 
who supported the machine - and indeed disagree over which
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immigrants were likely to vote for the machine, and why - 
they have not made any attempt to test empirically the 
validity of the various hypotheses that have been put 
forward to explain the distribution of electoral support for 
the political machine. It is only recently that any
researchers have attempted to do this, and their work has
produced some provocative findings.
Kenneth Wald, for example, has shown that the electoral base 
of Boss Ed Crump's machine in Memphis consisted of a
coalition of blacks and white e t h n i c s .^0 This may not seem
surprising since both groups normally occupy the lower rungs 
of the social ladder. However, in Memphis, white ethnics 
had achieved considerable economic success before Crump 
built his machine, and in 1900 they were more likely than 
white natives to fall into non-manual and skilled manual 
occupational groups, while blacks were firmly rooted at the 
base of the economic pyramid. Wald then goes on to suggest 
that the common denominator between blacks and white ethnics 
was certainly not economic, but rather social marginality. 
From this perspective. Crump's machine appealed most 
strongly to voters belonging to groups on the margins of the 
dominant culture - the "outsiders" or "strangers".
Again in New York, Martin Shefter has attempted to explain 
how Tammany Hall moved from a position of relative weakness 
on the political scene to a hegemony over the city's 
politics, based on the persistent and overwhelming support 
of a large and disciplined army of v o t e r s . T h e  bonds of
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ethnie, cultural and parochial loyalties of the kind upon 
which the machine fed, existed among New York voters, but 
remained fragmented among a number of competing 
organisations. In a short time, however, Tammany came to 
dominate the city's politics as these loyalties became 
centred in it.
Although this happened very quickly, Shefter points out that 
Tammany's hegemony over the voters did not develop 
automatically. Apparently habits and attitudes ready for 
immediate mobilisation may have been brought across from the 
Old World, but they did not begin operating mechanistically 
in the new political environment of New York city. It was 
second generation immigrant voters who were more likely to 
support the machine than more recent arrivals, because it 
took some time to be socialised into politics. Tammany's 
emergence as a dominant force depended upon an 
organisational innovation; the extension throughout the city 
of a network of political clubs that served as continuous 
sources for support, loyalty, and recruitment to the 
machine. Only then, according to Shefter, was Tammany able 
to mobilise in effective and permanent fashion the mass of 
ethnic voters in the city. Shefter confirms therefore, that 
voting choice is a two stage affair, the propensity of 
certain groups to vote one way, and the need to get them to 
do so through an essentially political process of 
organisation and network building.
To sum up then, I have suggested that a number of different 
issues have not been dealt with very satisfactorily in the
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existing literature on the urban political machine. These 
issues include such fundamental questions as, How can we 
account for the emergence of this political institution?
What functions did it fulfill in the American city? Which 
sections of the urban population supported the machine, and 
why? What valid distinctions can we draw between various 
"bosses"? The aim of this investigation, as stated earlier, 
is to address these questions using the city of Philadelphia 
as the model for inquiry. In the first instance however, it 
is necessary to identify precisely when the city's politics 
can be said to have been dominated by a political machine.
It is this issue which is the subject of the following 
section of the thesis.
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PART A
THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM AND RING RULE IN THE PRE­
MACHINE ERA, 1867-1887
It is my contention that, contrary to received wisdom, a 
political machine did not dominate Philadelphia politics 
until the turn of this century. The basis for this opinion 
rests not on conventional theories of the political machine, 
but on an examination of the number and structure of 
political formations that contended for power in the city 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, and the 
characteristic processes through which the struggle among 
them took place. Such an analysis reveals, as demonstrated 
in Part B, that it was not until after 1887 that a political 
machine gradually emerged as the dominant institution in the 
city's politics.
Prior to this development, as the first section of this 
thesis will show, the distinguishing feature of Philadelphia 
party politics was the weakness of political organisations 
and the fluidity of political alignments. Political 
competition was characterised by the multiplicity of 
formations (such as volunteer fire companies, street gangs, 
and committees of notables) and individual actors (such as 
saloon-keepers, lawyers, publishers and entrepreneurs) that 
contended for power in the city. Major politicians operated 
largely independent of political parties, their influence
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being essentially a function of the size and strength (both 
physical and financial) of their personal followings. 
Consequently, political competition in Philadelphia during 
this period was also quite violent and corrupt.^
As my view concerning exactly when Philadelphia politics was 
dominated by a political machine is contrary to that held by 
both contemporary observers and later historians, the aim of 
this first section is to demonstrate that a well-disciplined 
and cohesive political machine did not emerge in 
Philadelphia prior to the introduction of the Bullitt Bill 
as the city's new charter in 1887. Put another way. Part A 
will show that party politics in Philadelphia was not 
organised or centralised before 1887 and that, in spite of 
appearances to the contrary, local political life was not 
dominated by an over-riding cleavage between well- 
disciplined machine and reform forces.
Chapter 2 traces the exodus of the city's men of wealth from 
public office by the late 1860's, and their replacement by 
professional politicians. It also offers an explanation 
why, although the style of machine politics was a prominent 
feature of local political life from the 1840's onwards, an 
organised and centralised city-wide political structure did 
not emerge in ante-bellum Philadelphia.
Chapter 3 also demonstrates that while Republican 
politicians James McManes and William Stokley were able to 
exercise power and influence city-wide as a consequence of 
their respective power bases in the Gas Trust and Public
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Buildings Commission, neither can be considered to have 
been, in spite of the claims of contemporary observers and 
later historians to the contrary, a genuine city "boss".
This judgement is based on an examination of the Republican 
party organisation in the immediate post-bellum period which 
reveals that it did not function as its centralised and 
hierarchical structure suggested it should, that is with the 
party leader capable of exercising control over subordinates 
both in party office and public office. As McManes and 
Stokley's power was confined to the public rather than party 
offices which they personally occupied, it would be more 
appropriate, it is suggested, to describe them as having 
been leaders of "Rings" (that is, an intra-governmental 
operation which tied a loose coalition of politicians 
together in the quest for specific material benefits) rather 
than ambiguously as party bosses.
An analysis of reform politics during this period is 
provided in Chapter 4. This shows that while the city's 
"best men" did not abandon local affairs and politics as 
historians have traditionally alleged, neither were they 
responsible for bringing about the "fall of bossism" as 
contemporary publicists maintained. It also suggests 
furthermore that just as there was no well-disciplined city- 
wide political machine in Philadelphia prior to 1887 nor was 
there a well-organised reform movement.
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2. The Emergence of the Career Politician
Pre-industrial Philadelphia was a small, geographically
compact and socially integrated community. It was, as Edgar
P. Richardson put it
the most successful example in North America of 
the seaport city, a kind of city that the 
eighteenth century had brought to perfection. It 
was a community of merchants, mariners and 
mechanics. It was urban but pre-industrial, a 
tree-lined checkerboard of red-brick houses 
trimmed in white.
Work and residence were often combined at the same address, 
rich and poor lived next to one another, and there was no 
residential segregation among racial, ethnic and socio­
economic g r o u p s .2 It was a "pedestrian community" in which 
human relationships were established by personal contact 
over limited areas. A community that, as Michael Frisch has 
said, was experienced directly and informally, for 
individuals could not live free from the view of others, 
from their approval or d i s a p p r o v a l . ^
In such a social situation, those who became dominant in
economic, social and religious life established and
maintained acceptable patterns for the entire community. As
Sam Bass Warner Jr. has written,
the real secret of the peace and order of the 
eighteenth century town lay not in its government, 
but in the informal structure of its community.
Unlike later Philadelphia, the eighteenth century 
town was a community. Graded by wealth and divided 
by distinctions of class though it was, it 
functioned as a single community. The community 
had been created out of a remarkably inclusive 
network of business and economic relationships, and
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it was maintained by the daily interactions of
trade and sociability......the eighteenth century
pattern of settlement guaranteed every citizen a 
knowledge of town life. At such density and small- 
scale, no generation could be raised ignorant of 
the other side of town, of the ways of life of the 
working class, or of the manners of the haut 
bourgeois.
The absence of residential segregation meant that 
differences in values which might have led to differences in 
public demands were not readily revealed in political 
affairs. Urban political leadership reflected the 
integrated community. The close corporation created by 
Penn's Proprietary Charter of 1701 was a club of the wealthy 
Quaker elite that fell with the Revolution in 1776. 
Philadelphia's second charter passed in 1789 placed 
legislative power in a Select and Common Council, and 
executive power in the Mayor, who was initially appointed by 
the State Governor but subsequently chosen by Councils.^ 
Since Councilmen were elected at large and the franchise was 
restricted to local taxpayers (both important elements of a 
political culture in the Federal era that Ronald Formisano 
has characterised as "deferential-participant" ),^ the City 
Councils were invariably composed of men dominant in the 
community's social and economic life - bankers, merchants 
and lawyers.
Public office was the preserve of men of wealth and leisure 
such as the lawyer Michael Keppele (1811-12) and the 
merchant John Inskeep (1 800-1 ; 1 804-6 ) who served one and two 
terms respectively as Mayor in the early nineteenth century. 
The most successful officeholder however (and to whom 
officeholding seemed natural and proper) was Robert Wharton
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(1757-1834) who came from a merchant family and in 1798 was 
elected Mayor for the first of fifteen times (1798-1800; 
1806-8; 1810-11; 1814-19; 1820-24). A wealthy merchant and 
sportsman and the most popular member of the city's local 
aristocracy, he was President of the Gloucester Fox-Hunting 
Club, sixteen times Governor of the Schuylkill Fishing 
Company, the oldest gourmet club in America today, and 
Captain of the First City Troop between 1803 and 1810.^
The city's merchant class provided public commissions, and 
elective office with a variety of talent, experience and 
expertise. For example, shipping merchant and banker 
Stephen Girard, merchant and ironmaster Henry Drinker Jr., 
shipping magnate Thomas P. Cope, salt merchant Joseph Lewis, 
drug manufacturer John P. Wetherill and the sculptor William 
Rush, dominated the Watering Committee of the City Councils. 
They were responsible for pioneering the building of 
America's first municipal waterworks in 1801 - the Fairmount 
Water Works on the Schuylkill river, which was also to 
provide the basis of what was to become the first large 
urban park in the country.® In a similar vein, merchant 
and philanthropist Roberts Vaux and Samuel Breck 
successfully spearheaded the drive for legislative action to 
establish a system of free public education in the 1 830's. 
The Free School Act of 1836 also authorised the 
establishment of Philadelphia's Central High School, the 
first in the country.^
The political leadership of the city's merchants, as already
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suggested, followed from their economic and social 
leadership, a tribute, from their viewpoint, of their 
leading role in the economy. Mechanics, artisans and 
manufacturers were inclined to give their votes to 
merchants, in part, on the basis of shared interests. In 
the pre-industrial setting, it was merchants who organised 
growth and prosperity, finding markets for mechanics' 
products, lending funds for artisan production and 
organising the pursuit of commerce. Mechanics, with 
merchants, supported the Constitution and its promise of a 
thriving commercial republic.
Deference also followed from merchants' social leadership.
Politics and the obligations of the rich to the poor, worked
hand in hand. As Sam Bass Warner noted, the lines dividing
the social, economic and political leadership of wealthy
merchants were only lightly sketched. In a variety of ways,
the division between public and private pursuits, public and
private leadership, and public and private generosity, was
an indistinct one. That is why Warner regards the city's
wealthy merchants - such as for example the philanthropist
and shipping merchant Thomas P. Cope, (1768-1854) - as "old-
style generalists in business and p o l i t i c s . W a r n e r
suggests Cope,
regarded the city as the foreground of a man's 
loyalty and public concern. Public life for him 
was participation in the management of the city 
and he drew no sharp distinctions among public 
office, municipal committees, and private 
philanthropic groups.
Cope promoted the economic well-being of the city. He
established a regular packet service between Philadelphia
42
and Liverpool, founded the local Board of Trade, and for
twenty-two years served as its President and "like all
Philadelphia businessmen pressed for internal improvements
to expand the city's region of cheap, inland
transportation." A patrician who was the "poor man's
friend", he served as the manager of the Almshouse, one of
the Guardians of the Poor, and even carried food to the
houses of the sick. He also gave $40,000 to the Institute
for Coloured Youth to found a technical school for 
1 1Negroes.
As well as demonstrating generosity and concern, wealthy men
also provided leadership in the volunteer fire department.
The fire company provided an arena in which wealthy men
could demonstrate their courage and their capacity for
leading other men, in this case, usually those of the
middling social s t r a t a . A s  officeholders, men of
substance could control mobs. The traditional form of riot
control, in fact, involved less a show of physical force
than the use of "respect". Politics, as Formisano reminds
us, was still very much influenced by the fact that this was
a culture in which a gentleman could be recognised by dress
and manners.^5 For example, this was how Mayor Wharton was
described by one who knew him:
This Mr. Wharton was Mayor of the City in 1798 and 
for many years after. He was bold, intrepid and 
very active, ready at a moments notice to quell a 
riot. His appearance at such gatherings with staff 
in hand, and hat tipped a little on one side of his 
head with firm step and independent authority, 
would scatter the ire, and quell the fire of the 
most ferocious mob. Philadelphia never had a more 
efficient and popular municipal officer.
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Like other forms of civic leadership, governance was founded
on respect for courage and benevolence. This merchant style
of political leadership and urban governance however began
to be eroded in the 1830's and 40's. The volunteer fire
companies, for example, no longer qualified as genteel
dinner clubs which met in rented inns or halls. In terms of
composition, "respectable elements" were replaced by the
"less prestigious social classes." By the 1840's the
companies contained only a sprinkling of middle-class
occupational groups, namely master craftsmen, small
shopkeepers and clerks. Most of the officers and nearly all
of the firefighters were skilled journeymen who owned no 
1 7real property.
The social authority of wealthy men was also in decline. 
Major anti-black riots in the 1830's and the devastating 
nativist riots of 1844 testified to the inability of men of 
substance to control mobs.^® In politics too, wealthy men 
had been pressed to give way in the wake of the Workingmen's 
Party, trade union and labour political activism, and 
ultimately the career politician in the person of the 
"boss".  ^^  Political leadership once based on a more general 
deference came to be based on party organisation and mass 
partisan loyalty. Elections were increasingly characterised 
by v i o l e n c e . 20 in these circumstances it was hardly 
surprising that "by 1850," according to Warner, "the old
style generalists in business and politics......  were as
antique as the handloom weavers."21
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How can we account for these developments - the exodus of the 
wealthy from politics and the emergence of the career politician 
in the person of the "boss"? Sam Bass Warner has provided 
us with one explanation. He regards the emergence of the 
career politician in Philadelphia as a part of a more 
general process of specialisation and the division of 
labour.
The new habits of business taught the mid­
nineteenth century businessman that the city was 
not important to their daily lives and in response 
these business leaders became ignorant of their 
city and abandoned its politics.
As businessmen "abandoned the city's affairs" and turned
their attention to national and regional matters because the
larger economic environment became more relevant to profit-
making, "new specialists assumed their former tasks."^3
It is perhaps worth noting first of all that Warner's 
assertion about businessmen abandoning the city's affairs in 
the mid-nineteenth century, is inaccurate in two senses. In 
the first instance, the exodus of the wealthy from political 
office was a post-Civil War and not an ante-bellum 
phenomenon. Prior to the Civil War, the city's merchant 
class continued to provide leaders who combined a deep 
concern for promoting the city's political and economic 
health (regardless of party). For example, the drug 
manufacturer John P. Wetherill, woollen trader George 
Morrison Coates, and Theodore Cuyler, general counsel for 
the Pennsylvania Railroad, each served as President of 
Councils in the 1 850's and 60's. The first four mayors of 
Philadelphia after the political consolidation of the city
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and county in 1854 (see Figure 2.1) - Robert Conrad (1854- 
56), Richard Vaux (1856-58), Alexander Henry (1858-66) and 
Morton McMichael (1866-69) - were all life long local 
residents who had pursued successful careers either in 
trade, law or p u b l i s h i n g . ^ 4
Furthermore, a contemporary survey of the first Common 
Council after consolidation observed that Philadelphia was 
"represented by those whose business, wealth and position 
impels them to guard her treasury and her c r e d i t . T h e  
new Councilmen included John H. Diehl, merchant and 
President of Independent Mutual Fire Insurance Company; 
Stilwell Shaw Bishop, senior partner of the shipping house 
Bishops, Simons and Company; Conrad S. Grove, a manufacturer 
of linseed oil; William W. Watt, a textile manufacturer who 
employed over two hundred workers; A. M. Eastwick, a 
locomotive manufacturer who built a railroad line from 
St.Petersburg to Moscow under contract from the Tsar, and 
Alpheas W. Green, owner of a gentlemen's furnishing store.
In addition, there was also an owner of an iron foundry, a 
coal merchant, a drug manufacturer, publisher, silversmith, 
a clock and watch manufacturer, and a stageline owner. In 
sum, the new council was composed of " an assortment of 
practical, self-made businessmen, possessing great business 
talent," all of whom had clearly not "abandoned the city's 
affairs and its politics.
The retreat of the city's merchant class and businessmen 
from political office did not become marked until after the 
Civil War when Councils were inundated with an influx of
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Figure 2.1. Map of the City and Coun ty of Philadelphia, 1854 to the 
present. In 1854 the "old city" was merged with twen ty - s e v e n  other 
political subdivisions within Philadelphia County and grew from two 
square miles to 130: the same area that it covers today. [Source: 
Theodore Hers hberg (ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family and 
Group Expe rience in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), p .127]
"fourth rate political ward jobbers who go (there) not for
the honour but for the p l u n d e r ."^7 The changing composition
of Councils was also reflected in the make-up of the
Republican party organisation. Not one of the original
members of the Republican City Executive Committee in 1857
survived to the post-Civil War years. By 1869 the majority
of committee members owed their livelihood to politics. The
Republican Party had become dominated by career politicians
(see Table 2.1).^® This transformation in local politics
occurred because according to James Bryce, "during the Civil
War, the (city's) best citizens" had been
busily absorbed in its great issues and both then 
and for some time after, welcomed all the 
help that could be given to their party by any 
man who knew how to organise the voters and bring 
them up to the polls; while at the same time their 
keen interest in national questions made them 
inattentive to municipal affairs. Accordingly the 
local control and management of the party fell into 
hands of obscure citizens, men who had their own 
ends to serve, their own fortunes to make but who 
were valuable to their party because they kept it 
in power through their assiduous work among the 
lower class of voters.
Another contemporary observer, the reform publicist George
Vickers, described this process in rather more colourful and
dramatic fashion:
During the war years there came to the front of the
party organisation, a baser element the rag-tag
and bob-tail in politics. They were the moths of 
humanity drawn from the four quarters of the earth 
to the staid Quaker City by the glare of opportunity. 
One party to them was as good as another so far as 
principles were concerned. The main consideration 
that influenced their actions was opportunity for 
self-advancement. With the Democratic party 
labouring under reverses, and the Republican party 
successful in city and state their lot was, of 
course, cast with the latter. These political
Ishmaelites worked darkly and noiselessly......At
a time when every vote in the Republican party was
48
Table 2.1. Union Republican City Executive Committee, 1869- 
1 870
Officers 
and Members
Name Ward Public office/ 
Occupation
President John L. Hill
Vice-Presidents John W. Donnelly
John H. Seltzer 
Secretaries John McCullough
Robert T. Gill 
Treasurer George Boyer
5 
1 3 
1 0 
2 
1 9
Collector of 
Delinquent Taxes
lawyer 
assessor 
customs clerk 
liquor-dealer
Members Samuel Lutz 1
William Kelly 3
Richard Butler 4
Charles W. Ridgway 6
John V. Creely 7
Charles A. Porter 8
Jacob Albright 11
William Andress 12
William H. Johnson 14 
Henry Huhn 15
Joseph Ash 16
George W. Painter 17
Joseph S. Allen 18
Gideon Clark 20
John F. Preston 21
Thomas Dutton 22
A. L. Dungan 2 3
James Newell 24
John C. Sees 25
Morton A. Everly 26
Harry Hancock 27
Hiram Miller 28
alderman
inspector 
customs clerk 
lawyer
/Congressman 
county clerk 
Albright & 
Sheeler
clerk
Fowler & Huhn 
highways 
inspector 
county 
registrar 
Allen & Stites 
Register of 
Wills
customs
inspector
federal 
assessor 
deputy coroner 
collector 
bricklayer 
lumber dealer
Sources: Union Republican City Executive Committee, 1869-70, 
(Philadelphia, 1869), Historical Society of Pennsylvania; 
Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory for 1870 
(Philadelphia, 1870).
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needed, they were accepted without question. They 
at once made themselves useful, showed a practical 
disposition to look after the welfare of the party 
in the city, and thus in a measure relieve the 
real leaders of the party, some of whom were at the
front Carefully and with great system did they
lay their plans and push their fortunes.
So successful was the "baser element" that, according to
Vickers, the Republican party no longer qualified as a
"political party..... public freebooters was a more
appropriate title.
The other sense in which Warner's assertion about the exodus 
of the wealthy is misleading, is the inference that this was 
a voluntary gesture on their part, that is they chose to 
abandon the city's affairs and its politics. E. Digby 
Baltzell in a similar vein also talks about "the gradual 
withdrawal of the Philadelphia gentlemen away from public 
service and into the counting h o u s e . H o w e v e r  the 
evidence, I suggest, would seem to indicate there was an 
element of compulsion. That is, men of substance appear to 
have been forced to abandon the city's politics as much as 
they chose to leave of their own accord. The explanations 
suggested by Bryce and Vickers above would seem to imply 
this, plus the latter also complained that "men of character 
(like himself) were driven away" from Councils. Similarly 
Morton McMichael's North American argued that rising 
partisan criticism in local politics had the effect to 
"drive out of Councils, many high-toned gentlemen of 
Stirling integrity." Furthermore, in May 1868, the Union 
League, a social club composed of members of the local 
business elite who had been loyal to the Union during the
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Civil War, launched an effort to secure the election of 
their own candidates to office, that is of men "whom office 
seeks, rather than those who seek office." The reaction of 
the Union League to local political conditions and the 
subsequent reactions of men of substance in organising 
reform groups to clean up City Hall, simply does not square 
with the notion that "business leaders became ignorant of 
their city and abandoned its politics.
Warner's claim that the emergence of the career politician 
was a part of a more general process of specialisation and 
the division of labour is more persuasive, though by no 
means the only reason for this development. 
Industrialisation, and with it population growth and 
immigration, had by the mid-nineteenth century, as Warner 
points out, begun to transform Philadelphia's economic and 
social o r d e r .33 The artisan and merchant gave way to the 
worker, industrialist and f i n a n c i e r . 34 More profoundly, the 
consensus and community of the eighteenth century town, as 
depicted by Warner, were shattered, and in their place was a 
diverse and rather contentious aggregation of interests. 
Preconsolidation Philadelphia was in essence a divided city 
for the residents of the mercantile core of the old city and 
those in the adjacent suburbs were separated along social 
class, ethnic, religious, occupational and political 
lines.33
The most important element in this political environment 
was, according to Formisano, the establishment of political 
parties. The national two-party system established the
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institutional continuity around which organisations formed 
to help carry elections at the county, state and federal 
levels. It did not make its presence felt in city politics 
however until the new Whig and Democratic parties contended 
for power between 1834 and 1850. Increasingly, from the 
late 1830's onwards, city elections in Philadelphia, like 
state and federal contests (and like most places 
nationwide), were contested along strictly party lines.
In addition, the introduction of universal white manhood 
suffrage in 1838 and the proliferation of egalitarian 
appeals as the common rhetoric of mass political party 
organisations also meant that deference virtually 
disappeared as a factor in urban politics. Indeed, the 
local counterpart of the Jacksonian Revolution was that 
small, paternalist, elite-dominated city government was 
increasingly challenged by career politicians and mass 
political p a r t i e s . I t  would appear then that the 
emergence of the career politician was probably due to a 
unique combination of circumstances; that is, 
industrialisation, the extension of the franchise, and the 
appearance of the national two-party system in city politics 
for the first time.
The emergence of the career politician and the exodus of the 
wealthy from politics is a familiar theme in the literature 
on urban political development. Not so well publicised 
however, as Amy Bridges points out, is the notion that the 
career politicians' style of political leadership closely
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resembled the patrician s t y l e . C a r e e r  politicians and 
patricians were alike, according to Bridges, in the sense 
that they each stressed personal generosity and benevolence 
towards their supporters and communities, and proved their 
courage and leadership capacity in the volunteer fire 
department. Career politicians actually modified the 
patrician style to suit their own personal ends in the new 
political environment, for what distinguished them from 
patricians was their reliance on partisanship, rather than 
personality (or deference), for political victory, and their 
dependence on municipal funds and patronage, rather than 
personal wealth, to provide for their constituents and 
s u p p o r t e r s . F o r  example, when Warner cites Joel Barlow 
Sutherland as a representative career politician and the 
city's first "boss", he draws particular attention to 
Sutherland's friendship to the workingman, his distribution 
of patronage and favours, and his support for the basic 
economic interests of his district.^0 Thus, the exchange of 
patronage and favours for votes, which Banfield and Wilson 
and others regard as the distinguishing characteristic of 
machine politics, was part of the career politician from the 
outset.
However, although the style of boss politics emerged in 
ante-bellum Philadelphia, a well-disciplined and cohesive 
citywide political machine headed by a single party leader 
did not. Why? There are a number of reasons why this 
system of party politics was not organised or centralised at 
this time. They all pertain, to some degree, to the
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structure and organisation of city government and political 
parties in mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia.
Firstly, the simultaneous expansion and fragmentation of 
city government not only exacerbated the diffusion of 
political power, but provided opportunités for enterprising 
politicians to create their own personal organisations. As 
noted earlier, Philadelphia's second charter, passed in 1789, 
vested legislative power in a bi-cameral City Council, while 
executive duties were concentrated in a Board of City 
Commissioners who were appointed by the Mayor with the 
approval of Councils. It was not long,however, before the 
radical fears of strong executives, inherited from the 
Revolution and Jackson, prevented the Mayor and 
Commissioners from exercising much independence of action. 
When new municipal functions were added, as in the case of 
water, sewage and gas, the Councils created independent 
committees which did not report to the Mayor but to the 
Councils themselves. The Mayor was "gradually shorn of his 
various powers and duties as Executive" and "relegated.... 
to being simply chief of police and the figure-head of the 
corporation, not holding even the check of the veto 
power."41
Political consolidation in 1854 did nothing to arrest the 
dissipation of government responsibility and accountability 
for, as Edward P. Allinson and Boies Penrose noted in their 
history of Philadelphia government, "the organic law remains 
unchanged and consolidated Philadelphia is the ripened fruit 
of the system of the old city. No radical departure marks
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its e v e n t . "42 until the adoption of the Bullitt Bill as the 
new city charter in 1887 then, responsibility for city 
services was fragmented among up to thirty-two separate 
boards and departments all actively competing for their
share of city revenue.43
Indeed consolidation intensified the problems of city
government because it left a number of county officers
outside city authority. The City Treasurer, District
Attorney, Recorder of Deeds, Register of Wills, and Sheriff
were among Philadelphia's most important officers, yet they
maintained independent offices on State House Row, aptly
named because they remained responsible only to the state,
though they performed vital city s e r v i c e s . 44 These elected
county officers were not paid a fixed salary but received
lucrative commissions on the fees they collected often
amounting up to $100,000 a y e a r . 45 Financial returns of
this magnitude proved a considerable temptation that career
politicians found difficult to resist, for as local
reformers noted,
these vast pecuniary prizes with their princely 
revenues have proved the most potent source of 
corruption in our local politics, stimulating 
unprincipled men to obtain nominations by all the 
disgraceful arts known to Ring politicians and 
moreover furnishing the means through which every 
fibre of our local political system is vitiated.
It is not too much to compute that a million of 
dollars a year is levied upon the people by the 
officials of "the Row", the greater portion of 
which is illegally exacted and much of which is 
expended in manipulating precinct politics and 
perpetrating election frauds.
Thus the fee system attached to "Row" offices enabled
enterprising politicians such as District Attorney William
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B. Mann and Sheriff William R. Leeds to build up a strong 
personal following and in doing so make themselves 
relatively independent of political parties.
The "triumph of localism," a consequence of the extension of 
electoral democracy, constitutes a further reason why a 
well-disciplined and centralised political machine failed to 
emerge in mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia. The 
expansion in the size of the electorate referred to earlier 
was accompanied by an increase in the number of elected 
offices. After 1839, the mayor was elected by the people 
rather than by Councils, while state judges ceased to be 
appointed officials. Political consolidation made the City 
Treasurer an elected rather than appointed official and 
created two new elected positions that of City Controller 
and Receiver of Taxes.
Howard Gillette and William Cutler have recently argued that 
consolidation, "effected a dramatic shift of power from 
local to central authority" and "concentrated power and
decision-making perhaps more than any other event in the
city's h i s t o r y ."48 Although they are correct to stress that 
consolidation brought unity of management to the functions 
of government they exaggerate the centralising aspects of 
consolidation for the latter fostered extreme localism in 
politics. For example, it extended electoral democracy by 
making ward officers such as school directors, tax 
collectors and assessors, guardians of the poor, and 
representatives on the Board of Health elective rather than
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appointive offices, for the first time. It also left the 
petty judicial position of Alderman unaltered as an elective 
office. In addition, consolidation provided that Select and 
Common CounciImen were to be elected from wards and not at 
large, as formerly.
Consolidation then, by making these local offices elective, 
enhanced their political importance and made wards the new 
.focus of politics. As wards served as the local basis for 
representation on city councils and as administrative 
districts for many of the municipal services, they now 
became the basic unit of political life. Wards were turned 
into the city's fundamental entities for political 
organisation providing aspiring politicians a base around 
which to build personal followings. In essence, 
consolidation paved the way for the emergence of the 
independent ward "boss".
The nature of political parties themselves provides the 
final reason why a political machine failed to emerge in 
ante-bellum Philadelphia. It needs to be stressed that 
political parties at this time were loosely structured, 
poorly organised, ill-disciplined and not subject to legal 
c on t ro ls .A c c o r d i n g l y  they could be treated as just what 
they were - private organisations designed to operate openly 
on the basis of personal favours and rewards in the spirit 
that is of Plunkitt who "seen his financial opportunities 
and took 'e m . I n  these circumstances party leaders could 
not control the behaviour of local party officers nor of 
party workers in public office. Indeed,, the party apparatus
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was so weak that career politicians relied on, and were 
often products of, organisations whose primary purpose was 
not the delivery of the vote. Consequently it was groups 
such as the volunteer fire companies, gangs, social clubs, 
coteries of saloon frequenters, and other structures of 
status and prestige within neighbourhoods, that dominated 
the electoral process, and not party organisations.
It seems that in Philadelphia fire companies were the most 
significant group, for as Frank Willing Leach, secretary to 
the State Republican party leader Matt Quay, recalled in 
1 905:
In those days [1856] local political battles at the 
polls were not fought by Executive Committeemen, by 
division workers and the like, as is the case 
nowadays. The chief factor then and for many years 
afterward were the active members of the volunteer
fire company.52
Indeed, in 1856 Philadelphia was considered to have an 
excess of fire companies, as seventy of them functioned 
within the city. These provided an arena in which a man who 
wanted to be a political leader could demonstrate his 
courage and leadership capacity, for their colourful 
uniforms, exciting dashes to fires and competition for 
community recognition made them very attractive to young men 
in the city. Those who wished to exercise political 
leadership attempted to gain executive office by 
demonstrating their ability to the satisfaction of their 
peers. Directors were elected from and by the members, and 
bestowed with the considerable honour of supervising the 
fighting of fires.53 Company members created each company's
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distinct identity. Some company names like Franklin, 
Washington, Lafayette and Americas suggested patriotism; 
some like Schuylkill, Southwark and Moyamensing, 
neighbourhood; and some like Harmony and Good Will, a sense 
of duty; while others such as Shiffler and Hibernia 
indicated nativism and national origin respectively.^4
The circumstances surrounding fire-fighting (such as the 
race to arrive first at a fire, and the honour of 
extinguishing it), community loyal^ties, and political and 
religious differences, provided the basis for trouble 
between these rival companies. Indeed, "the conflicts 
between these rival associations became the major source of 
organised violence before the Civil War."^5 For example, in 
Moyamensing the Irish Protestants of the Franklin Hose 
Company fought savage contests against the Irish Catholics 
of the Moyamensing Hose Company, while in Southwark arson 
and fighting accompanied the uncompromising hostility 
between the Weccacoe Engine Company a temperance, nativist 
outfit, and the Weccacoe Hose Company, an Irish and non­
temperance o r g a n i s a t i o n . I t  was in the bitter competition 
with rival companies that men were able to prove loyalty, 
courage and leadership capacity to the satisfaction of their 
fellows, thereby proving themselves worthy of support and 
loyalty. Such local city politicians as Mayor William 
Stokley (Harmony Engine Company); Sheriff William R. Leeds 
(Goodwill Engine Company); Councilman William E. Rowan 
(Columbia Engine Company) and William McMullen (Moyamensing 
Hose Company); Congressman Charles O'Neill (Franklin Hose
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Company); State Representative Lewis Cassidy (Hibernia Hose 
Company); Chief of Police Samuel Ruggles (Columbia Hose 
Company) and future "bosses" of the city in the 1890's, Dave
Martin (Taylor Hose Company) and Charles Porter (Schuylkill
Hose Company), all began their political careers in the 
ranks of the volunteer fire companies.^7
Street gangs were another significant source of support for 
the career politician. Although we do not know how many of 
these bands existed one survey uncovered fifty-two street 
gangs in the city during the period 1836 to 1878.^® They
tended to be concentrated in poorer working class districts
such as Southwark, Moyamensing, Northern Liberties and 
Spring Garden, on the edge of the old city (see Figure 2.1). 
The vast majority of these groups had very short lives of 
three years or less, though some such as the Snakers (seven 
years). Buffers (ten years) and Schuylkill Rangers (twenty- 
six years) persisted for much longer periods. Headquartered 
at a saloon, club-house, abandoned building or simply a 
streetcorner, these gangs had distinctive dress, fashioning 
clothing styles that became their hallmark. Their names 
were also assertions of their distinct identity. The 
Schuylkill Rangers and Kensington Black Hawks were named for 
their turf; Killers, Rats, Bouncers, Spitfires, Tormentors, 
Smashers and Flayers drew on slang, while Shifflers,
American Guards, Orangemen and Kerryonians expressed 
ethnicity or n a t i v i s m . ^9 Sometimes the turf and 
neighbourhood loyalties of the gangs coincided with those of 
the fire companies. For example, the Weccacoe Hose Company
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ran to and from fires escorted by the Bouncers, while the 
Killers and Moyamensing Hose Company, and the Shifflers and 
Shiffler Hose Company had established alliances. Often 
there was little distinction between the two institutions.
Gangs complemented the role of fire companies in the 
electoral process, by promoting the political fortunes of 
those whom they supported. They were particularly useful in 
guarding ballot-boxes and keeping opponents away from the 
polls. In return they were courted with donations, 
patronage and freedom from arrest.^0 Gangs, fire companies 
and the like, thus provided the bases then for grass roots 
political organisation in ante-bellum Philadelphia. This 
development-had important consequences for political parties 
and the nature of political competition. From the partisan 
and party leaders’ point of view, as these groups were not 
primarily political, they were a poor substitute for ward 
organisation or for a permanent presence in the wards. 
Collectively they served to give the parties popular ties 
and a popular base but individually most of them were 
unreliable for they were tied more to individuals than to 
parties, and therefore capable of changing partisan 
affiliation. Even when they remained faithful to their 
partisan allegiance however, these organisations maintained 
their own self-direction and autonomy. There was thus no 
compelling incentive for them to accept centralised control 
or to follow the wishes of the party leadership. The 
independence of these groups had significant implications 
for political competition. Their size and strength (often
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literally their physical strength) were regarded as a 
measure of the influence of the individual politicians they 
promoted, for the latter relied upon them to secure party 
nominations and subsequent election. The electoral arena 
then became increasingly violent and corrupt, as brawlers, 
cash payments and patronage were variously used to achieve 
victory.
William "Squire" McMullen's career as Democratic "boss" of 
the fourth ward throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century provides an excellent illustration of the style and 
structure of boss politics that I have been d i s c u s s i n g . ^ 2  
Born in Moyamensing in 1824, the son of an Irish Catholic 
grocer, McMullen held a variety of jobs before he settled 
into politics. He served as an apprentice printer and 
carpenter, worked in his father's store and finally decided 
to join the navy. It was on his return to Philadelphia in 
the mid-1840's, after his enlistment expired, that he 
established his reputation as a street fighter with the 
Moyamensing Hose Company, earning the epithet "Bull" because 
of his brute strength. When the Mexican War broke out, the 
Company enlisted, and McMullen the loyal Democrat went with 
them. He was ultimately placed in command of the "Moya" 
troops and returned to the city a genuine war hero. He was 
a conspicuous leader of the Moyamensing Hose company and 
considered a protector of the local Irish Catholic community 
against the attacks of nativists, Protestants and a police 
force drawn exclusively from the native-born population. In 
1850, McMullen was elected President of the Keystone Club,
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an association of Democratic party workers and established 
an alliance with the "Killers" streetgang. A few years 
later he became a saloonkeeper. He was elected Alderman in 
1856, and was simultaneously made a prison inspector in the 
wake of the Democratic victory in the Mayoralty election.
He ruled paternalistically over his "subjects" and earned 
the title "Squire" for the way he helped his neighbours gain 
parole and other considerations from the legal system.^3
McMullen enjoyed a successful political career because he 
controlled votes in this poor section of the city "through 
favours, patronage and outright cash payments to voters."^4 
His "political style was based on rowdyism," as Harry Silcox 
puts it. "His reputation as a street-fighter, a scoundrel 
and a lawless thug marked McMullen's youth. Later these 
same traits would characterise his election day 
b e h a v i o u r . I n d e e d ,  in the local election of October 
1871, Octavius V. Catto, president of the fourth ward black 
political club, was shot dead by one of McMullen's
associates. McMullen managed to survive the public outcry
following this incident. He also survived the abolition of 
the volunteer fire department in 1871 and that of the
position of Alderman in 1873, as well as the demise of the
local Democratic party. He was able to do this because he 
had been a loyal Democrat, made deals with Republicans like 
James McManes and William Stokley whenever politically 
expedient, and increasingly relied on his saloon as a focus 
for his supporters. McMullen's strategy was so successful 
that he was able to serve an uninterrupted tenure as Select
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Councilman for the fourth ward from 1874 until his death in 
1901 .66
Ward "bosses" like McMullen yielded little strength beyond 
their respective ward boundaries, but they were crucial to 
those who sought election to city office or one of the "Row" 
offices. As these positions were elected at large, those 
who aspired to such an office had to draw up alliances with 
career politicians at grass roots level. For example, in 
1856 "gentleman-Democrat" Richard Vaux was elected Mayor 
largely through his alliance with local "bosses" and 
firehouse gangs, notably Irish Catholic politicians Lewis C. 
Cassidy and William M c M u l l e n . 67 ^ lawyer, Quaker, and son
of merchant and philanthropist Roberts Vaux, Richard 
connected himself with working class interests and 
organisations such as the Columbia Hose Company and posed as 
the champion of the common man. The price for the letter's 
support was evident after Vaux's victory when "lines of his 
supporters seeking jobs with the city filled the Chestnut 
Street s i d e w a l k s."6® McMullen for example, rejected a 
lieutenancy in the police force in favour of a position on 
the Board of Prison Inspectors, but he did secure the 
appointment of at least six volunteer firemen from 
Moyamensing Hose Company to the police f o r c e . 69
The most successful aspirant for city office at this time 
was William B. Mann who was elected District Attorney in 
1856 and served until 1874 with just one interruption, the 
three year term 1868 to 1871. Born in 1816, the son of a 
clergyman and teacher, Mann practised as a lawyer in the
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Northern Liberties district. He stood as the Whig, Know 
Nothing and Republican candidate in 1856 and defeated 
Democrat, Lewis Cassidy. Like Vaux and Cassidy, Mann 
courted the support of local "bosses" and fire companies, 
and was himself a member of the Pennsylvania Hose Company. 
The election result was contested in the courts by both 
candidates, and it seems that Mann prevailed as victor 
because the ballot frauds perpetrated in the "uptown" 
district of Northern Liberties were of less magnitude than 
those carried out by McMullen in the "downtown" areas of 
Moyamensing and Southwark.^0
As a "Row" officer, Mann enjoyed an income of between 
$75,000 and $100,000 a year in fees, which he used to cement 
a personal following with various local "bosses" and fire 
companies throughout the city. Consequently, Mann was a 
major influence within the local Republican party and 
depicted as its first great leader and "Boss" by his 
e n e m i e s . M a n n ' s  position within the Republican party was 
soon contested, however, by two career politicians who, 
unlike Mann, did not have to suffer the insecurities 
attendant upon constant public re-election, but owed their 
influence to the unusual positions they occupied in 
Phladelphia city government. These were James McManes and 
William S. Stokley.
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3. Ring Rule
While the power of city and county office-holders, such as 
William Mann, rested on a shaky organisational base, and 
ward "bosses" like William McMullen rarely exercised 
influence beyond ward level, James McManes and William 
Stokley were able to establish city wide organisations as a 
consequence of their respective power bases in the Gas Trust 
and Public Buildings Commission, which occupied unique 
positions in Philadelphia city government.
- JAMES McMANES AND THE "GAS RING"
An Irish immigrant of Ulster Presbyterian stock, McManes was 
only eight years old when his family emigrated to 
Philadelphia in 1830. After a brief education he went to 
work as a bobbin-boy in a Southwark cotton mill and later 
became an apprentice weaver. At twenty-six years of age 
McManes had saved sufficient money to set up his own modest 
spinning business but this was destroyed by fire, so he 
reverted to being a supervisory foreman for Thomas Harkness, 
a manufacturer of cotton goods. In 1855, he joined with 
Edward C. Quinn, a conveyancer, in setting up a real estate 
business which allowed him to pay off his old creditors, lay 
the foundations of his future fortune and boost his 
political career which had begun half-heartedly twelve years 
earlier.
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Naturalised in 1844, McManes joined the Whigs and was a 
prominent campaigner for Winfield Scott, their Presidential 
candidate in 1852. After Scott's defeat McManes switched 
parties and organised a People's Republican Club in the 
Seventeenth Ward. He also joined forces with other 
individual political operators such as William H. Kern, 
William Kemble, Henry Bumm, Alfred C. Homer and H. C. Howell 
in a "log-rolling" venture, whereby they all agreed to help 
one another to achieve political success. As a result, 
McManes was elected school director in 1858, a position he 
held until 1866 when he joined the city Board of Education. 
In 1860, McManes helped nominate Andrew G. Curtin for 
Governor at the state Republican convention and supported 
Lincoln when he was a delegate to the national convention.
As a reward for loyalty, Curtin appointed him Bank Inspector 
of Philadelphia.^
In 1865, McManes was elected to the Board of Gas Trustees by 
Common Council and remained a member, except for one 
interrupted break in 1883 to 1884, until the Trust's 
abolition in 1887. McManes quickly emerged as the dominant 
figure on the Board because, by the admission of his 
enemies, he possessed "the personal qualities - courage, 
resolution, foresight, personal capacity (and) the judicious 
preference of the substance of power to its display," needed 
for political l eadership.^ W i t h  his "centre of power" in 
the Gas Trust, he became all-powerful in the city's 
politics, because according to James Bryce, McManes,
by his superior activity and intelligence, secured
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the command of the whole [Republican] party 
machinery and reached the high position of 
recognised Boss of Philadelphia.
Why, and how, did the Gas Trust become the "centre of power" 
with McManes as the "Boss of Philadelphia"? In 1835, the 
City Council enacted an ordinance which provided for the 
establishment of a gas works with a capital outlay of 
$100,000 to be secured by an issue of stock. The city 
reserved the right to purchase the plant at any time by 
converting the stock into a twenty year loan. In addition, 
the administration of the plant was placed in the hands of a 
Board of twelve members elected by Councils, who constituted 
the trustees of the loans issued for the construction and 
enlargement of the gas works. By an ordinance of June 17, 
1841, the city exercised its right to become the owner of 
the gas works. The ordinance also provided that the trustee 
system should be continued until the loans on the gas works 
account had been paid off. As thirty year loans under these 
conditions were issued until 1855 (after 1855, subsequent 
loans required by the Gas Trustees were made payable by the 
City Treasurer) the Board of Trustees had an assured lease 
of life until 1885.^
It was soon apparent that the Gas Trust had been unwittingly 
invested with autocratic power for as Henry C. Lea pointed 
out :
When the Gas Trust was organised in a shape that 
rendered it impervious to political influences, it 
seems to have been the fond belief that it would 
always be kept in the hands of such men as 
Alexander Dallas Bache, Samuel V. Merrick,
Frederick Brown, Joseph S. havering, M. W. Baldwin 
and others of similar high character whose names
68
figure in the early lists of Trustees. With the 
gradual deterioration of our municipal 
administration such names as these disappear and 
are replaced by working politicians whose earnest 
efforts to obtain admission to unsalaried position, 
entailing no little labour can scarcely be expected 
to arise from disinterested self-sacrifice. The 
inevitable result is that the Gas Trust becomes a 
vast political machine, wielding the influence 
derivable from hundreds of appointments and 
millions of expenditure.
As Dr. Frederick W. Spiers of the Municipal League later
recalled:
The unique opportunities for spoliation offered by 
this irresponsible administrative board were 
speedily recognised and during the Civil War period, 
a body of political bandits succeeded in capturing 
the Trust. From this vantage ground, they 
proceeded to corrupt the whole municipal 
administration, and the Philadelphia Gas Ring 
speedily created a political machine which rivalled 
that of its contemporary - the Tweed Ring - in the 
neatness and dispatch with which it transferred the 
money of the people from the public treasury to the 
pockets of the politicians.
The Trust was able to achieve this because although the
Select and Common Council each elected six trustees who
served for a period of three years, they did not control the
Board. As Henry C. Lea explained to Bryce:
It might be thought that the power of election 
vested in the Councils would enable the latter to 
control the trustees, but when "politics" invaded 
the trust, a vicious circle speedily established 
itself and the trust controlled the councils. Its 
enormous pay-roll enabled it to employ numerous 
"workers" in each of the 600 or 700 election 
divisions [precincts] of the city, and aspirants 
for seats in the councils found it almost 
impossible to obtain either nomination or election 
without the favour of the Trust. Thus the Councils 
became filled with its henchmen or "heelers", 
submissive to its bidding, not only in the 
selection of trustees to fill the four yearly 
vacancies, but in every detail of city government 
with which the leaders of the trust desired to 
interfere. It is easy to understand the enormous 
possibilities of power created by such a position.
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McManes' clout depended on the resources of the Gas Trust, 
which were considerable. The Board spent over four million 
dollars a year, half of which took the form of large 
contracts for purchasing supplies. It also employed a 
workforce which fluctuated from eight hundred to two
O
thousand men. Henry C. Lea, in his report for the Citizens 
Municipal Reform Association, claimed that the gas works 
were grossly over-manned, produced gas of an inferior 
quality, had excess leakage, and made too little profit for 
the city.9 One reason for the low profit was that the 
Trustees paid approximately $1 per ton over the current 
market price for coal. This "drawback" amounted to a total 
"wastage" of one million dollars a year, much of which the 
Gas Trustees probably received back, it was alleged, in the 
form of a rebate or "kickback".^^
Several attempts were made by reformers and Councils to
improve the accountability of the Gas Trust but all these
efforts in 1854, 1858, and 1868 failed in the Courts, which
ruled that the trustees had a secure lease of life until the
final loan matured in 1885. Henry C. Lea pointed out the
"anomalous position" occupied by the Gas Trust as a result
of these judgements:
Its property is in reality the property of the 
city which holds the title to all its real estate: 
if ably managed, its profits would enure to the 
benefit of the public; if recklessly or corruptly 
conducted, the loss falls upon the city. The city 
is liable for the loans which are administered by 
the Trust. The Trustees are elected by Councils, 
and yet when once elected, they are practically 
independent of the power creating them, which is 
responsible for their acts, and for whose profit 
or loss they are acting.....
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......... The Gas Trust is thus a close corporation,
permitting no intrusion or investigation, holding 
its sessions in secret, giving out contracts at its 
pleasure, without public competition, submitting 
its accounts to no auditor, presenting to the public 
such information, and no more, of its acts and 
doings as it pleases, spending annually more than 
four million of public money and practically 
admitting no accountability to anyone. That it 
should become a political engine of vast influence 
was inevitable and that its management should share 
in the general degradation of municipal politics 
is a necessary consequence.
Thus the Gas Trust "became the centre of power" as the
Public Ledger put it. Its authority
became absolute. Political caucuses were held in 
the Board Room. Appointments to the local, state 
and national offices emanated from its walls and 
aspiring young politicians looked to its sacred 
precincts for inspiration.^^
Bryce explained that such a consequence was not so
remarkable for,
it must be remembered that when a number of small 
factions combine to rule a party, that faction 
which is a little larger or better organised, or 
better provided with funds than the others, obtains 
the first place among them and may keep it so long 
as it gives to the rest a fair share of the booty, 
and directs the policy of the confederates with 
firmness and skill........
The merit of the system was that it perpetuated 
itself, and in fact grew stronger the longer it 
stood. Whenever an election was in prospect, the 
ward primaries of the Republican party were 
thronged by the officers and workpeople of the Gas 
Trust and other city departments who secured the 
choice of such delegates as the Ring had previously 
selected in secret conclave.
McManes' influence was particularly strong in the Tax
Department, for example, which he controlled between 1873
and 1882, as the office of Receiver of Taxes was occupied
successively by his close associates and fellow gas
trustees, Thomas J. Smith (1873-76) and Albert C. Roberts
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(1876-81). Indeed, Independent Republican, Joseph Caven, 
called the Tax Office, "a graduating place for gas 
trustees."14 The position was very attractive in the 1870's 
because a new office, that of Collector of Delinquent Taxes, 
had been created to recover the ten million dollars of 
outstanding tax arrears that had accumulated in the city.
The Collector, appointed by the Receiver, was paid a five 
per cent commission on the taxes he recovered. This office 
yielded fees of between $150,000 and $200,000 a year between 
1873 and 1881, making it "one of the richest prizes of the
political spoilsman."15
The material benefits that McManes gained from the Gas Trust 
and the Tax Office meant that "his power in city politics 
equalled and ordinarily exceeded that of any other person." 
According to Harold Zink, McManes "had become sufficiently 
powerful to deserve the appellation 'King'."1  ^ Similarly, 
the North American in its obituary on McManes suggested he 
was "one of the most powerful dictators whoever ruled this 
city. His rule was absolute, as that of a Czar, and his 
word was law."1^
WILLIAM S. STOKLEY AND THE "BUILDINGS RING"
William S. Stokley was the other leading politician who 
emerged in the immediate post-war years and he was to 
challenge McManes for the title of "city boss" from his 
centre of power on the Public Buildings Commission, and as 
Mayor of the City from 1871-81. Stokley epitomised the
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self-made man. Born in Philadelphia in 1823, the eldest 
child of three, he was only in his youth when his father 
died, leaving him with the responsibility of caring for the 
family. He established a successful confectionery business, 
and entered politics through the Franklin Hose Company. An 
active fireman for sixteen years, he served as the Company’s 
treasurer and its representative on the City’s Fire 
Association. In 1860 Stokley was elected as a Republican to 
the Common Council from the ninth ward, and after being 
successively re-elected for four terms, gained the 
Presidency in 1865. By 1867, Stokley had moved on to the 
upper chamber and in 1868 was elected President of the 
Select Council.T8
While President of the Select Council Stokley established a 
modest reputation as a ’’law and order man” and ’’reformer”. 
This was based on two controversial ordinances he 
introduced, one calling for the abolition of the volunteer 
fire companies in favour of a professional fire department; 
and the other advocating the transfer of the gas works from 
the Gas Trust to a Department of Gas. Both ordinances 
successfully passed Councils, though the gas works remained 
under the Trust after McManes’ appeal to the state Supreme 
Court was upheld. The 1867 measure advocating the 
establishment of a paid fire department by 1871 seems to 
have been successful for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
public opinion had become increasingly hostile towards the 
volunteer system, as fire companies had a long record of 
street-fighting, arson, shooting and murder. Secondly, new
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technology in the form of the steam-powered fire engine 
drove a wedge into the volunteers' ranks. The new engines 
were not only very costly but also heavy, requiring horses 
rather than men to pull them. Consequently the city argued 
that it was now opportune to rationalise operations.
Finally, professional politicians who, like Stokley himself, 
were often former firemen believed there was a need for 
change. They recognised that the volunteer fire companies 
were too unruly and unpredictable and too much inclined to 
adopt independent lines of action to fit comfortably into 
Republican party organisation's efforts to unify political 
control of the city. Stokley's reform of the fire service 
and his efforts to transfer the gas works to the city won 
general support throughout the city and formed the basis of 
his successful bid for the Mayoralty in 1871.^^
As President of Select Council Stokley was also involved in 
the dispute over the erection of new public buildings. The 
controversy over their location and over who was to build 
them and control the expenditures was to leave Stokley in an 
unprecedented position of power in Philadelphia. What was 
not disputed was that Philadelphia desperately needed public 
buildings to house its growing government and court systems. 
As early as 1838, rapid population growth, commercial 
developments and the expansion of government services and 
bureaucracy, had led civic leaders to advocate the need of 
concentrating these services in a single forum. The failure 
to agree on how this should be done meant that the problem 
had considerably intensified when Councils again revived the
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issue after the Civil War. In February 1867 an ordinance
was drafted making building commissioners of the Councils'
Committee on City Property and suggesting that the new
buildings be erected on Penn Square in the ninth ward. A
Special Joint Committee of Councils set up to consider the
issue reported back with two amendments designed to satisfy
the city's commercial interests. It suggested that a number
of prominent businessmen replace the Committee on City
Property as Building Commissioners and proposed that the
site be changed to Independence Square in the fifth ward
commercial area. Stokley, as Select Councilman for the
ninth ward, opposed the change of site and along with A.
Wilson Henszey (tenth ward), his ally in the Common Council,
successfully led the effort to reject the ordinance and
p n
postpone the issue indefinitely.
In 1868, William Bumm, an associate of McManes and chairman 
of the City Property Committee, introduced a new bill for 
public buildings keeping the Independence Square site but 
replacing the businessmen commissioners with men who were 
more politically oriented, such as the chief engineer, and 
surveyor, the highways commissioner and the Committee on 
City Property all of whom were appointed by Councils, plus 
some other Councilmen and contractors who could sell their 
services to the city. The bill passed both Councils and was 
approved by the Mayor in January 1869. The Commission 
brought together jobbers and contractors belonging to the 
Mann wing of the Republican party. As a sop to Stokley who 
joined the Commission by right of his position as President
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of Select Council, the Commissioners elected him President 
of the body.
Unable to gain support for the Penn Square site, Stokley 
turned to newly elected State Senator Wilson Henszey for 
help. He supported Henszey's successful efforts in guiding 
bills through the state legislature that made Independence 
Square "a public green forever," submitted the issue of the 
site for the buildings to a popular vote and established a 
new commission. The new Buildings Commission set up on 
August 5, 1870 did not include any members of the original 
commission established the previous year. Instead it was 
composed of the Mayor, Presidents of Councils, and 
Councilmen John Rice, Henry Phillips and Stokley, as well as 
Theodore Cuyler and John P. Wetherill, who were two former 
Councilmen with close ties to the business community. This 
development represented a considerable coup on the part of 
Stokley and Henszey for they had entirely changed the 
complexion of the C o m m i s s i o n . 22 However the new Commission 
"aroused general indignation" because of its unlimited 
power. Councils were denied supervisory powers and were 
directed to accept any contracts the Commission entered into 
and to raise money through an annual tax on property. As 
lawyer and reformer Horace Binney put it, the state 
legislature
have appointed for us a Building Commission, 
empowered to tax us without limit, and to spend 
our money without supervision, to hold office 
without restriction of time and to fill all 
vacancies in their own body...... inflicting on us
all the evils of taxation without representation.
Although the Commission "was so subversive of the principles
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of self-government" reform efforts to abolish it failed, and 
it remained intact until 1901, when the task of building a 
new city hall was complete.
The referendum on the site of the city hall gave a narrow 
majority in favour of Penn Square over Washington Square, 
even though many business leaders argued that the former was 
too isolated from the city's commercial d i s t r i c t . T h e  
Commission then entered a new controversy by proposing to 
build a single mammoth city hall at the intersection of the 
city's major thoroughfares. Broad and Market streets, 
instead of having separate offices on each of the four 
blocks constituting Penn Square. The intersection scheme 
was vehemently opposed by the city's business community and 
Stokley voted against the proposal when it was raised in 
June 1871. Stokley also suggested that all the contracts 
awarded by the Commission should be subject to the approval 
of the City Council. These actions enabled Stokley to 
deflect public criticism against himself in the crucial 
period prior to his nomination and election as Mayor in 
November, 1871.
According to Howard Gillette however, Stokley's behaviour 
subsequent to his proposal advocating Council supervision 
"reveals calculated deceit," because far from seeking to 
dilute the Commission's powers, he worked hard to fill it 
with allies.27 For example, when Henry Phillips, Theodore 
Cuyler, John P. Wetherill and John Rice resigned from the 
Commission over a six month period between October 1871 and
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April 1872, Stokley secured the election of associates such 
as Mahlon Dickenson, former Receiver of Taxes Richard Peltz, 
and the letter's brother-in-law, marble-cutter John Hill, 
all of whom had known him since his days as a f i r e m a n . ^8 
Moreover, except for Hill who served until 1894, they all 
remained Commissioners for thirty years, until the body was 
abolished in 1901.^9 in the process, they spent $24 
million, well over double the original $10 million estimate 
for the construction of city hall. Over 20 percent of this 
amount was attributable to a single contract, the largest 
ever awarded in the city's history. In October 1872, the 
Commission, without advertising for bids, gave a $5,300,000 
contract to William Struthers & Son, to provide marble as 
the foundation material for the new building. Critics were 
quick to point out that Struthers would provide marble from 
the Lee Quarry in Massachusetts, which was owned by ex- 
Commissioner John Rice, and was where John Hill had served 
his apprenticeship. Soon afterwards both Stokley and Hill 
moved into $20,000 brownstone houses on Filbert Street, 
provided, it was alleged by the press, by city building 
contractors.
Stokley's position on the Buildings Commission paved the way 
for further political alliances. District Attorney William 
Mann, for example, was made one of the sureties for the 
Struther's contract. In addition, as the intersection 
scheme disrupted street railway traffic, Stokley used his 
influence to help the Union Railway Company break the West 
Philadelphia Railway's Company exclusive privilege of laying
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tracks on Market Street. Stokley bestowed a number of 
favours on Union Directors and major stockholders. For 
example, in 1873 Stokley's friends in Councils secured 
authorisation to deposit city money in Union Directors' 
William Kemble and James McManes' People's Bank. The 
Commission also named city treasurer, and Union stockholder, 
Peter Widener as its own treasurer. Another Union 
stockholder. Sheriff William Leeds, secured from the 
Commission brick contracts worth over $50,000 in 1873 alone. 
Another contract, worth over $200,000 over five years from 
1874 to 1879, was awarded to the Excelsior Brick Company 
which listed among its directors Widener's business 
colleague, William Elkins.
The links between these individuals were cemented still 
further through the practice of what George Washington 
Plunkitt has termed "honest graft".^2 under Mayor Stokley 
and Highways Commissioner John Hill, highway expenditures 
mushroomed into a one million dollar a year business. The 
bulk of this money was appropriated for city improvements in 
Philadelphia's growing suburban districts (see Table 3.1).^^ 
Hill, along with close associates such as Leeds, Henszey, 
Dickenson, Widener, Elkins, as well as Councilman George 
DorIon, Prothonotary John Loughridge, Registrar of Water 
James Wark, and contractor Charles Porter, bought land in 
west and north central Philadelphia, and then made sure the 
city provided the improvements necessary to enhance the 
value of the p r o p e r t y . T h e  "highway ring's" success was 
guaranteed because Stokley had secured Henszey's election as
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Table 3.1. The Distribution of Population in Philadelphia,
1850, 1880
Old City
Districts 
Adjacent to 
Old City
Outlying
Districts
Total
1 850 121,376 218,669 68,717 408,762
(29.7)3 (53.5) (16.8)
1 880 112,846 361,024 373,300 847,1 70
(-7%) (+65.1%) (+443%) (+207.3%)
(13.3) (42.6) (44.1 )
Source: John Daly and Allen Weinberg, Genealogy of
Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 
1966), pp. 92-100.
^ Figures in parentheses represent the proportion of the
total population in Philadelphia county.
^ Spring Garden, Northern Liberties, Kensington,
Moyamensing and Southwark districts.
President of Common Council (1873-76) who in turn had 
appointed William Ellwood Rowan (27th ward) as Chairman of 
the Committee on Highways and John Bardsley (28th ward) as 
head of the Finance Committee. Both Councilmen were keen to 
provide municipal services for their own districts and 
approved every highway appropriation requested.
The Philadelphia Times in March 1875, suggested that the 
control of city services allowed Stokley, Hill and Leeds to 
rule the city:
The secret of the great influence exercised by the
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Table 3.2. The Society of Mysterious Pilgrims, 1872-75
Name Public Office Affiliation
John E. Addicks 
James B. Alexander 
Joseph R. Ash 
William Baldwin 
Thomas J. Barger 
David Beitler^
Henry H. Bingham 
Joseph A. Bonham 
James Brearly
William M. Bunn 
William C. Calhoun 
Lewis C. Cassidy 
Gideon Clark^
John Cochrane 
Charles C. Cochrane 
C.H.T. Collis 
Harry Coward 
E. W. Davis 
Jacob B. De Haven^ 
William A. Delaney^ 
Hamilton Disston^ 
George Dorian 
Joseph H. Edwards^ 
William L. Elkins 
William Elliott^
Health Officer Stokley
State Senator
State Representative
Councilman
Buildings Commissioner Democrat
Alderman
Clerk of Quarter Sessions Cameron
Solicitor, Register of Wills
Chief Clerk,
Register of Wills
Guardian of the Poor
Sealer of Weights & Measures
Buildings Commissioner Democrat
Register of Wills
Councilman
Cashier, City Treasurer Democrat
City Solicitor Stokley
Highways contractor Stokley
State Senator 
Tax Collector 
Book-keeper
Fire Commissioner Indep.
Councilman Stokley
deputy Sheriff
Councilman Cameron
Sheriff Cameron
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N. F. English 
George D. Glenn^ 
E. W. C. Greene^ 
A. Wilson Henszey 
John L. Hill^ 
Marshall C. Hong^ 
Harry Hunter 
Hiram Hunter 
Samuel P. Jones^ 
Samuel Josephs^ 
James N. Kerns 
William King
John Lamon 
David H. Lane 
Peter Lane 
William R. Leeds^ 
Robert Loughlin 
John Loughridge 
Robert Mackey 
William Mann 
John McCall 
John McCullough 
Alexander McCuen^ 
George H. Moore^ 
Robert Morris 
Richard Peltz^ 
Charles A.Porter^ 
William A. Porter
Flour Inspector
Caterer, Quarter Sessions McManes
Pension Agent
President, Common Council Stokley
Highways Commissioner Stokley
deputy Sheriff Stokley
State Representative 
State Senator 
Clerk
State Senator Democrat
U.S. Marshall Cameron
Chief Clerk,
City Controller
State Senator McManes
deputy Recorder of Deeds Cameron
Clerk, City Treasurer 
ex-Sheriff Stokley
Councilman
ex-Prothonotary Stokley
State Treasurer Cameron
Prothonotary Cameron
Councilman
Councilman McManes
Fire Commissioner
Alderman
Mercantile Appraiser 
Buildings Commissioner Stokley
Highways contractor Stokley
Fire Commissioner
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oErastus Poulson
William E. Rowan 
Harry C. Selby 
William Siner 
William L. Smith 
William S. Stokley 
William H. Taggart^ 
William A. Thorpe^ 
Joseph Tittermary^
R. C. Tittermary^ 
Isaac W. Van Houten^ 
Frederick J. Walter^ 
John Welsh^
Peter A. B. Widener^
Solicitor,
Receiver of Taxes
Councilman
Registrar of Water
Councilman
City Commissioner
Mayor
Coal Inspector 
Police Magistrate 
Mercantile Appraiser 
Mercantile Appraiser 
Superintendent 
Clerk
Port Warden 
City Treasurer
McManes
Stokley
Stokley
Democrat
Cameron
Sources: Laws of Pennsylvania, 1872, Act No. 934 (to 
incorporate the Mysterious Pilgrims of Philadelphia, April 
5, 1872), pp.979-80; Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory 
for 1872 (Philadelphia, 1872); Manual of Councils, 1872-73; 
Times, June 19, 1875.
Cameron: indicates those members whose chief loyalty was to 
the state Republican party leader, Simon Cameron.
I original incorporator
0 Officer
triumvirate is that they usually work together and 
being the dispenser of almost unlimited patronage, 
and to the extent of millions of dollars annually, 
they wield immense power in local politics and when­
ever they uq^ertake a thing, they are bound to put 
it through. 36
Stokley's new politics found social expression in the 
Society of Mysterious Pilgrims established in 1872. In
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addition, to prominent Republicans such as the Mayor and his
chief supporters Hill, Leeds and Peltz, it included
Democrats like Public Buildings Commissioners Lewis Cassidy
and Thomas Barger, as well as the city's most active ward
politicians who made their living through a variety of
elective and appointive offices (see Table 3 . 2 ) . In 1875,
a watchdog sub-committee of the Union League publicly
condemned the Pilgrims as
that dictatorial band of men, nominally of both 
parties, but without true allegiance to either, 
which now rules and oppresses our city and is 
disgracing and destroying the Republican 
organisation.^
At the head of this "dictatorial band" who now ruled the 
city were Stokley, Hill and Leeds who were likened by 
journalists to Rome's first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey 
and Crassus.^9
THE LIMITS OF BOSS POWER
Both contemporary observers and later historians have 
depicted McManes and Stokley as "bosses" who wielded 
enormous power and influence city wide. McManes has been 
described variously as "James I", "King James", and "Boss of 
Philadelphia". With Stokley "as a powerful auxiliary" he 
became "one of the most powerful dictators who ever ruled 
this city."40 To what extent are these characterisations 
accurate? How far do McManes and Stokley qualify as genuine 
"city bosses"? That is, to what extent did they control 
their followers in party office; the distribution of
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patronage; the membership and decisions of the party 
organisation's local units; the party's nominations for 
public office; the behaviour of elected officials nominally 
affiliated to them; city government? In short, did they 
head a well-disciplined and centralised party organisation 
that was capable not only of distributing patronage but also 
of routinely centralising power in the city?
The observations of contemporaries and later historians 
would seem to suggest they did. As we we saw earlier, Henry 
C. Lea explained to James Bryce that although the Councils 
elected Gas Trustees, it was the Gas Trust that controlled 
the C o u n c i l s . T h i s  was because the Trust had secured 
control of Republican party nominations due to the judicious 
distribution of patronage at its disposal, which allowed it 
to employ numerous party "workers" in the city's 700 
divisions. Bryce reiterates that "nearly all the municipal 
offices were held by their nominees. They commanded a 
majority in the Select and Common C o u n c i l s . L e a ' s  
biographer, Edward S. Bradley, confirms that McManes 
"secured command of the whole party m a c h i n e r y . " ^ 3
Other contemporaries agreed with Lea's assessment. Quaker 
reformer and manufacturer, Philip C. Garrett, for example, 
noted how "Seventh Street", where the office of the Gas 
Trust was situated, had become a "synonym" for "the Ring" in 
Republican party c i r c l e s . M o r e  dramatically George 
Vickers claimed that,
James McManes held sway as an imperious and
exacting taskmaster. Artful in politics as a
Machiavelli, his name was synonymous with all that
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an autocratic and unscrupulous control of political
machinery and methods could imply....... Entrenched
in a political position which he had converted 
into a veritable fortress for purposes, offensive 
and defensive, he had gathered about him as his 
aides and lieutenants, men who were apt and skilful 
in executing his orders and prompt in sharing his 
spoils..............
To enter public service whether as a Councilman, a 
member of the legislature or as an officer of a 
public department, was to first give satisfactory 
proof of allegiance to these men to their claims 
and methods, with no reference whatever to personal 
scruples or to convictions of personal duty. The 
ease with which these combined spoilsmen made and 
unmade public offices.... was performed with the 
facility of a simple wave of the hand. Under their 
rule although elections still went on with their
accustomed regularity.......every material outcome
of such elections was in the interest of the self­
constituted dictators and against the interests of 
the people. To the cause of the former, Stokley 
with his twelve hundred police officers was a 
powerful auxiliary. ^
The Public Ledger and North American repeated these claims
in their obituaries of McManes, as did historian Harold
Zink, writing in the 1930's, who suggested that.
Republican nomination conventions followed the 
"King’s" orders because he controlled the 
organisation or machine which sent the delegates 
to the conventions.
McManes was able to control Councils in turn, because "in
Republican Philadelphia, nominations as a rule carried with
it election to o f f i c e . M o r e  recently, Howard Gillette
has argued that Stokley built a new political machine by
turning the "machinery of government into a vast patronage
system" and that Philadelphia's city hall now stands as a
"monument" to it.^7
It is my contention that contemporary observers and later 
historians have exaggerated the power and influence 
exercised by McManes and Stokley, and that neither qualifies
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as a genuine city boss. In the first place, there is the 
nature of their relationship to consider. Stokley was not 
always McManes' "powerful auxiliary," as Vickers claimed him 
to be, for he contended for power in his own right and not 
as an adjunct to McManes. Their relationship oscillated 
between mutual co-operation and outright hostility. Put 
briefly, McManes resented Stokley's periodic interference in 
the running of the Gas works. In 1868, it was Stokley who 
introduced the ordinance which attempted to abolish the 
Trust, and transfer the works to a Department of Gas. Again
in 1875, Stokley attempted to bring the gas works with all
its patronage under his control as Mayor. This effort also 
f a i l e d . 48 Nevertheless Stokley's hostility to the Gas Trust 
did not prevent McManes from endorsing him for the Mayoralty 
in 1874, and again in 1877. This was because Stokley had 
secured a number of favours for the Union Railway Company, 
of which McManes was a major stockholder, and in 1877 had 
agreed to support Albert C. Roberts, McManes' candidate for 
Receiver of Taxes (thereby guaranteeing McManes control of 
the Collectorship of Delinquent T a x e s ) . 49
Thereafter, however, a serious rift developed between the 
two, as they bitterly fought to gain the upper hand within 
the Republican party. In May 1878, at the state 
gubernatorial convention, the division of the city's 
delegates into factions was apparent when McManes' 
supporters donned "Black Hats" and Stokley's "White 
H a t s " . 80 Relations worsened in 1880 after Rufus Shapley, 
one of Stokley's closest allies and friends, published an
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anonymous political satire entitled Solid for Mulhooly which
gave a very unflattering account of McManes' career. It
traced Michael Mulhooly's (McManes) rise to fame from his
ancestral roots or "Paddy-Gree", "among the bogs of County
Tyrone" to "Boss of the Ring", by way of the saloon "in
which his first lessons of life were learned," to his
"apprenticeship as a repeater at the polls" following his
fraudulent naturalisation, and then as
a corrupt and perjured member of the municipal 
Legislature, always to be hired or bought by the 
highest bidder, and always an uneducated, vulgar, 
flashily-dressed, obscene creature of the Ring 
which made him what he is, and of which he is a 
worthy representative.
Mulhooly is portrayed as a bull-necked, beefy thug chomping
on a cigar, decked out in a gaudy vest and patterned
pantaloons, complete with derby hat and cane; the familiar
image which the public have associated with the boss for
generations (see Figure 3.1). Though published anonymously,
the authorship of the satire was speedily traced to Shapley
and in the subsequent Mayoral election in February 1881,
Stokley lost his bid for a fourth term of office partially
as a result of McManes' supporters cutting the Republican
ticket in a number of key wards.
Secondly, neither Stokley or McManes satisfactorily 
controlled the city Council. The Presidency of Councils was 
a very important position because the occupant appointed 
Councilmen to the Council Committees that considered and 
discussed prospective legislation and appropriations and 
made recommendations to the legislature. As the President
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Figure 3.1. Michael Mulh ooly (James McManes): His Ancestry, Education and Portrait. [Source: Solid for 
Mulhooly. A Political Satire by Rufus E. Shapley (Philadelphia, 1881). pp.l, 16, 20. Illustrations are 
by Thomas Nast.]
was elected each year at the start of the Council session, 
the office provides us with a gauge of the factional 
superiority of the various groups contending for power. An 
examination of the affiliations of the various Presidents 
between the Civil War and 1884, suggests that McManes and 
Stokley exercised at best only intermittent control over 
Councils (see Table 3.3). Stokley was at the height of his 
power between 1873 and 1876 when his close associate, A. 
Wilson Henszey, was President of Common Council. In January 
1876, Henszey was defeated by Independent Republican Joseph 
L. Caven, from the fifteenth ward (a district renowned for 
its "independence" in politics) and he held the office for 
five years before retiring to private life.^3 McManes' 
strength rested largely in the Select Council but his 
control was so insecure that he himself was defeated as a 
candidate for re-election to the Gas Trust in 1882.^4
The reason why they failed to control the city council lies 
in the fact that they did not control the Republican party 
either. Let us take, for example, the Republican party's 
nominations for public office. The Republican party rules 
provided for a party organisation and a nominating system. 
The organisation of the Republican party paralleled the 
city's governmental structure. It included bodies 
representing the electoral division (precinct), the ward, 
and the city at large. Division associations organised 
annually, and were designed to be popular assemblies of the 
resident Republican voters. At the regular annual primary. 
Republican citizens met at their respective Club Rooms to
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Table 3.3. Presidents of Councils and their Political 
Affiliation, 1865-1884
Ward Years of Office Affiliation
Common Council
William S. Stokley 9 1865-67 Stokley
Joseph F. Marcer 20 1867-69 IR
Louis Wagner 22 1869-71 IR
Henry Huhn 15 1871-72 IR
Louis Wagner 22 1872-73 IR
A. Wilson Henszey 1 0 1873-76 Stokley
Joseph L. Caven 1 5 1876-81 IR
William H. Lex 8 1881-84 IR
Select Council
William S. Stokley 9 1868-70 Stokley
S. W. Cattell 24 1870-72 Stokley
W. E. Littleton 1 2 1872-74 IR
R. W. Downing 1 4 1874-75 Stokley
W. W. Burnell 1 5 1875-76 Democrat
George A. Smith 28 1876-78 IR
George W. Bumm 1 8 1878-81 McManes
William B. Smith 28 1882-84 IR
Sources: Manual of Councils, 1889-90, pp.124-5; George 
Vickers, The Fall of Bossism: A History of the Committee of 
One Hundred and the Reform Movement in Philadelphia and 
Pennsylvania, v. 1, (Philadelphia, 1883); Frank W. Leach, 
"Twenty Years with Quay," North American, Feb. 12, March 12, 
April 23, 1905; Howard F . Gillette, Jr., Corrupt and 
Contented, Philadelphia's Political Machine, 1865-1887 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970), 
chs. 2, 5, 7, 8.
IR Independent Republican
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elect three (and from 1877, two) members from each division 
to the ward executive committee. In turn each of the ward 
committees elected a member to the City Executive 
Committee.
With reference to the nominating system, the candidates for 
all offices were nominated by either a ward or city 
convention. Initially, all public offices at large were 
nominated at one city convention but the opportunities this 
had created for log-rolling led to a "growing indignation 
(among) the people," and by 1868 separate conventions for 
each public office had been instituted, "in order to render 
less easy the purchase or dictation of nominations by the 
managers of rings," as local reformers put it.^^ Each 
division elected one delegate to each City Convention, and 
two representatives to the Ward Convention. The only 
alteration in these arrangements, prior to the introduction 
of the direct primary in 1906, occurred between 1877 and 
1881, when the number of delegates each ward was entitled to 
send to a City Convention was made dependent on the number 
of Republican votes that were polled in the particular ward 
in the prece_ding general election. That is, each ward was 
entitled to one representative for every 500 Republican 
votes, or majority thereof, although every ward was to be 
represented by at least three d e l e g a t e s . ^7 This meant that 
the average size of City Conventions, prior to 1887, was 688 
delegates, though only 160 between 1877 and 1881.
With such large numbers of delegates at City conventions
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held at the same time on the same day, it would have been 
extremely difficult to exercise central control even under 
circumstances of party harmony. As it was however, the 
Republican party was rent by factionalism, particularly 
during the period 1877 to 1881. As well as the triumvirate 
of Stokley, Hill and Leeds, and the supporters of McManes, 
such as Councilman William E. Rowan and City committeeman 
Christian Kneass, it is possible to distinguish a third 
faction that contended for power within the Republican 
party. This was led by Hamilton Disston and included State 
Treasurer, Robert Mackey, and nineteenth ward leader, David 
Martin. Disston was a man of considerable independent 
wealth. In 1878, at the age of thirty-four, he inherited 
his father's saw manufacturing works which employed over
2,000 men and was reputed to be the largest of its kind in 
the country. Disston, like Mackey and Martin, was as 
interested in the state political arena as well as the local 
one.58
Consequently, there was no single "boss" dictating party 
nominations, rather the various factions fought it out 
(sometimes, literally) in the convention hall. As a 
successful nomination depended on factions securing the 
largest number of delegates, conventions occasionally became 
rowdy and violent as disputes arose, particularly over the 
admission of delegates when seats were contested by rival 
factions.59 Sometimes the factions were able to compromise 
on a slate, but when such negotiations failed, and if the 
differences were strong enough, the struggles between them
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spilled over into the electoral arena. For example, in 
November 1876, William E. Rowan, McManes' candidate for 
Sheriff, was defeated by almost 7,000 votes, while other 
city wide Republican candidates gained a majority of between
14,000 and 15,000 votes. Rowan's defeat was attributed to 
Disston and Stokley supporters refusing to vote for him.^O 
A similar explanation was offered a year later when the 
Democrat, Robert E. Pattison, defeated James Sayre, another 
McManes' candidate, to become City Controller. Finally, as
noted earlier, Stokley himself was defeated for the
Mayoralty in 1881, when McManes' supporters cut the 
Republican ticket.
Furthermore, these three broad factions did not exercise a
monopoly on the candidate selection process for it was still
possible, given the number and size of city conventions, for
an individual politician to secure a nomination by making an
independent and direct appeal to party workers. Success in
such a venture usually depended on how well their campaign
was organised, the personal popularity of the individual
concerned, and their record of party s e r v i c e . F r a n k  W.
Leach, a Republican party worker in the eighth ward in the
1870's, recalled in 1905 that:
The methods resorted to thirty years ago to secure 
a nomination for an important city or county office 
were so unlike those employed nowadays that the 
lack of resemblance almost suggests another 
nationality and a different form of city government. 
Then the ward and precinct workers who possessed 
minds, souls, individualities much as they were of 
their own were duly sought after and consulted. 
Candidates went from ward to ward and almost from 
house to house.
By 1905, division representation had become an "abstract
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principle" according to Leach, but a quarter of a century 
earlier it "meant division representation pure and 
simple.
In these circumstances, John O'Donnell was able to secure
the nomination for Recorder of Deeds in 1881, and George de
B. Keim that of Sheriff in 1882, entirely independent of the
various party factions. Moreover William B. Smith secured
the Mayoralty nomination in January 1884, despite a position
of open defiance towards M c M a n e s . ^5 Thus it would seem that
contrary to the claims of reformers, and later historians.
Republican nominating conventions did not follow McManes, or
anybody else's, orders. As Leach put it rather wistfully:
In these days [1905] of enormous majorities, when 
Philadelphia's wonderful "Organisation" glides upon 
the even tenor of its way, seemingly unmoved and 
undisturbed by criticism or opposition, it is 
difficult to comprehend the conditions as they 
existed a quarter of a century ago.
Whereas placidity prevails today in the inner 
councils of the party managers, then all was 
turbulence and strife. First the factions fought 
among themselves. Then the people combined to 
overthrow the factions. Encounter succeeded 
encounter, as the night the day; charge followed 
charge along the entire line of battle. The 
militant host slept upon their guns, or slept not 
at all.
Surely these were strident, stringent, strenuous
dayslGb
It is not surprising then that since these factions 
struggled to gain control over party nominations for city 
offices, they exercised even less influence over ward public 
offices. The party appeared to be somewhat centralised 
since it was governed by a City Committee, but this
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appearance was illusory. That is, the party organis_,ation 
did not function as its centralised and hierarchical 
structure suggested. So, even if McManes was the sole boss, 
and party factionalism was absent, he would still have had 
no formal control over the membership and decisions of the 
party's local units. This was because the wards were the 
prime units of the organisational structure. For example, 
representatives on the party's City Committee were selected 
at the ward level and could only be removed from office by a 
two-thirds vote of the ward committee.Moreover,  as we 
have seen, each ward elected candidates to Councils, and as 
that body became increasingly involved in the decisions that 
allocated the city's tangible resources, the ward caucuses 
acquired even greater political importance. In practice, 
what evolved was a botton-heavy structure in which candidate 
selection and voter mobilisation depended on action at the 
ward level. The City Committee did not function as a 
centralised and powerful institution that was capable of 
extinguishing dissent and controlling the candidate 
selection process. It had no institutionalised means to 
control the selection process for the increasingly important 
seats on the Councils. The City Committee could not slate 
or deslate nominees for public office made by Republican 
ward conventions. In sum, it had no monopoly over the 
recruitment of candidates to public office.
Consequently, neither McManes or Stokley was able to ensure 
the renomination of followers nominally affiliated to them, 
nor the failure of renomination of those who opposed them.
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For example, when Stokley's ally, Wilson Henszey, was 
defeated for the Presidency of Common Council by Joseph 
Caven in January 1876, the terms of seventeen of the twenty- 
eight Councilmen who voted for the former were about to 
expire. Only six of these sixteen faithful Stokley 
supporters who sought renomination were successful, and just 
four were re-elected in February 1876. By contrast, ten out 
of eleven of the thirty-two Councilmen who voted for the 
Independent Republican were successfully renominated and 
elected, including Caven himself despite "organised 
hostility on the part of a considerable number of office­
holders" in the fifteenth ward.^® Stokley and McManes also 
failed to prevent Caven's re-election in 1879, and were 
similarly unsuccessful in their efforts to dislodge the 
Committee Chairmen, appointed by Caven, either at the ward 
nominating conventions or subsequent elections.
Furthermore, they could not prevent Republican politicians 
not endorsed by the party organisation from being elected. 
For example, John Hunter, Caven's Finance Committee 
Chairman, was successfully elected as an Independent 
Republican from the 24th ward in 1877, and re-elected in 
1880, even though he was denied the Republican party's 
nomination on both o c c a s i o n s . E v e n  more damaging for 
McManes, his closest associates were vulnerable to electoral 
defeat. For example, in February 1881 Nathan Spering was 
defeated for re-election to the Select Council when 
dissident Republican "regulars", organised by Samuel 
Houseman and Israel W. Durham, split the party vote in the
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seventh ward when they opted to support the Democratic
candidate George R. S n o w d e n . Again, in February 1882, in
the elections to the Select Council in the eighth,
thirteenth, twenty-eighth and thirty-first wards, four
Independent Republicans (A. Haller Gross, J.P. Woolverton,
William B. Smith, and James Whitaker) defeated four McManes
stalwarts (Don Blair, James Miles, James Dobson, and Frances
Martin) even though they failed to secure the Republican
7 ?party nomination in their respective wards.
The methods of distribution of patronage and the nature of 
party organisation, enhanced the "independence" of wards and 
weakened prospective centralised control still further. As 
noted earlier, the mayor had been gradually shorn of his 
powers as Executive and the responsibility for city services 
had become fragmented among over thirty separate boards and 
departments. As the bulk of these departments reported to 
Councils and not the Mayor, the patronage associated with 
the new city services fell to the Councillors (see Table 
3.4). Since each ward nominated and elected its own 
representative the ward leaders had direct control over the 
increasing number of municipal jobs. Excluding the gas 
works and the police department, as well as the "Row" 
offices, there were more than 4,000 municipal jobs available 
in 1879, worth a total value of over two and a half million 
d o l l a r s . A n  examination of the patronage appointment 
books for the Water Department reveals that the party 
successful in Councils in electing its nominee as head of 
department, secured the spoils. In this case the
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Table 3.4. The Jurisdiction of Political Appointments
Mayor Counci1s City Officers County ("Row') Offices
*Chief of Police 
Chief Boiler Inspector
Positions held by virtue of Mayoral 
Office:
Sinking Fund Commissioner 
Parks Commissioner 
Director, Board of City Trusts
Managers, House of Refuge 
Trustee, Penn Museum
Clerks & Messengers of Councils City Controller
Highways Commissioner City Coroner
Commissioner of Markets & City Property ^City Solicitor
Chief Engineer Water Dept ^Receiver of Taxes
Chief Surveyor 
Fire Commission
Chief of Electrical Dept.
Managers, House of Correction 
Board of Guardians, Phi la.Alms House
Trustees of the Gas Works 
Board of Port Wardens 
Trustees of the City Ice Boats 
Board of Health
Trustees,N.Liberties Gas Company 
Sinking Fund Commissioners 
Buildings Inspector 
Directors of Girard College
* Directors of Rail-Road Companies
City Treasurer 
District Attorney 
Recorder of Deeds 
Register of Wills 
Sheriff
Sources: The Republican Manual containing information in Relation to the Government of the Republican 
Party in the City of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1857), pp. 81-2; Manual of Councils'  ^ 1835-86, p p . 55-59. 
T appointments subject to confirmation by Select Council 
X The Pennsylvania Railroad and Philadelphia and Erie Railroad Companies.
Republicans successfully elected William H. McFadden as 
Chief Engineer of the Water Department (1873-1882) and 
patronage appointments were distributed among Republican 
Councilman regardless of their affiliation with which 
f a c t i o n . T h e  City Committee did not control the 
distribution of patronage and nor did any single individual. 
McManes' chief source of power lay in the Gas Trust, while 
Stokley's, as Mayor, lay in the 1200 privates and 98 
officers of the police department.75
Contrary to Gillette's claims, Stokley did not build a new 
political machine by turning the "machinery of government 
into a vast patronage system." Indeed, the Republican party 
organisation at this time seems to have resembled a feudal 
hierarchy since local officials, in return for their 
partisan support, exercised control over a significant 
proportion of the material rewards available to the party. 
This control not only enhanced their influence within their 
petty domains, but also increased their bargaining power 
against those wishing to centralise power within the party 
organisation.
Furthermore, although the abolition of the volunteer fire 
department in 1871 paved the way for a more disciplined 
party organisation, the Republican party apparatus still 
remained weak in the 1870's. For example, over two-thirds 
of the divisions (23 out of 33) in the nineteenth ward had 
no year-round organisation as late as October 1877, even 
though this had been made mandatory rather than permissible 
in the party rules since 1871.76
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Thus, the absence of an effective party apparatus and the 
lack of control over the distribution of rewards combined 
with a set of party practices (ward level nominations and 
elections), effectively precluded the City Committee or any 
individual "boss" from exerting firm discipline over party 
workers. Consequently, party leaders such as McManes and 
Stokley also had difficulty in controlling the behaviour of 
their nominal followers in public office. For example, when 
Stokley received the news that Caven had been elected 
President of Common Council against both his and McManes' 
wishes, the Sunday Times reported "his fat cheeks became 
flushed with excitment and rage." At once, he announced his 
intention to suspend and revoke the police appointments 
previously made for the nineteen Republicans who voted for 
C a v e n . T h i s  incident underlines the weakness of Stokley's 
position, namely that patronage by itself, without a strong 
party organisation, was not a sufficient guarantee that 
subordinates would always follow orders.
In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that neither 
Stokley or McManes were genuine city bosses. That they have 
been portrayed as such is due in large measure to the 
contemporary assessment of their powers by observers such as 
Lea, Bryce and Vickers. Lea and Bryce accurately describe 
the Republican party structure and organisation, but not how 
it functioned. In their defence it can be argued that they 
are not the only ones that have overlooked this crucial 
distinction. Historians and social scientists, such as
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Robert Merton for instance, have also subsequently mistaken 
the hierarchical structure of party organisations for their 
actual functioning. However Lea and Bryce also assumed that 
all office-holders were beholden to McManes, and they failed 
to distinguish the various factions and contenders for power 
within the party. Consequently, one is left with the 
colourful picture, drawn by Vickers, which depicts a 
Republican political machine as a monolithic mob with 
McManes as the supreme nabob, dictating every act and every 
crime (see Figure 3.2). Historians like Zink perpetuated 
the traditional myth of the dictatorial sway of the boss, 
because their research was based on the reform-inspired 
apocrypha of the times.
This is plainly no longer adequate. It is perhaps more 
accurate to describe McManes and Stokley as leaders of 
"Rings"; that is, an intra-governmental operation that tied 
a loose coalition of politicians together in the quest for 
specific material benefits. Unlike ward "bosses", they were 
able to exercise power and influence city-wide because of 
the public, rather than party offices, they personally 
occupied. Ironically their respective power bases, although 
unusual features of Philadelphia city government in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, actually resembled 
the close corporation of the eighteenth century colonial 
town. The Public Buildings Commission and the Gas Trust 
were secret bodies, not accountable to city Councils; the 
former created by the state legislature, the latter 
unwittingly invested with autocratic power. Gillette's
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Figure 3.2. Michael Mulh ooly (James McManes): The Supreme Nabob. [Sources: Solid for Mulhooly. A Political 
Satire by Rufus E. Shapley (Philadelphia, 1881), pp. 70, 185. Illustrations are by Thomas Nast. See also 
George Vickers. The Fall of B oss ism : A History of the Committee of One Hundred and the R e form Movement in 
Phil adelphia and P e n n sylvania (Philadelphia, 1883), pp. iii, vi-vii, 3-5, 20, 219J
claim that city hall now stands as a "monument to a new 
political machine" is misleading, because it was the 
Republican political machine that emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, that actually canvassed for the 
abolition of the Buildings Commission. Indeed when the 
Commission was finally abolished in 1901, U.S. Senator Boies 
Penrose, Quays's heir as state Republican party leader, 
telegraphed his congratulations from Washington to his 
faithful lieutenant in Harrisburg, State Senator James P. 
McNichol, who along with Israel Durham controlled the new 
Republican machine in Philadelphia.
A final limitation on "boss" power at this time (and indeed 
right up until 1951 when Philadelphia finally achieved home 
rule) was the fact that the city was not a self contained 
arena of political activity. The city government was a 
creature of the state legislature and the boundaries of the 
urban polity were highly permeable. The dependence and 
permeability of the urban polity meant that things happened 
not only in Philadelphia but also to Philadelphia. For 
example, in the absence of a general incorporation law 
before 1874, the state legislature exercised its 
constitutional right to enact special and local legislation. 
Street railway companies, for instance, were granted access 
to the streets of Philadelphia on such terms as the 
legislature saw fit. In 1868, the legislative jurisdiction 
of the city was by-passed completely, when the state 
legislature passed the so-called "Railway Boss Act" which 
prohibited the city from regulating street railroads without
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specific authorisation from the Assembly.®^ The creation of 
the Public Buildings Commission in 1870 was, as we have 
seen, another example of the legislature undermining the 
principle of self-government.®^
Indeed, Henry C. Lea blamed the lack of self-government as
the main reason for the failure of Philadelphia's municipal
administration, as he explained to fellow-reformer John P.
Wetherill in October 1872:
The source of much of the evil which we suffer is 
to be found in the exaggerated powers exercised by 
our legislature. We boast that we are a free 
people and yet there is not a municipality in the 
state that is not subject to a despotism as 
arbitrary and as irresponsible as that which vexes
the inhabitants of Moscow or Constantinople......
the theory of absolute and indefeasible sovereignty 
residing in the State, supreme in all things not 
specially reserved to the Federal authority, places 
every fragment of the people under a domination as 
autocratic and irresponsible as that of an Eastern 
despot.
.........Every detail of municipal government....
is regulated for us by those who cannot possibly 
know anything about it and in exchange for this we 
acquire the wretched privilege of similarly 
interfering with the self-government of our fellow 
citizens. The absurdity of such a system is so 
self-evident that the mere statement of it would 
seem to be sufficient to insure its removal.... 
our very municipality is merely the creature of 
the legislature which may abolish it altogether 
at any moment or interfere in the minutest detail 
of its organisation.®®
Patronage provided another way in which Philadelphia's 
political system was penetrated by external authorities.
The state appointed port wardens, physicians, prison and 
bank inspectors, public notaries and the City Recorder, as 
well as county inspectors to regulate trade, weighers of 
merchandise, measurers of grain and so forth. In total the
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governor controlled over 660 appointments in Philadelphia in 
1876.84 The national government had even larger patronage 
resources at its disposal. In addition to the Customs 
House, the Federal Mint, the Schuylkill and Frankford 
Arsenals, and the Southwark Navy Yard, there were the jobs 
controlled by the U.S. Marshall in the city, the 
subtreasurer and postmaster, all of whom were federal 
appointees.
The limited capacity of city government and the potential 
interventions of state and national government meant that 
local politicians were forced to go outside the city itself 
to achieve their aims. Working for local goals at the state 
or national level required them to seek allies outside the 
city. Conversely, the size and importance of Philadelphia 
led those political actors in the state arena to ally with 
politicians from the city. Although Philadelphia was the 
smallest of the sixty-three counties in Pennsylvania in 
terms of size, its population of 674,022 in 1870 was well 
over double that of its nearest rival, Allegheny County, 
which numbered only 262,204 inhabitants. As the state's 
second largest city, Pittsburgh's population was only 53,000 
in 1870. Philadelphia's political importance can be 
adjudged from the fact that in 1870 it accounted for 
approximately one-quarter of the state's electorate, and 
provided six of Pennsylvania's twenty-seven Congressmen, 
four of its thirty-one state senators and eighteen of its 
one hundred state representatives. It also provided sixteen 
members of the Republican State Central Committee formed in
1 06
1868, while every other county in the state was restricted 
to just one representative.®^ Philadelphia was so powerful 
politically that the New York Times claimed that "it was the 
state." Similarly, the Harrisburg Patriot called the state 
capitol "Philadelphia's thirtieth ward."®^ While these 
claims are exaggerated, they do testify to the crucial 
significance of Philadelphia in state and national politics. 
State and federal political actors therefore needed to 
accommodate the city's politicians if they were to increase 
their power in the state and federal arena. In the process 
of jostling for supremacy they were to change fundamentally 
the configuration of political forces in the city.
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4. The Politics of Protest and Reform
This investigation of party politics in Philadelphia has so 
far concentrated solely on the political "boss" and his 
organisation. I have suggested that although the style of 
political competition associated with machine politics 
played a central role in the city's political life, the 
system of party politics was not organised or centralised. 
Put another way, in spite of appearances to the contrary, 
Philadelphia, in the period prior to 1887, was not governed 
by a single overall "boss" at the head of a well-disciplined 
and centralised party organisation.
What I want to consider now in this chapter is the nature of 
political reform in Philadelphia during this period. Any 
assessment of reform politics at this time must take into 
account two conflicting interpretations of the political 
activities of the city's men of wealth in the post-bellum 
city. On the one hand, sociologist E. Digby Baltzell and 
historians Sam Bass Warner Jr. and Russell Weigley, have 
argued that the city's men of wealth (in particular the new 
business and banking elite which displaced the old colonial 
gentry at the top of the city's social structure at the time 
of the Civil War) abandoned local affairs and politics. On 
the other hand, contemporary observers such as George 
Vickers, Alexander McClure, James Bryce, E. V. Smalley and 
subsequently Henry Lea's biographer, Edward S. Bradley, have 
claimed that reform groups organised by the city's "best
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men" scored a series of stunning reform victories against 
"bossism" in the 1870's, culminating in Stokley's defeat in
1 881 J
It is my contention that neither interpretation is accurate, 
for, as.I will show, the city's businessmen did participate 
in local affairs, but since reform politics was limited to 
groups that were few in number, short-lived, poorly 
organised and unrepresentative, they did not enjoy- the 
degree of success that contemporary publicists maintained. 
Indeed, the reform groups organised by the city's 
businessmen played only a peripheral role in the electoral 
and governmental arena. I would suggest that they resemble 
those early reform groups which Kenneth Fox has categorised 
as "indigenous" responses to local conditions. That is, 
those reform groups which/ in the absence of a national 
social scientific approach to the theory and practice of 
urban government, drew entirely from resources and values 
already in place, and addressed the municipal condition as 
purely a local one.^ The intention of this chapter is to 
show that just as there was no cohesive city-wide political 
machine in Philadelphia at this time, nor was there a well- 
organised reform movement.
THE "BEST MEN" IN RETREAT?
Although the exodus of the wealthy from political life is a 
familiar theme in the literature on nineteenth century urban 
politics, I suggested earlier, in Chapter 2, that Warner's
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assertion that Philadelphia businessmen "abandoned the 
city's affairs and its politics" was misleading, in the 
sense that their retreat from political office was a post- 
bellum rather than ante-bellum phenomenon, and that it was 
as much a change forced upon them as it was a voluntary 
gesture on their part.^ It is necessary, however, to 
qualify Warner's claim still further for as it stands it 
bears little relation to historical reality. That 
businessmen had not become "ignorant of their city and 
abandoned its politics" in the post-bellum period can be 
demonstrated in a number of ways. If we take the city's 
post-war social elite as drawn up by Baltzell for instance, 
an analysis of the thirty-nine men in the city whose income 
exceeded $25,000 in 1864 reveals that ten, far from 
"abandoning the city's affairs," were actively engaged in 
local reform politics (see Table 4.1). It is worth noting 
that these men of wealth were not just members of reform 
groups but prominent activists who occupied important posts 
of responsibility. Indeed they were often the prime movers 
in their formation. For instance, it was Henry C. Lea, ably 
supported by Wheeler, Baird, Drexel and Lippincott, who was 
largely responsible for the organisation of the Citizens' 
Municipal Reform Association (C.M.R.A.) in June 1871, and 
the Reform Club in Spring 1872.^
The C.M.R.A. was set up in response to the establishment of 
the Public Buildings Commission by the state legislature in 
the summer of 1870. Reform publicist George Vickers 
pinpointed the act creating the Commission,
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Table 4.1. Elite Philadelphians and their Political
Activities, 1871-1886*
Name Occupation C.M.R.A. Reform
Club
Comm, 
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Other
Matthew
Baird
(2nd)& Locomotive
Manufacturer
Central
Council
M U.L.
Charles
Wheeler
( 5th) Ironmaster Tr. M M C.S.R.A.
U.L.
Anthony 
J. Drexel
(6th) Banker Finance
Comm.
Vice 
Pres.
Tr. C.S.R.A.
U.L.
Edward 
W. Clark
(14th) Banker M C.M.A.
J. Vaughan 
Merrick
(17th) Ironmaster Central
Council
C.M.A.
C.S.R.A.
Joshua B. 
Lippincott
(18th) Publisher Central
Council
Vice 
Pres.
U.L.
Clarence 
H. Clark
(21st) Banker C.M.A.
Henry 
C. Lea
(27th) Publisher Vice 
Pres.
Pres. M C.M.A.
C.S.R.A.
U.L.
John
Wanamaker
(33rd) Dry Goods 
Merchant
M C.S.R.A.
Clement
Biddle
(39th) Lawyer M M MC 1871 
U.L.
Sources: E. Digby Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy 
(New York, 1958), p.108; Howard F. Gillette, Corrupt and 
Contented, Philadelphia's Political Machine, 1865-1887 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970), 
pp.53-4; Citizens' Municipal Reform Association, Committee 
and Membership, 1871-72; Committee of One Hundred (undated 
leaflet listing members of the Committee and their 
residence); Citizens' Municipal Association, Constitution, 
By-Laws, and List of Members, 1886; Civil Service Reform 
Association of Philadelphia, First Annual Report of the 
Executive Committee, 1882, pp.37-48; all the above pamphlets 
were published in Philadelphia and are held at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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One elite Philadelphian actively engaged in politics 
though not included in this table is Thomas Dolan 
(11th), on the grounds that as chairman of the state 
Republican party in 1882, he was an associate of 
Matthew Quay and the state Republican machine, and not 
a participant in reform activities. See ch.8 of this 
thesis.
^ The figure in parentheses indicates the position of the 
elite member in Baltzell's table of the wealthiest 
individuals in the city in 1864.
C.M.A. Citizens' Municipal Association
C.S.R.A. Civil Service Reform Association
M Member
MC 1871 Democratic party candidate in the 1871 mayoral 
election
Tr. Treasurer
U.L. Union League
as the origin of the reform movement in 
Philadelphia. By creating a body with unlimited 
tenure of office, with power to fill all vacancies, 
with authority to tax the community and to spend 
the public money without restriction or supervision 
this act was so subversive of all the principles of 
self-government that when its provisions came to be 
fully understood it aroused general indignation.^
Those citizens indignant enough to join the reform effort 
included the city's most prominent bankers, lawyers, 
manufacturers and merchants. Of the seventy-five C.M.R.A. 
activists listed in Appendix 1 , for example, one-third were 
manufacturers, seventeen were lawyers, sixteen, merchants, 
and four, bankers. Four publishers, two stockbrokers, two 
physicans, a railroad president, newspaper publisher, hotel 
proprietor and a painter, made up the remainder. These 
reformers varied in background as well as in occupation.
For example, some such as the "gentlemen-lawyers" Clement
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Biddle, Theodore Cuyler and William Rawle, were descendants 
of the city's "First Families" of the Revolutionary period, 
while others, like Irish immigrant and locomotive 
manufacturer Matthew Baird, ironmaster Charles Wheeler and 
publisher Joshua Lippincott had worked themselves up out of 
poverty to establish million dollar businesses. Still 
others, such as the publisher Henry C. Lea, ironmaster J. 
Vaughan Merrick, and bankers Anthony J. Drexel and Edward W. 
Clark, had inherited their respective family businesses.^
The reformers also differed in their political allegiance, 
for while the majority of them were strongly Republican, the 
group did include conspicuous Democrats such as Lehman 
Ashmead, James Dougherty, William Massey and Colonel James 
Page.^
The reform group as a whole then included an impressive 
cross-section of the city's best citizens, whose unity 
(given the differences between them) would have seemed quite 
remarkable were it not for the fact that they had been 
accustomed to joint intervention in local politics in the 
past; such as for example, in sponsoring measures like the 
political consolidation of Philadelphia and the chartering 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, on the basis that it would be 
for the general good of the business community, and the city 
as a whole.® Howard Gillette has argued that it was this 
"tradition by which government and business formed a 
partnership for the public good (that) provided the common 
ground for businessmen reformers.
Unity among businessmen was also fostered by organisations
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like the Commercial Exchange and the Board of Trade.
Founded in 1854 by merchant reformer George L. Buzby, 
precisely for the purpose of bringing businessmen of all 
types together, the Commerical Exchange listed among its 
membership in 1871 manufacturers from the reform groups such 
as William Massey (brewer), Barton Jenks (textiles) and 
Israel P. Morris (iron), and merchants Henry Winsor 
(shipping), John Wetherill and Amos R. Little (dry goods). 
Links between merchants and manufacturers were strengthened 
still further through exclusive social clubs such as the 
Union League of which at least thirty of the seventy-five
C.M.R.A. activists were m e m b e r s . W h a t  brought businessmen 
together in the immediate post-war period was not a scheme 
for internal improvements or such like, but a common threat 
to the security of their wealth, in this case the career 
politician who, as we saw in Chapter 2, had taken control of 
the local Republican party organisation and city government.
The sense of grievance men of wealth felt at the loss of 
their social and political leadership was aggravated by the 
economic consequences of the influx of "fourth rate 
political ward jobbers into Councils who go there not for 
the honour but for the p l u n d e r . B u s i n e s s m e n  reformers 
were particularly alarmed on two counts. On the one hand 
they believed that the city's finances were out of control 
and that escalating levels of taxation, expenditure and 
indebtedness had to be arrested or else the "inevitable 
result (will) be the destruction of our credit and a 
crushing burden of taxation that will destroy the sources of
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our prosperity.  ^ On the other hand, they also felt
aggrieved that in spite of "the vast sums which have been
levied upon us," basic city services were still poor and
i n a d e q u a t e . T h e  C.M.R.A. maintained that,
the sums so recklessly squandered during the past 
ten or twelve years should have given us the best 
ordered, cleanest, best-paved, best-lighted city 
in Christendom, with exhaustless supplies of pure 
water, a model police force and a school system 
unapproachable in its excellence and completeness.
Yet there is not a third-rate city in Europe that 
is not our superior in most of these necessary 
adjuncts to modern civilisation. Our streets 
never were filthier nor so constantly in need of 
repair, breeding pestilence and wearing out horses 
and vehicles. Our gas never was so poor or so 
dear; our water supply so indifferent in quality 
and insufficient in quantity; our school system 
manifesting so alarming a tendency to extravagance 
and corruption; our police force so passive in 
maintaining order and so active in perpetrating 
election frauds.
The reason why "we are so deficient in nearly all the
comforts and adornments which befit a great metropolis" is
due to "the culpable neglect of the authorities," in
particular, "fraud and extravagance" on the part of
a few hundred idle and worthless politicians [who] 
grow rich, while the people are plundered and 
receive comparatively nothing, either in good 
government or necessary improvements.
The reformers identified the two "sources of evil from which
we suffer"1G as being on the one hand, "the fact that the
people of our large cities really do not govern
themselves,"1  ^ and on the other,
the heated partisanship which has led our 
citizens to sacrifice their better judgement and 
independence to the dictates of party discipline, 
and to support the "regular nominees" of their 
political faith irrespective of the character and 
qualifications of candidates....
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......Corruption, incapacity and self-seeking have
become recommendations for office, and our 
municipal government has thus necessarily passed 
into the hands of the corrupt and incapable.
The remedy to the city's problems then, the reformers
believed,
lies in emancipating ourselves from the bonds of
party discipline............ It lies in recognising
the difference between the business of supplying 
our community with water, gas, cleaning, paving, 
schooling, and justice, and the great questions of 
statesmanship which divide the country at large 
into political parties.
Between these there is no necessary connection and 
the object of the Reform Association has been to 
form an organisation through which men of the most 
opposite political convictions could unite in the 
work of securing an honest, efficient and 
economical transaction of municipal business 
without thereby proving false to their political 
allegiance or endangering the success of their 
respective parties throughout the nation.
The reformers set themselves a simple general objective: "to 
reform, if possible existing abuses and to prevent their 
reoccurrence by causing honest men to be elected to 
legislative and municipal o f f i c e . T h e y  set about 
achieving this objective, in the first instance, by 
attempting to secure additional support from the rest of the 
business community. At Henry Lea's instigation, they 
organised a Reform Club designed so as to counteract the 
feeling among businessmen that independent voting in local 
elections would aid Democratic attempts to lower tariffs.
The Reform Club's constitution, like the C.M.R.A.'s charter, 
prevented it from participating in state or national 
politics, and consequently the reformers confined their 
activities to municipal affairs which they regarded "as 
simply a matter of business and not of politics.
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In order to secure the election of capable, honest men, 
irrespective of party, the reformers reasoned that it would 
be necessary initially "to arouse public indignation."^^ 
Accordingly, they sought to demonstrate to the electorate, 
by way of pamphlets, tracts, addresses and public meetings, 
that "we were being most frightfully robbed and 
m i s g o v e r n e d . "22 For example, they issued tracts purporting 
to show the prevalence of ballot fraud under the existing 
registration and election laws; the reckless extravagance of 
the "Row offices" and the fee system; how funds were 
misappropriated by the city treasurer, and how levels of 
taxation and expenditure were outstripping the growth of
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population and the value of property. In a similar vein, 
Henry Lea published a political satire in September 1872 
entitled Songs for the Politicians. They included "The 
Respectable Man" and "The Educated Hog" which ridiculed 
those respectable middle-class citizens who, driven by 
conformity or self-interest, always voted for the "regular" 
ticket. The hired thug who intimidated the voter at the 
polls was the subject of "The Battle Song of the Rounder", 
while "The Lament of the Taxpayer" was devoted to the 
citizens who always ended up the l o s e r . 24
For all their propaganda, however, the reformers failed 
miserably in the electoral arena. The maximum number of 
votes they collected when they presented their own ticket 
for county officers, for example, was in 1872 when they 
received just 13,000 votes out of the 90,000 cast.25 The 
reformers blamed national issues, ballot fraud and the
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novelty of independent voting for their poor performance.^^
Although frustrated in their electoral efforts, they were 
more successful in their attempt to curb state legislative 
interference in local affairs. In this respect they were 
beneficiaries of (as well as being participants in) the 
successful campaign for constitutional revision that was 
launched in the early 1870's, following the widespread 
publicity given to allegations of political corruption in 
the state government. In presenting the reformers' 
proposals in January 1873 to the state convention that was 
given the task of drawing up a new constitution, Lea argued 
that responsible local self-government in Philadelphia could 
be realised only if the practice by which the state 
legislature enacted special and local legislation was ended; 
the voter registration and election laws changed; the system 
of administering justice in petty cases reformed; the fee 
system abolished and provision made for the punishment of 
bribery of public officials.^®
By stripping the (Republican dominated) Board of 
Aldermen of supervisory control of the voter registration 
system; forbidding special and local legislation, replacing 
fees with a salaried system and making bribery punishable, 
the convention accepted every one of the reformers 
suggestions except for the proposal that elected Aldermen be
p Q
replaced by magistrates appointed by the Governor. With 
the adoption of a new state constitution in 187 4 reform 
activity subsided as the city's "best men", confident that
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the foundations for responsible local government had been 
laid, turned their attention to the effort to bring the 
nation's Centennial celebration to Philadelphia.^^ A new 
era in Philadelphia politics failed to materialise however, 
and when the opportunity arose to exploit the factional 
rivalry within the Republican party, the city's businessmen, 
inspired by paper manufacturer E. Dunbar Lockwood and dry 
goods merchant Amos Little, mobilised in November 1880 "to 
give the Gas Trust its death blow."^^
The Committee of One Hundred closely resembled earlier 
reform groups both in its membership and objectives.
Indeed, thirteen former members of the C.M.R.A. such as Lea, 
Drexel and Wheeler were members of the original Committee 
set up on November 26 (see Appendix 2). Of the 137 members 
who participated between 1880 and 1883, a substantial 
majority listed their occupations within the business 
community as merchants(45), manufacturers(30) or 
professional men(13).^^ Like their predecessors Committee 
members also pursued their business interests in civic and 
social organisations for fifty-six of them belonged to the 
Board of Trade, and seventy to the Union League. The 
Committee's high social status can be adjudged from the fact 
that two-thirds of its members (90) were listed in Boyd's 
Blue Book which described itself as a "society directory 
containing a list of the names and addresses of the elite of 
the city of P h i l a d e l p h i a . I n  a subsequent review of 
early reform groups, the Municipal League of Philadelphia 
depicted the Committee of One Hundred as being "a select
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body of men" that represented "in its personnel many of the 
city's commercial and professional interests.
Initially conceived as an Independent Republican body 
"seeking to reform the management of the Republican party," 
the Committee quickly abandoned the notion of "reform within 
the party," in favour of an "effort on behalf of the whole 
people."^5 "Believing in the principle that party interests 
must be subordinate to those of the whole city," the 
Committee sought to "restore the honest administration of 
the early days of the municipality" and thereby make "the 
government of the city... a model of efficiency and 
e c o n o m y . "36 The reformers (like their predecessors) 
believed this could be achieved by securing "the nomination 
and election of a better class of candidate for office," 
maintaining "the purity of the ballot," prosecuting those 
"guilty of election frauds, maladministration of office and 
misappropriation of public funds," and promoting "a public 
service based upon character and capability o n l y . "37 in 
pursuit of the latter sixty-three (41 percent) members of 
the Committee also enrolled in the local civil service 
reform association.38
The reformers met with instant success in the first election 
they contested, for the joint ticket they presented with the 
Democrats defeated the regular Republican one headed by 
Stokley. The election of Samuel G. King as Mayor and John 
Hunter as Receiver of Taxes, in February 1881, marked the 
beginning of the Committee's five year involvement in local 
politics.39 The reform group confined itself largely to
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endorsing candidates for public office who "at the very 
least (were) law-abiding citizens, known for their sobriety, 
morality, trustworthiness and general f i t n e s s . T o  ensure 
that only the most suitable candidates for Councils and ward 
offices were selected, a sub-committee on ward organisation 
was instructed to set up "auxiliary committees of citizens 
in every ward" made up of "all persons desirous of co­
operating with the Committee of One H u n d r e d . T h e  
reformers commitment to non-partisanship in local affairs 
meant that they endorsed candidates irrespective of party, 
and sometimes of neither party.
A further sub-committee, on legislation, was set up "to 
promote such measures as are necessary in the interest of 
r e f o r m . "42 it reported in favour of civil service reform 
and structural changes in the system of city government, and 
when these proposals were incorporated in the Bullitt Bill, 
the reformers sent a delegation to Harrisburg to support the 
m e a s u r e . 43 indeed, with the adoption of the Bullitt Bill as 
the new city charter, the Committee of One Hundred formally 
disbanded in January, 1886.44
Enough has been said to establish that, contrary to Warner's 
claims, the city was still important to local businessmen in 
their daily lives, and that the latter had not abandoned its 
affairs or its politics in the post-bellum period. Indeed, 
a little reflection argues that the idea that the wealthy 
could abandon local politics solely for profits does not 
square with common sense. For instance, businessmen as
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local residents were the wealthiest city dwellers, and 
therefore had a vested interest because of taxation in city 
politics and government. Besides, city government was 
charged with important housekeeping functions that 
determined everything from the value of real estate to the 
use of police as strikebreakers; and men of wealth, like 
citizens in general, also cared deeply about the provision 
of basic city services such as water, gas, street lighting, 
parks, and police and fire protection, particularly at a 
time of rapid urban growth.
Indeed, as we have seen, it was a mixture of resentment at 
the deterioration of municipal services amid fears that the 
rapid growth of the city budget was endangering the security 
of wealth against taxation, that prompted men of substance 
to organise the first of a series of reform groups aimed at 
improving local government. In December 1869, for example, 
a number of local businessmen set up the Citizens' 
Association for the Improvement of Streets and Roads of 
Philadelphia, to act as a clearing house for passing on 
complaints about the city's streets to the appropriate 
authorities.45 Again in June 1871, the C.M.R.A. was 
organised in response to the creation of the Public 
Buildings Commission, for as the reformers pointed out, the 
latter was,
empowered to tax us without limit, and to spend our 
money without supervision, to hold office without 
restriction of time, and to fill all vacancies in 
their own body, [thus] inflicting on us all the 
evils of taxation without representation. °
Warner's argument only makes sense if by "the city's affairs
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and its politics" he means "public office", for in this
respect, as noted earlier, the retreat of the wealthy is
marked. Even such a committed reformer as Henry C. Lea
could not be persuaded to enter formal politics. For
example, in November 1878, when Joseph Caven suggested that
he put his proposals for the reform of the gas works into
effect by running for the office of trustee. Lea replied:
Mr. Henry assures me that I could be of substantial 
service, owing to the factions within the trust and 
that it would enable you to overthrow the "Gas Ring" 
which has so long exercised a baneful influence over 
our politics....[but]....I long ago determined never 
to accept public office of any kind and the one in 
question would be especially distasteful to me as a 
proper performance of its' duties would involve 
labour incompatible with my other engagements...
Furthermore? the Committee of One Hundred prided itself that
"not a single member was a politician or an aspirant for
o f f i c e . "48 Anxious to avoid the fate of its predecessor the
C.M.R.A., which was dismissed as a "mere party of office
seekers (who) have no right to reproach others on the same
account" when it placed its own members on an election
ticket, the Committee of One Hundred's Articles of
Association provided,
that no person holding any important office under 
the national, state or city government shall be 
eligible for membership; and that any member 
becoming a candidate for office shall cease to take 
an active part in the affairs of the Committee; and 
if elected shall cease to become a member.
Although unwilling to run for public office themselves, the
reformers were still committed to bringing about political
change through the election of men "whom office seeks,
rather than those who seek o f f i c e . H o w  successful were
they?
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THE "FORWARD MARCH OF REFORM"?
According to contemporary observers such as Alexander 
McClure, James Bryce, George Vickers, newspaper reporter E . 
V. Smalley, and subsequently Lea's biographer Edward S. 
Bradley, a well-organised reform movement was not only pre­
eminent in local party politics in the period prior to 1887, 
but it also scored a series of remarkable victories against 
"bossism". Beginning with the "practical political coup" by 
which the C.M.R.A. succeeded in defeating gas trustee 
William E . Rowan's election bid for the office of Sheriff in 
1876, the reformers made a "break in Bossism's Wall" by 
electing, and re-electing, the Democrat Robert E. Pattison 
to the post of City Controller in 1877 and 1880.^^
"This evidence of Independent strength so encouraged the
remnant of the old Reform Association," Bradley suggests,
that E.Dunbar Lockwood convened a Committee of One 
Hundred leading citizens of Independent sympathies 
to put in nomination at coming elections [February 
1881] a slate of local officers who should have at 
heart the best interests of the city. Thus began 
a movement which continued with increasing success 
until 1886 when the passage of the Bullitt Bill 
assured the end of the Gas Trust.
Contemporary journalist, E. V. Smalley, noted in the wake
of Stokley's defeat in February 1881 that,
A great change has recently been brought about by 
the sincere, courageous, and persistent efforts 
of a few businessmen acting in the field of 
politics but outside of party lines. These men 
successfully appealed to the conscience, self- 
interest and public spirit of the best classes 
of their fellow citizens.
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Similarly, Alexander McClure in his autobiography
subsequently claimed that:
The Committee of One Hundred came into power and 
found it possible to enforce something approaching 
honest elections, and they thoroughly 
revolutionised the city. It was the best-directed 
reform movement of modern times. It was made up of 
practical businessmen who understood that idealism 
in politics was good in theory, but utterly 
valueless in practice, and they not only defeated 
the notoriously corrupt machine men of the city, 
but they defeated men of the highest standing who 
adhered to and sustained the organisation, thereby
giving it the benefit of their reputations......For
a full decade, the Republican leaders were under 
fair notice that Machine candidates would be made 
to bite the dust.
These claims about the reformers' achievement neatly 
complement the standard history of the Committee of One 
Hundred written by George Vickers in 1883, in which Vickers 
gives a passionate account of how the city's businessmen 
brought about The Fall of Bossism in Philadelphia. The 
impression that bossism was dead and that the city's 
businessmen were responsible for it, was also conveyed in 
James Bryce's analysis of "The Philadelphia Gas Ring" which 
relied heavily on Vickers "little book" for information on 
local politics and reiterated Vickers' claims.
It is my contention that just as contemporary observers 
overstated the power and influence exercised by "bosses" 
such as McManes and Stokley, they have also exaggerated the 
role that early reform groups played in local party 
politics. Indeed, a closer examination of their claims 
suggests that the reformers were not responsible for the 
successes that have been attributed to them.
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In the first instance, it is difficult to see how Rowan's 
defeat in 1876 and Pattison's victories in 1877 and 1880 can 
be attributed to the efforts of the C.M.R.A., since there 
was no organised reform activity in the city at this time. 
Although Vickers and Bradley both argued that the C.M.R.A.'s 
work did not come to an end until 1878, there is reason to 
believe that the group suffered a lingering death and had 
ceased to be an influential force in local politics since 
the adoption of the new state constitution in 1874. It is 
also worth noting that by Vickers own admission "the 
C.M.R.A. although not disbanded ceased to act politically as 
an organisation after February 1877," that is, nine months 
before Pattison's victory later that year.^G
It seems that the only work carried out under the auspices
of the C.M.R.A., after the constitutional reforms it had
advocated had been adopted, were Lea's three exhaustive
reports on the operation of the gas works under the Gas
Trust, published in 1874.^7 Lea appears to have been an
isolated crusader for as Howard Gillette has pointed out,
his continued activity in the name of reform, 
publicised as it was after 1875, simply did not 
represent the existence of any organised reform
effort.58
This is also suggested by Bradley who attributes the demise
of the C.M.R.A. to Lea's enforced absence from the city on
the grounds of ill-health.59 in retrospect Lea himself
suggested to Frank W. Leach, in March 1905, that the main
reason why the reform group went into decline was because
the task was endless......the essential weakness
of all such [reform] efforts is that the powers of
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evil are untiring and always at work, for they make 
their living by it, while the volunteers for good 
have something else to do, in time their energies 
are spent, they disband and the enemy reoccupies
the field...... Then came the end not abruptly,
sensationally as the result of some great 
catastrophe, which disrupted the organisation and 
ground it into powder. But the simple silent
processes of nature were at work........One by one
those who laboured dropped out and there were none 
to take their places, and the association quietly 
went out of existence having opened the path for 
those who might come to take up the burthen when a 
recrudescence of misrule might call for new effort.
As well as having to attend to their respective businesses, 
the challenge of organising the forthcoming Centennial 
Exposition provided the reform volunteers with "something 
else to do." C.M.R.A. member John Welsh, for example, quit 
his position as the first President of the Reform Club to 
become chairman of the Centennial Board of Finance. Joseph 
Patterson, John Wetherill, Nathan Parker Shortridge, Henry 
Winsor and Amos Little, of the reform group, also joined the 
B o a r d . O t h e r  reformers such as Henry Lea, Clement Biddle, 
Barton Jenks, Henry Lewis, and William Massey, recognising 
the financial boom that America's first world fair would 
bring to the city, led fund-raising efforts and "mobilised 
the financial community with the same spirit as they devoted 
to the Union League in the Civil War.
Another important factor in accounting for the demise of 
organised reform activity in the mid-seventies, was the 
serious division that reformers suffered within their ranks 
over the question of partisanship. This was particularly 
notable in the case of the Reform Club and the Union League. 
Problems arose over the Reform Club's role in local politics
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because of the contradiction inherent in its constitution.
On the one hand, the club's constitution declared that its
"fundamental object...is to advance its principles by mutual
intercourse and discussion and not as a political or
partisan body," but on the other hand it was also committed
to associate for the purpose of aiding in the
reform and improvement of the municipal government 
of the city of Philadelphia, in the election of 
honest and capable men to fill its offices and 
represent it in the State legislature, irrespective 
of their views on national and State politics; in 
the punishment and prevention of fraud and 
corruption in municipal officers; and in guarding 
the rights and privileges of the city of 
Philadelphia from legislative encroachment.
Consequently friction developed between those reformers who
were committed to active intervention in local politics, and
those who sought political change only through "mutual
intercourse and discussion." Indeed, at the very time when
the reformers were supposed to have scored their first
notable victory over "bossism", the Reform Club had
"irreparably split" over the issue of p a r t i s a n s h i p . ^4
In November 1876, for example, while Rowan failed in his bid 
to become Sheriff, J. V. Ingham filed a suit against the 
Reform Club in the Court of Common Pleas. The court upheld 
Ingham's claim that the resolution passed at the club's 
annual general meeting calling for a "political" assessment 
of three dollars to be levied on every member for the year 
1876-77, to form a special fund to aid municipal reform, was 
an infringement of the first article of the club's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . B y  the time of Pattison's victory, those 
members who wanted the club to be "a purely social 
organisation" were in the majority, but the acrimony between
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the two factions persisted to such an extent that the Reform 
Club was ultimately forced to disband in May 1880.^^
The split in reform ranks, over the degree to which they
should participate in local affairs, emerged even earlier in
the case of the Union League. In April 1875 internal
dissension erupted among the League's membership when the
watchdog Committee, that had been appointed by the Board of
Governors to oversee local elections, refused to endorse the
Republican party ticket for the forthcoming county
e l e c t i o n . S i n c e  the League was pledged to using its
influence to secure the nomination of men who placed the
welfare of the people above party interests, the Committee
of Sixty-Two reasoned that as Henry Bingham and David Lane
were members of the Society of Mysterious Pilgrims, they
were unfit to hold public office. Furthermore, the
Committee publicly condemned the Pilgrims as,
that dictatorial band of men, nominally of both 
parties, but without true allegiance to either, 
which now rules and oppresses our city and is 
disgracing and destroying the Republican 
organisation.
Some members were outraged by the Committee's stand, 
particularly since Bingham was a director of the Union 
League, while others felt that by making its conclusions 
public knowledge, the watchdog group had exceeded the 
responsibility invested in it. At the subsequent annual 
general meeting, a majority of the League's members voted in 
favour of an amendment to the By-Laws which declared that 
"the League as a body should not hereafter take part in 
municipal politics unless otherwise directed by members in
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General Meeting."^9 By 1876 then, the League had 
effectively withdrawn from municipal politics, and in future 
would concentrate only on national affairs.
If Rowan's defeat and Pattison's success did not mark "the 
beginning of the forward march of reform" how then can we 
account for these election results? In short, it was a 
combination of party factionalism and independent voting, 
rather than the efforts of a well-organised reform movement, 
that was responsible for Rowan's failure and Pattison's 
victory. As noted earlier in the last chapter, the 
Republican party was rent by factionalism in the 1870's, as 
three loose coalitions of politicians led by McManes, 
Stokley, and Disston respectively, contended for power 
within the party. That Rowan's defeat was due to party 
factionalism is suggested by the fact that he was the only 
city-wide Republican candidate who failed to be elected in 
November 1876. While city treasurer Delos Southworth and 
President Rutherford Hayes obtained majorities of 14,720 and 
15,427 votes respectively. Rowan lost to the Democratic 
candidate William Wright by 6,227 votes. Since he polled 
consistently less votes than Southworth in the election 
returns for Disston's twenty-ninth (10.6%) ward, Deed's 
tenth (13.0%) ward, Stokley's ninth (8.3%) ward and Martin's 
nineteenth (6.6%) ward, it seems likely that Rowan was cut 
by the supporters of McManes' factional rivals within the 
party (see Figure 4.1). Suspicion of party treachery is 
also suggested by the fact that Disston was the nephew of 
the Democratic candidate, and that Wright's chief supporters
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were Lewis Cassidy and Thomas Barger who where both Pilgrims 
and allies of Stokley on the Buildings C o m m i s s i o n . ^0
It seems that Rowan's close association with McManes and his
reputation as a "jobbing politician" also cost him the
support of many traditional Republican voters, for as E. V.
Smalley reported prior to the election;
The Republicans of Philadelphia are loaded with a 
candidate for Sheriff in the person of the regular 
nominee Mr. Rowan, whom many thousands of them 
are refusing to carry. For many years he has been 
a prominent spoilsman in the corrupt councils ring 
and his reputuation is so bad that before the 
County Convention met, every decent Republican 
paper in the city attacked him.''
The returns of traditional Republican suburban wards such as
the twenty-second (Germantown) and Caven's fifteenth ward,
where Rowan polled 14 percent and 11.3 percent less votes
than Southworth respectively, indicates that Smalley's
7 ?assessment may well have been accurate.
Party factionalism also seems to have been responsible for 
Pattison's victory in 1877, even though reform publicists 
insisted that it was another step in "the forward march of 
reform." By failing to stress that the C.M.R.A., the Reform 
Club and the Union League did not take any part in the 
election campaign, and that the whole Democratic ticket was 
elected and not just Pattison, the accounts of these 
contemporary observers give a misleading impression of 
Pattison's election victory. Pattison himself suggested to 
the Democratic convention that nominated him that "the signs 
of the times" such as "the dissensions of the Republicans, 
and their maladministration in office while in power... point
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to victory."73 Leach concluded that "the rampant factional 
strife within the ranks of the "regular" Republican 
politicians" was the "determining" factor in the election.74 
The election returns also indicate that James Sayre, Russell 
Thayer and Andrew J. Knorr suffered the same fate as Rowan 
had the previous year, for the Republican ticket was cut 
again by a combination of Disston and Stokley supporters.75
As Pattison was the only candidate on the Democratic ticket 
to be elected in November 1880, and since this year was also 
a Presidential election year when party lines were 
traditionally more tightly drawn, it is Pattison's re- 
election, rather than initial election, that is remarkable. 
On this occasion it appears that independent voting, rather 
than party factionalism, was the main factor responsible for 
his election victory. Pattison, a young lawyer and son of a 
Methodist preacher, had so impressed Independent Councilmen 
and many of the city's "best men", in his role as guardian 
of the city treasury, that Joseph L. Caven organised a rally 
at which fifty of Philadelphia's leading businessmen who 
were "Republican in national politics" but "independent in 
local affairs" endorsed Pattison for re-election.76
The President of the Common Council explained that:
As a Republican I propose on next Tuesday to vote 
for Garfield because the best interests of the 
country demand that no change be made in the 
national administration; as a Republican I propose 
at the same time to vote for Robert Pattison for 
Controller because the best interests of 
Philadelphia demand that no change be made in the 
administration of that office.
Thousands of Philadelphians seem to have followed Caven's
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line on election day, for while Garfield and three local 
Republican candidates carried the city by over 20,000 votes, 
Pattison defeated Harper Jeffries by 13,593 v o t e s . T h a t  
Pattison's victory was not due to the efforts of an 
organised reform movement was acknowledged by both Bradley 
and Vickers. Bradley suggests that "Independent strength" 
in the form of a "public protest against corruption 
overwhelmed the bosses," while Vickers notes that the 
spontaneous bolt against the Republican candidate was "by 
the people unorganised, by popular sentiment crystallised 
into tangible o p p o s i t i o n ."^9 Similarly the North American 
regarded Pattison's victory as "unmistakably the result of 
independent personal effort by citizens of character, 
property, education and responsibility."®^
An examination of the election returns reported in Table 4.2 
also suggests that Stokley's defeat in the mayoral election 
of February 1881 was due to a combination of the independent 
voting and party factionalism that had characterised local 
elections over the previous five years. A comparison of the 
percentage of votes polled by Stokley in 1881 with those 
received by W. Nelson West, the successful Republican 
candidate who was supported by both McManes and the 
Committee of One Hundred, indicates that there was a 
repetition of the spontaneous independent bolt in the 
traditional Republican suburban wards (15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
26, 28, 29) that had brought about Pattison's victory, the 
previous year, while the ward returns from North 
Philadelphia (13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 31), where
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Table 4.2. The Republican Party vote in selected city
elections, by ward, 1877, 1881
( as percent of total vote)
Candidate
Office
Year
W. S.
Mayor
1877
Stokley W. S. Stokley 
Mayor
1 881
W.N. West 
City
Solicitor 
1 881
Ward Diff.a Dif f.b
1 58.2 -9.0 49.2 + 6.8 56.0
2 40.9 -2.5 38.4 + 4.0 42.4
3 40.9 -6.2 34.7 + 0.9 35.6
4 53.3 -14.1 39.2 -0.1 39.1
5 60.4 -5.8 54.6 + 2.3 56.9
6 45.0 -4.9 40.1 + 1 .9 42.0
7 61 .9 + 2.2 64.1 + 5.2 69.3
8 58.3 + 3.3 61 .6 + 5.4 67.0
9 52.8 + 2.6 55.4 + 5.5 60.9
10 63.5 -1 .7 61 .8 + 7.2 69.0
1 1 34.5 -4.4 30.1 + 3.8 33.9
1 2 49.2 -8.0 41 .2 + 5.1 46.3
1 3 51 .3 -2.8 48.5 + 10.4 58.9
1 4 52.3 -4.4 47.9 + 10.3 58.2
1 5 46.5 + 2.6 49.1 + 12.0 61 .1
1 6 48.1 -10.7 37.4 + 6.1 43.5
1 7 35.2 -2.8 32.4 + 4.1 36.5
18 50.0 -3.5 46.5 + 13.5 60.0
1 9 46.2 -1 .5 44.7 + 8.5 53.2
20 49.6 + 0.1 49.7 + 9.9 59.6
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21 52.2 + 0.4 52.6 + 8.9 61 .5
22 53.9 -6.6 47.3 + 14.8 62.1
23 53.5 -6.2 47.3 + 15.9 63.2
24 47.7 -5.6 42.1 + 14.2 56.3
25 42.8 -2.5 40.3 + 7.3 47.6
26 57.8 -9.3 48.5 + 9.4 57.9
27 65.4 + 1 .7 67.1 + 7.4 74.5
28 52.7 -0.8 51 .9 + 10.0 61 .9
29 50.1 -0.2 49.9 + 12.2 62.1
30 50.9 + 0.9 51 .8 + 8.5 60.3
31 50.1 + 0.4 50.5 + 12.5 63.0
Sources: Inquirer, Feb. 21, 1877; Manual of Councils, 1881-
82, p.111 ; George Vickers, The Fall of Bossism: A History of 
the Committee of One Hundred and the Reform Movement in 
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania v.1 (Philadelphia, 1883), 
pp.129-132; Frank W. Leach, "Twenty Years with Quay," North 
American, March 5, 12, 1905.
^ The figures in this column represent the percentage 
difference between the votes cast for Stokley in the 1877 
election, when he was supported by James McManes, and those 
he received in the 1881 election, when he was opposed by 
both the Committee of One Hundred and the Gas Trust leader.
^ The figures in this column represent the percentage 
difference between the votes cast for Stokley in the 1881 
election and those received by Nelson West, a party 
candidate who was supported by both McManes and the 
Committee of One Hundred.
McManes' support was particularly strong, also suggests that 
Stokley was a victim of party factionalism (see Figure 4.1).
That Stokley's defeat was in part attributable to a suburban 
protest against the misuse of city funds, is also suggested 
by the fact that ring wards (15, 20, 22, 24, 28 and 29) 
which consistently provided Republican majorities in mayoral
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elections between 1865 and 1884 failed to do so in 1881 
(see Table 4.3).®^ The idea that Stokley's defeat was also 
due to McManes supporters "cutting" his candidacy, is not 
too surprising when we recall that the Mayor had used 
similar tactics in previous years to prevent the election of 
party nominees endorsed by the gas trust faction. Moreover, 
the publication of the political satire Solid for Mulhooly 
by one of Stokley's close associates, along with the Mayor's 
campaign pledge to abolish the gas trust, would suggest the 
"ticket-cutting" was probably an important feature of the 
election, as the Times maintained.®^
If the above analysis of the 1881 election is accurate, then 
it would appear that reform publicists were wrong to 
attribute Stokley's defeat to the intervention of the 
Committee of One Hundred. It is my contention that just as 
these contemporary observers failed to distinguish the 
difference between the structure of the Republican party 
organisation and its actual functioning, they also committed 
the error of assuming that because the Committee of One 
Hundred endorsed the Democratic candidate Samuel G. King for 
the mayoralty, then the reform group must have been 
responsible for his victory. That is, they wrongly credited 
this "reform success" to the Committee when in fact, by 
their own admission, the "strength of the city's Independent 
voters" to which they referred to, was an "unorganised" 
phenomenon that had emerged as a significant factor in local
o  o
elections before the reform group had even been set up.°
1 37
Table 4.3. City wards returning a majority for Republican 
Mayoral Candidates, 1865-1884
Year Candidate 50-55% 55-60% 60% +
1 865 
(26)^
McMichael 9 
1 6 
20
19
23 24
8
13 15 
21 22
1 7
10 14 18 
26
1868 Tyndale 
(28)
1 7 8 
13 19 
20 24 27
14 15 18 
21 22 23 26
1 0
1871 Stokley 
(29)
8 9 
1 6 
24
13
20
1 4 
27
1 5 
28
1 6 
29
1 9
1 7 
10 18 
21 22 23 26
1874 Stokley 
(29)
9 5 8
12 13 14 16
20 21 24 25 28 26 29
18 19
1 7 
10 1 
27
1877 Stokley 
(31 )
4 9 1 8
13 14 18
21 22 23 28 29 26
30 31
5 7 
1 0 
27
1881 Stokley 
(31 )
21 28 
30 31
7 8 
1 0 
27
1884 Smith 
(31 )
5 9 
13 14 
20 22
1 5 
24
1 9
1 8 
10 18
21 23 28 29 26 27 
30 31
Sources : 
Oct. 11, 
Feb. 16,
Election statistics published in the Inquirer, 
1865; Oct. 14, 1868; Feb. 18, 1874; Feb. 21, 1877; 
1887; and the Manual of Councils, 1881-82, p. 111.
^ The figure in brackets represents the total number of 
wards in the city at the time each mayoral election was 
held. Ward 27 was subdivided from ward 24 in 1866; 28 from 
21 in 1867; 29 from 20 in 1871 and 30 from 26 and 31 from 19 
in 1875. See John Daly and Allen Weinberg, Genealogy of 
Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 
1966), pp. 69-72.
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I would further suggest that the notion that the Committee 
of One Hundred was even capable of (let alone solely 
responsible for) dealing bossism a stunning blow in February 
1881, is difficult to sustain. In the first place it is 
questionable whether the Committee had sufficient time to 
mobilise the "Independent strength" of the electorate since 
it was only actually organised on November 26, 1880, and did 
not finally agree on a mayoral candidate until just two 
weeks before the election day.®^ Since "not a single 
member" of the Committee "was a politician or an aspirant 
for office," as E. V. Smalley emphasised, it is also 
debatable whether these businessmen had the necessary 
expertise to organise a great political movement.^5 Even 
more serious however, was the division that the reformers 
suffered within their ranks over what tactics should be 
employed to secure a reform victory. In short, the 
Committee was badly split over whether to seek reform 
"within the (Republican) party" or outside of party lines.
Given the failure of past non-partisan reform groups such as 
the C.M.R.A. and the Reform Club, the Committee was 
initially set up purely as an Independent Republican body 
"seeking to reform the management of the Republican 
party."8^ However, the group's Executive Committee "caused 
consternation" at the general meeting of December 20, 1880, 
when after "considering the subject of the nomination of 
proper candidates for municipal offices to be chosen at the 
February election," it recommended that the Committee should 
actually endorse Stokley for the mayoralty.^7 The "general
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uproar" subsided only after executive member, James A. 
Wright, explained to the meeting that Stokley's nomination 
was recommended on the grounds that the Mayor had promised 
the committee that he would support certain reform measures 
such as transferring the gas works to the city and 
establishing a police force free of political influence.®® 
The general meeting eventually voted in favour of Stokley's 
nomination by fifty-two votes to thirty.®^ (That forty 
members of the Committee, or one-third of the entire body, 
were absent from the meeting also calls into question how 
genuinely committed the businessmen were to political 
reform).
Convinced that the group had made a fatal error in endorsing 
Stokley, Rudolph Blankenburg and John Verree resigned and 
organised a rival Businessmen's Committee to promote the 
nomination of manufacturer Edward T. Steel for Mayor.
That Blankenburg and Verree were correct in their assessment 
was soon confirmed, for when Stokley secured the Republican 
nomination for Mayor on January 13,1881, he reneged on his 
promises to the reformers, and ignored their request for him 
to endorse the Committee's Declaration of Principles. 
Consequently, the Committee withdrew its nomination of 
Stokley and recognising that it had been "deluded" by the 
notion of "reform within the party," amended its Declaration 
of Principles to permit "a union of all the elements of 
opposition to the Ring, irrespective of party."^2 The 
Committee's about-turn on how best to achieve political 
reform in local politics was sufficient to woo Blankenburg
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and Verree back to the group, but its subsequent endorsement 
of Select Councilman Samuel G. King, the Democratic nominee, 
for the mayoralty, on January 30, 1881, led several 
prominent members such as Anthony J. Drexel, Henry Winsor, 
William Sellers, Benjamin Comegys, Oliver Evans, Frederick 
Loeble, James Dobson and R. H. Griffith, to resign from the 
Committee in protest at its betrayal of the Republican 
party.
The division between reformers over the question of 
partisanship continued to undermine the Committee's 
effectiveness in local elections however. For example, in 
the 1884 mayoral campaign, twenty-three members, led by 
Edward R. Wood, John P. Wetherill and Lemuel Coffin, 
resigned from the Committee when the group voted to endorse 
Samuel G. King for re-election, in preference to the 
Republican nominee Independent Republican Councilman,
William B. Smith.^4
Apart from the "internal weakness manifested in the ranks of 
the organisation itself," the Municipal League later 
attributed the Committee's lack of "vigour and success" to 
the fact that the group was not "thoroughly representative," 
nor "well-organised in every ward of the city."^^ With 
reference to the former, we have already noted that the 
members of the Committee of One Hundred, like their 
predecessors in the C.M.R.A. and the Reform Club, were a 
socially exclusive group, but it is also worth pointing out 
that since almost half (forty-two) of them lived in 
fashionable neighbourhoods such as Rittenhouse Square
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(eighth ward) in centre city, or prestigious suburban 
districts like Chestnut Hill and Germantown (twenty-second 
ward), they were also residentially segregated from the bulk 
of the city's population. Moreover, as one-third of the 
city's wards (ten out of thirty-one) were not represented on 
the Committee at all, the group's geographical isolation was 
accentuated even further (see Appendix 2).^^
Since the Committee was also a self-constituted body that
conducted political affairs in an autocratic manner, there
is reason to believe that the efforts of the city's "best
men" made little impact on the city's electorate. As the
Times suggested, the Committee of One Hundred, like its
predecessor the C.M.R.A.,was composed of men who
sat in their cosy parlours and cooked up tickets for 
others to vote and issued flaming manifestos to the 
public but like the Pope's bull against the comet, 
these paper bulletins amounted to little or nothing 
because the masses of people were not taken into
account.
Similarly, Committee member George H. Earle Jr. later 
conceded to Frank W. Leach that the reform group had 
"perished" because it "was essentially aristocratic in 
temperament," while former C.M.R.A. executive officer, John 
J. Ridgway, even suggested that the Committee's "entire 
course (had) alienated the public.
The reformers' influence in local elections was also 
hampered by their poor organisation and their dislike of 
political activism. Indeed, the Committee's participation 
in local elections was limited merely to endorsing 
candidates on the recommendation of the group's Executive
1 42
Committee for city-wide offices, or on behalf of its 
"auxiliary committees of citizens in every ward" for 
district offices.^^0 it was on this basis that contemporary 
newspapers judged the Committee's success or failure in 
local politics. For example, in February 1882 they heralded 
a "reform victory" since three-quarters of those elected to 
Councils had been endorsed by the Committee, whereas in 
February 1884 they deemed the successful election of all 
regular Republican nominees to be a "Reform Waterloo". 
Consequently, the impression that the reader picks up from 
these accounts is that the Committee played a dominant role 
in local elections. They impart the belief, for example, 
that the Committee was solely resonsible for the election of 
forty-two of the fifty-four Councilman elected in February 
1882, and therefore fully deserved its reputation as being 
the "conqueror of the b o s s e s " . W h i l e  we cannot be 
certain about the extent to which the Committee influenced 
local elections, it is clear that opposition to boss rule 
was never matched by comparable political organisation.
Historian Philip S. Benjamin attributes the "gentlemen 
reformers" reluctance to build an effective political 
organisation to the strong Quaker influence on the Committee 
for, as he points out, although the Quaker proportion of the 
city's population was less than one percent, almost one-
i n  -3
fifth of the group's members were prominent Friends.
Even though "the operations of boss rule clearly violated 
standards basic to the Quaker ethos," Benjamin argues that 
"the Quakers proved hesitant and ineffectual as political
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reformers" because they were
unable to resolve the dilemmas posed by......the
Friends' tradition of avoiding active participation 
in politics and of their [usual] attachment to the 
Republican party.
The Committee's dislike of political activism and 
organisation was such that they refused to endorse William 
B. Smith for the mayoralty in February 1884, even though 
they had supported his election to Select Council in two 
earlier campaigns and had applauded his stand against 
McManes, as President of the upper chamber, from 1882 to 
1884. This was because the reformers believed that Smith's 
method of campaigning was "undignified" and "unethical" 
since it involved him conducting a personal canvass of the 
city and making a direct appeal to the party's division 
workers.^^5
Even if the reformers could have overcome their "distaste 
for organisation on the ward and precinct level," however, 
they would still have had difficulties establishing a 
"viable base to launch their challenge to the machine" 
because as vehement opponents of the spoils system they had 
no way of rewarding reform v o l u n t e e r s . ^^6 ^s McClure 
pointed out,
the labour of the reformers is a thankless task.
It is all work and no pay beyond the gratification
of having performed a duty to the public.
In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that since the 
reformers not only lacked experience but were weakened by 
divisions over partisanship, and formed groups that were
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poorly organised and unrepresentative, they were not capable 
of achieving the electoral victories which has traditionally 
been accorded them.^O?
Finally, reform publicists misrepresented the real 
significance of the new city charter when they depicted it 
as the culmination of the reformers' achievement, for it was 
in fact the leaders of the state Republican party, Simon 
Cameron and his chief lieutenant Matt Quay, who were 
responsible for the passage of the Bullitt bill.^^B Their 
motivation however was not to bring about better urban 
government but rather to extend their influence over 
Philadelphia City Council and the local Republican party
o r g a n i s a t i o n . 1 0 9
Philadelphia, as I suggested at the end of the last chapter, 
was because of the size of its population, extremely 
powerful politically, particularly in terms of its electoral 
and representational strength. Indeed the city's 
politicians had played a key role in the factional struggle 
between Cameron and Andrew Curtin for control of the state 
Republican party organisation. It was only after allying 
with "Ring" leader James McManes and Sheriff William 
Elliott, for instance, that Cameron was able to pressurise 
William Mann, one of Curtin's most faithful allies, into 
accepting his leadership of the party.11^ The alliance with 
McManes, Elliott, Mann, and ultimately Stokley, combined 
with the deployment of superior patronage resources and the 
successful conversion of key leaders (such as Quay and Wayne 
MacVeagh) away from the opposition camp, enabled the
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resourceful Cameron to not only establish himself as the 
undisputed leader of the state Republican party, but also, 
by attracting Philadelphia's full electoral strength, 
withstand the Liberal Republican revolt of 1872.^^^
Cameron's efforts to control the state legislature were soon
handicapped however, and the electoral success of the
Republican party placed at risk, when some of the
Philadelphia politicians he had accommodated, namely Stokley
117and McManes, began to publicly question his authority.
He was therefore forced to take steps to curb their power. 
His uncompromising insistence, as a senatorial oligarch, on 
complete loyalty from his personal following, placed him in 
the position anyway of having to eliminate those who stood 
in his path.^ ^ ^
What the passage of the Bullitt Bill in 1885 represented in 
essence, I would suggest, was the culmination not of the 
reformers' achievements, but of Cameron and Quay's efforts 
to eliminate Stokley and McManes as significant political 
actors in the city's political arena. This process they had 
initiated almost a decade earlier, when in the wake of the 
defeat of the Mayor's ally Wilson Henszey for the Presidency 
of Common Council in January 1876, they had supported, 
through loyal subordinates led by twentieth ward leader and 
Councilman David H. Lane, the adoption of a tight spending 
policy by new President Joseph L. Caven and his Independent
. , 114associates.
This economy drive, combined with the "Pay-As-You-Go" Act of
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1879 (a state legislative bill which, sponsored by Caven and 
again supported by Cameron Republicans, restricted 
Philadelphia's debt limit and required each city department 
to make requests for funds within limits set in advance by 
the tax rate) had the desired effect not only from the 
reform perspective of bringing an "end to profligacy" in the 
administration of city finances, but also from Cameron's 
viewpoint in the sense that Stokley was seriously weakened 
as resources for local patronage and opportunities for 
"honest graft" d e c l i n e d . ^ T h e  policy of retrenchment 
returned Cameron a handsome dividend for those who suffered 
most from the misuse of city funds, that is, suburban 
residents in the city's fastest growing wards, expressed 
their displeasure, as we have seen, by switching from their 
usual Republican allegiance and voting in favour of 
Stokley's Democratic opponent, Samuel G. King in the 1881 
mayoral election. The strength of the suburban protest vote 
ultimately cost Stokley the election and with this defeat he 
ceased to be a significant factor in the city's politics.^
Collaboration with Independent Councilmen also played a part
in Cameron and Quay's efforts to undermine McManes' position
in the city's politics. Joint action in Councils to secure
the election of Gas trustees who would be hostile to the
"Ring" leader, and also the appointment of a Committee to
investigate alleged mismanagement of the Gas Works met, on
117this occasion, with only partial success however. What
provided Cameron and Quay with the decisive breakthrough in 
curbing McManes' power were not the efforts to challenge
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his leadership of the Gas Trust or to improve the Trust's 
accountability, but rather the initiatives they made aimed 
at diminishing his influence within the local Republican 
party, and also city government.
With regard to the former, the state leaders in May 1883
attempted to lure Independent Republicans back to the ranks
of the regular party by organising a new political club, the
United Republican Association of Pennsylvania.
Headquartered in the Betz Building on the north-west corner
of Broad and Chestnut Streets, adjacent to the new city hall
building, the U.R.A. was "brought into being to attract" as
Leach put it "all local elements thought to be in antagonism
to the McManes d y n a s t y . T h a t  the state leaders were
successful in their goal is suggested by the fact that the
U.R.A. managed to woo not just local party activists who
were opposed to McManes but also prominent businessmen such
as Edward C. Knight, George A. Boker and Colonel A. Louden
Snowden; men who were "staunch Republicans in national
affairs but not necessarily conspicuous in municipal
politics." Independent Republicans such as Joseph L/Caven
and John J. Ridgway, and members of the Committee of One
Hundred reform group like Francis B. Reeves, George D.
McCreary, Thomas Learning, H. W. Bartol, Nathianiel E.
Janney and Thomas W. Barlow, also joined the new
organisation.^^^ The North American commented that the
members of the U.R.A. included,
many active young men thoroughly acquainted with 
political affairs but who have never been attached 
to the cliques whose power brought the party
1 48
organisation into contempt; and considering the 
condition of the party at present, it will not be 
long before the association will exert a powerful 
influ^gge in shaping the political affairs of the
The paper's prediction proved accurate for by the end of the 
year, the U.R.A., led by Ridgway and supported by Lane, had 
secured the nomination of "a vigorous opponent of McManes" 
for the mayoralty, namely Independent Republican and 
President of Select Council, William B. S m i t h . Smith's 
subsequent victory in the election in February 1884 meant 
that, for the first time since Cameron's senatorial triumph 
in 1867, the mayoralty of Philadelphia lay with entirely 
loyal interests. Henceforth, the Times suggested that the 
local Republican party would be controlled by Quay, Smith 
and Lane "who turn in with the Cameron e l e m e n t . "^^2
Cameron and Quay attempted to attract Independent 
Republicans back to the party organisation, not just through 
the creation of a new political club, but also by supporting 
reformers' efforts to establish a new system of government 
in Philadelphia. This initiative "startled Independents 
everywhere" not least because businessmen reformers regarded 
the provisions of the Bullitt Bill (such as the application 
of civil service rules to all city employees; the reduction 
of city departments from thirty-two to nine and the granting 
to the Mayor the power of appointment and removal of 
department heads) as the key to combating "bossism" in local 
politics, and yet here, ironically, were in their view, two 
of its most conspicuous practitioners supporting the same 
reform principle as them.^23
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Why Cameron and Quay supported the same goals as businessmen
reformers however was not, as I have suggested, because of
any sincere commitment to reform, but because it was
politically expedient for them to do so. On the one hand,
for example, it placed them in a positive light in the eyes
of reformers and Independents (as they intended) and on the
other the Bullitt Bill, if implemented, would (by placing
the Gas Trust under the new Department of Public Works,
whose Director would be held responsible by appointment to
the Mayor) abolish McManes' "centre of power". Cameron and
Quay also favoured the centralisation of power and
responsibility under a strong Mayor, because it would strike
a* decisive blow against Councilman and ward "bosses", since
the practice of having executive departments controlled and
administered by Committees of Councils would be eliminated.
Philadelphia state representative Boies Penrose, for
example, advised Quay that "the ward and district leaders"
who were fighting the Bullitt Bill were
losing influence. They're moss covered and sawdust 
stuffed. They're years behind the times. Younger 
men who will be more vigorous and harder to control 
will take their place unless the independent power 
of those local bosses is taken away and 
concentrated in a single head. You can control one 
man, particularly if you've been careful to select 
a tame and respectable one, but a dozen ignorant 
saloon-keepers can raise hell.
The irony of Cameron Republicans supporting the same 
legislation as reform groups such as the Committee of One 
Hundred and the Civil Service Reform Association, did not 
escape the attention of some contemporaries who recognised 
the political advantages that the former could gain from the
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bill. In an editorial entitled "Boss Rule in Reform
Disguise", McClure's Times argued that "the sweeping
absolutism of the Bullitt Charter" would produce "an
absolute Boss R e s t o r a t i o n . "^^5 The paper claimed that:
Every facility is given for the Bosses to organise 
the whole city government under their dependents, 
and when thus organised there will be no power of 
removal or possibility of reform except by another 
appeal to a future legislature. With all the 
audacious villainry of Tweed no such reckless 
violence to public rights was ever dreamed of.
In a similar vein, George H. Earle of the Committee of One 
Hundred, predicted that the Bullitt Bill would "create the 
worst ring which ever ruled the city."^^? other "highly 
reputable and well-known citizens" such as John Wanamaker, 
John W. Patton, A. Louden Snowden, Louis Wagner, and George 
S. Graham also had doubts about the proposed new charter. 
They were wary of "the danger of sudden and sweeping change" 
that would occur if the Bill was implemented. Since "the 
Mayor has almost despotic powers" they were also concerned 
about "the difficulty of electing a good Mayor and the risk
of electing a bad or unfit one."^^®
Despite the reservations of some of the city's men of
substance, and the bitter opposition of the "Gas Ring" and
Councils, the Bullitt Bill was passed by the state 
legislature in May 1885, and brought into effect in April 
1887.^2^ As it transpired the fears of the minority of the 
city's best citizens were well-founded for the structural 
changes in local government implemented under the new city 
charter did not bring about "the fall of bossism" as
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reformers had anticipated. James Bryce, for instance,
subsequently acknowledged that the Bullitt Charter,
has worked for good..[in that]....it extinguished 
the separate Gas Trust and therewith quenched the 
light of Mr. McManes who ceased to be formidable 
when his patronage departed and had now become a 
"back number"..[but]..in the stead of Mr. McManes 
the State Boss now reigns.
In the process of curbing McManes' power and extending his 
influence over Philadelphia City Council and the local 
Republican party. Quay by "turning reformer", also managed 
it should be noted, to undermine the bonds that held the 
reformers together. As Lucretia L. Blankenburg later 
recalled:
Senator Cameron stood back of Quay; together they 
worked to defeat all reform movements in 
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania. They enmeshed 
different members of the Committee of One Hundred 
until they ceased to be reformers and finally were 
largely the cause of the Committee's dissolution.
Thus political expediency on Quay's part yielded a handsome
return; the abolition of McManes' "centre of power" and the
demise of organised reform activity in the city.
Contrary to the opinion of reform publicists the new city 
charter then, I would suggest, represented more a triumph 
for Cameron and Quay, than it did for genuine political 
reform. Indeed, by consolidating power and responsibility 
in local government, the new charter paved the way "for the 
worst ring which ever ruled this city" as some men of 
substance had forecast. A "ring" moreover, that was to be 
controlled not by city politicians, as in the past, but by 
state Republican party leader, Matthew S. Quay.
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PART B
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF A DOMINANT MACHINE, 1887-1933
In the late nineteenth century, party politics in 
Philadelphia became dominated by an over-riding cleavage 
between well-organised machine and reform forces. In 
particular, the Republican political machine (or 
"Organisation") emerged as the central force in the 
government and politics of the city. Put another way 
political power in Philadelphia was consolidated by the turn 
of the century; that is, power within the Republican party 
was centralised and the control it, in turn, exercised over 
the city government expanded to such an extent that the 
"Organisation" emerged as the dominant institution in the 
local polity.1
The intention of this section is to explain how this change 
in the organisation and structure of the city's party 
politics came about; that is, to account for the (internal) 
consolidation of power within the Republican party and its 
ability to overwhelm its (external) electoral opponents, as 
well as to examine how the non-partisan reform movement 
emerged as the only serious threat to the "Organisation's" 
hegemony during this period.
That a reliable system of control and discipline was indeed 
established within the Republican party organisation is
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demonstrated in Chapter 5 where, it is also argued that, as 
a result of this development, successive party leaders David 
Martin, Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare 
brothers, can unlike their predecessors James McManes and 
William Stokley, be considered to have been (in the literal 
sense) genuine city bosses.
Chapter 6 offers an explanation for the consolidation of 
power within the Republican party organisation. The 
centralisation of the "Organisation", it is argued, was 
attributable not just to the monopolisation by the political 
boss of the distribution of patronage (itself a consequence 
of the administrative consolidation and centralisation of 
power and authority under the new city charter of 1887) as 
conventional wisdom suggests, but also to turn-of-the- 
century changes in party rules, methods, recruitment and 
finance which transformed the way in which the Republican 
party organisation functioned and enabled the party 
leadership to exercise reliable control over subordinates 
both in party office and in public office.
Since the establishment of a system of discipline was 
contingent upon the "Organisation" being able to control the 
electorate Chapter 7 examines the electoral foundations of 
the Republican machine. A quantitative analysis reveals 
that the "Organisation's" ability to control votes 
successfully was based on the "social services" it provided 
to the "new" immigrant, poor, and black population of the 
inner city. Although this analysis indicates that 
proponents of the post-migration theory, such as Robert
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Merton, Richard Wade, William F. Whyte and Oscar Handlin 
provide us with the most likely explanation for the 
attachment of voters to the "Organisation", it does not 
necessarily follow, it is argued, that the various 
Republican party leaders were "good guys" who served the 
needs of the urban poor. On the contrary, it is suggested 
that the "Organisation" exploited its firmest supporters, as 
much as it helped them, and that rather than being the 
natural functional substitute for government that Merton's 
theoretical model suggests, the machine's role in 
Philadelphia was, if anything, dysfunctional. That is, it 
was destructive of functioning government for the vast 
majority of-its supporters who in fact needed such 
government the most.
The final section of Chapter 7 examines the remarkable 
degree of electoral success that the Republican machine 
enjoyed between 1887 and the re-emergence of a competitive 
two party system in 1933. The "Organisation's" electoral 
supremacy, it is suggested, was attributable not so much to 
public indifference, but to the control it exercised over 
the election machinery, the local strength of Republican 
partisanship, and the reduction of the Democratic party to 
the status of a "kept minority."
Those who benefitted from and supported the "Organisation's" 
hegemony in local affairs, and those who were opposed to it 
are the subject of the final two chapters. Chapter 8 
focuses on the relationship between consolidation in the
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urban polity and in the local economy. It describes how 
Republican party leaders helped a clique of plutocrats to 
establish monopoly control over the city's street railway, 
gas and electricity supply systems; a development, it is 
suggested, which, like the centralisation of local political 
power, was to the mutual benefit of both the party boss and 
the group of utility entrepreneurs. It is also argued that 
since the party boss and his machine were independent of, 
and not subservient to, business interests economic man, 
contrary to received wisdom, did not triumph over political 
man in turn of the century Philadelphia.
Chapter 9 demonstrates in what ways reform groups, organised 
after 1886, differed from their predecessors, and also 
offers an explanation for the emergence (as well as failure) 
of the non-partisan reform movement as the principal 
opposition to the "Organisation's" hegemony in local 
affairs.
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5. The Salient Characteristics of Republican Boss Rule in 
Philadelphia
The purpose of this introductory chapter to Part B is to 
show that, unlike James McManes and William S. Stokley, 
successive party leaders David Martin (and his ally, Charles 
A. Porter), Israel W. Durham, James P. McNichol and the Vare 
brothers can be categorised as genuine city "bosses". My 
contention that it was only after 1887 that the city was 
governed by an overall "boss" for the first time, can be 
demonstrated by specifying those characteristics which 
Martin and his successors had in common but which 
distinguished them from their predecessors.^
The first distinguishing feature of the "boss rule", that 
accompanied the institutionalisation of the Republican 
"Organisation", is that Martin and his successors were 
chosen to run the city Republican party organisation by the 
state party leader (or "boss"), Matthew S. Quay. Put 
another way. Quay and his successor Boies Penrose exercised 
a firm grip over the Republican party organisation in 
Philadelphia, or as James Bryce observed, "in the stead of 
Mr. McManes, the State Boss now reigns supreme through his 
lieutenants."2 Muckraker Lincoln Steffens even suggested 
that Quay was "the proprietor of Pennsylvania and the real 
ruler of Philadelphia, just as William Penn, the Great 
Proprietor was."^ Indeed, this characteristic led Steffens 
to conclude that:
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The Philadelphia Organisation is upside down. It 
has its roots in the air, or rather like the banyon 
tree, it send its roots from the centre out both up 
and down and all around and there lies its peculiar 
strength.... the Organisation that rules 
Philadelphia is not a mere municipal machine, but a 
city, state and national organisation.^
A second distinguishing feature of Republican "boss rule", 
after 1887, is that Martin and his successors did not occupy 
any public office in city government when they held the 
position of city "boss". Indeed, apart from McNichol's six 
year spell as Select Councilman, and Bill Vare's four year 
term in the upper chamber, local party leaders avoided city 
government office altogether. Instead they opted for public 
positions in county or state government (see Table 5.1).
This preference may well have been a reflection of the close 
links that existed between the city and the state boss, or 
was perhaps recognition of where power really lay, since the 
city of Philadelphia was merely a legislative agency of the 
state and not an independent sovereignty. However, what is 
particularly significant is that, unlike McManes and 
Stokley, the power of Martin and his successors did not just 
stem from the public offices they personally occupied. That 
is, local party leaders after 1887 were able to subject 
their followers to a system of control and discipline 
regardless of whatever public office they themselves 
occupied.
In the case of party office, the city "boss" exercised a 
firm grip over the internal affairs of the Republican party 
organisation. For example, in 1905, when ward leaders 
Charles F. Kindred, Theodore B. Stulb and Alexander Crow
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Table 5.1 Republican Party Leaders In Philadelphia 1887-1934
Itee
Birth and 
Death
Political
Base
Occupation
Public
Office
David Martin Charles A. Porter
1845-1920 1839 - 1907
19th ward 
N.E.Phlla.
Garbage
Collector
1889 - 91 
Collector of 
Internal 
Revenue for 
1st district 
of Penn
8th ward 
Downtown
Contractor
1862 - 66 
Supervisor of 
Streets
1872 - 74 State 
Representative
1897 Secretary 1890 State 
of the Common- Senator 
wealth
1898 State 
Senator 8th 
District 
1905-9 State 
Insurance 
Commissioner
1909-13 Register 
of Wills
1916 - 20 State 
Senator
Israel W.Durham James P. McNichol George Vare Edwin Vare William S.Vare
1856-1909 1864-1917 1859-1908 1862-1922 1867-1934
7th ward 10th ward 1st ward 1st ward lst/26th ward
Downtown Downtown South Phi la. South Phi la. South Phi la.
Flour Dealer Contractor Contractor Contractor Contractor
1885 - 1985 1898 - 1904 1890 - 96 1897 State 1898 - 1902
Police Magistrate Select Council State Repre­
sentative
Represen­
tative
President, Board 
of Mercantile 
Appraisers
1897 State 1904 - 1917 State 1896 - 1908 1908-1922
Senator Senator 3rd State Senator State 1098 - 1902 Select
1899 - 1905 State
Insurance
Commissioner
1908-9 State 
Senator
District 1st District Senator 1st 
District
Counci 1
1902-1912 Recorder 
of Deeds
1912-1926 U.S. 
House of
Representatives
1926-1929 U.S. 
Senator-elect
Sources: John A. Smull, Smull's Legislative Handbook (Harrisburg, 1900), pp. 1161, 1164; 1910, pp.974-5;
1920, pp.1098-1100; Manual of Councils, 1898-1904; The North American, Philadelphia and Popular Pheladelphi ans 
(Philadelphia, 1891), pp. 18, 27-29; Harold Zink, City Bosses in the~United States (Durham. N.C., 1930), pp. 
206-229; William S. Vare, My Forty Years in Politics (Philadelphia, 1933).
Jr., questioned Durham and McNichol's authority during a
period of reform insurgency, they were automatically
replaced on the Republican City Committee by Peter E. Smith,
John Klang and Charles L. Brown.^ Reform leader, Rudolph
Blankenburg, wryly observed that
disobedience to the orders of the "Organisation" 
whether from the rank and file or those higher up 
is meted with instant punishment.... it cannot and 
does not brook insubordination, which in fact is 
about the only "crime" it is unwilling to
tolerate.G
Bill Vare was also able to dictate his choice of ward 
leaders, for as contemporary political scientist Professor 
John T. Salter noted, "when Vare says 'There is your leader 
- elect him,* the Ward Committee follows orders."^ This 
kind of obedience prompted the Sunday Dispatch to remark 
that, "The Republican Organisation is a good deal like an 
army. It obeys the wishes of the general staff."®
Local elections provide a good example not only of the 
smooth efficiency of the machine, but also illustrate the 
tendency of party workers, throughout the city, to carry out 
the boss's orders. The September primary election of 1925, 
or the "Shoyer Stickers election" as it became known, 
provides perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the 
boss's ability to subject party subordinates to a 
reliable system of control.^ John M. Patterson, the 
"Organisation" candidate for the Republican nomination for 
District Attorney, fell ill just before the primary, and on 
election day was believed to be dying. At 3 p.m. the Vare 
leaders went into conference at Republican party 
headquarters and decided to defeat their own candidate.
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This decision was quite remarkable given that voters had 
been going to the polls since 7 a.m. to vote for Patterson, 
and there were only four hours left before they closed.
Ward leaders were summoned by telephone to party 
headquarters and given bundles of stickers, which had been 
printed on the eve of election day and held in readiness, in 
the event of Patterson's death. The stickers, bearing the 
name of former City Treasurer, Frederick J. Shoyer, were 
distributed by car to polling places throughout the city, 
where they were placed by election officials over 
Patterson's name or in a blank space on the ballot paper. 
Soon after the polls closed, Patterson died, but the Vares' 
were unable to rob him of victory as he received 168,795 
votes. Yet in an incredible feat of organisation, the Vare 
machine had managed to cast 124,895 votes for a man not 
previously discussed as a candidate for District Attorney, 
and whose name had not even been printed on the ballot 
paper.  ^^
The system of control which the city boss exercised over 
subordinates in party office also extended to those 
followers who occupied public office. From the 1890's 
onwards, one-third to one-half of the members of Select 
Council also sat on the Republican party's City Committee, 
while the lower chamber was packed with party workers who 
had served the "Organisation" loyally in their respective 
wards.  ^^
That the "Organisation's" leadership could control the
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behaviour of their supporters in elected public office was 
demonstrated in 1901, when state "boss" Quay punished an 
ungrateful Peter B. Widener for his lack of support during a 
political crisis. Quay supervised the passage of 
legislation, creating a new category of street railway 
company, which was specifically directed towards destroying 
Widener's monopoly of the transit industry in Philadelphia. 
While Widener set sail for a European holiday, two of Quay's 
supporters introduced the necessary bills, without notice, 
in the state legislature on May 28, 1901. They were whisked 
through the House and Senate by June 5, and passed by 
Governor Stone on June 7, when charters were issued for 
roads in Scranton and Pittsburgh, and for thirteen companies 
in Philadelphia.
The machine in Philadelphia was equally effective. Under 
instructions from "Iz" Durham, James L. Miles, President of 
Select Council and Chairman of the Republican City 
Committee, called a special session of Council for Monday, 
June 10, to consider the thirteen franchise ordinances. The 
forty-member Council included nineteen ward leaders, and it 
quickly referred the bills to the Street Railroads Committee 
chaired by Watson D. Upperman, the thirty-first ward 
representative on the Republican City Committee. 
Significantly, Charles Seger, the machine's "whip" appointed 
by Durham, also sat on the Railroads Committee, and it took 
just one hour to approve these ordinances which affected 
nearly two hundred miles of the city's streets, as well as 
the rights and interests of existing transit companies. The
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bills were then passed by Councils on June 12, sent to Mayor 
Ashbridge the following day, and initialled shortly after 
midnight on June 14, but not before the Mayor had publicly 
refused to veto or accept an offer to the city of two and a 
half million dollars for the same franchises, from store 
merchant John Wanamaker.
The street railway franchise "grab" was widely condemned by 
the forces of good government, but what is remarkable about 
this incident from the perspective of political 
organisation, is the speed by which the conspiracy was 
executed. Since this legislation was passed by the state 
legislature and city council in just over two weeks, I would 
suggest that this "macing" exercise provides an excellent 
illustration of the superb way in which Quay and Durham were 
able to marshall their "troops" in the respective 
legislatures.  ^^
Local party leaders managed to maintain control of their
followers in city council, even on occasions when they were
starved of patronage resources. For example, the Vare and
McNichol forces in Councils successfully combined to thwart
Blankenburg's reform initiatives, by employing
obstructionist tactics to undermine his mayoral
administration (1912-16). Morris L. Cooke, Blankenburg's
Director of Public Works, acknowledged that "the real
stumbling block" to reform was
the openly antagonistic attitude of our City
Councils The whole body is organised so that
a very few strong-willed and corrupt men at 
points of vantage, arrange everything. A bare 
half dozen absolutely dictate to twenty times
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their number.
The monotonous regularity with which successive party 
leaders secured public contract work suggests that the city 
"boss's" ability to control the behaviour of his followers 
was not confined to unusual or special occasions. On the 
contrary, the remarkable way in which firms that party 
leaders invested in, or associated themselves with, 
prospered, indicates that the city "boss" was able to 
subject subordinates in public office to a reliable system 
of control and discipline, on a consistent and regular 
basis.
For example, David Martin, Charles Porter and John Mack, 
were nicknamed the "Hog Combine", because "they hogged 
everything in sight and m o r e l B e t w e e n  1887 and 1894 
companies they controlled completed nearly five million 
dollars worth of business with the Department of Public 
Works (see Table 5.2). After 1894 Martin and Porter's 
Vulcanite Paving Company received a total of 736 contracts 
worth approximately four million dollars, while John Mack's 
businesses acquired over four thousand contracts, carrying 
out at least thirty-three million dollars worth of public 
work.^ G
Similarly, McNichol and the Vare brothers were labelled "the 
Contractor Bosses". James P. McNichol, along with his 
brother Daniel, inherited the family building firm and 
completed over six million dollars worth of municipal work, 
in the form of street-paving and repair contracts, in the
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Table 5.2. City Contracts for the Department of Public 
Works, Awarded to the "Hog Combine", 1887-1894
Bureau: Highways Water Surveys Misc. Total
$ $ $ $ $
1 887 102,178 227,360 329,538
1 888 141,461 252,145 393,606
1 889 109,323 352,029 461,352
1 890 354,562 4,249 73,175 431,986
1 891 244,626 59,555 15,916 320,097
1 892 174,157 23,148 271,759 469,064
1 893 956,272 1 ,851 24,303 982,426
1 894 307,560 1, 038,000 72,080 83,481 1,501,121
2 ,390,139 1, 958,337 432,930 107,784 4,889,190
Vulcanite Filbert Charles
Paving Company & Porter A. Porter
Number of
Contracts 1 52 1 6 1 6
1 887 102,176 227,360 329,536
1 888 156,505 237,101 393,606
1 889 126,024 328,199 7,128 461,351
1 890 358,812 73,175 431,987
1 891 304,1 82 15,916 320,098
1 892 197,305 271 ,759 469,064
1 893 982,427 982,427
1 894 391,041 1,110,080 1,501,121
2,618,472 1,902,740 367,978 4,889,190
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Major Items: Paving Broad Street $700,406
Lining East Park Reservoir $792,660
North Pennsylvania Junction $263,400
Queen Lane Reservoir $1,038,000
Sources: Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1887-1894,
Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia; City 
Contracts, Records Centre, City of Philadelphia; Anti- 
Combine Committee, For Good Government, (Philadelphia,
1 895), pp.15-21 .
The Mayor's Annual Register lists the number of contracts 
that was awarded to the above firms during this period, 
while the value of them has been calculated by tracing the 
individual contracts stored at the Records Centre, 410 N. 
Broad Street.
The Anti-Combine Committee was a local non-partisan reform 
group set up in 1895 with the aim of electing former 
Democratic governor Robert E. Pattison "as Mayor, to secure 
a business administration of city affairs."
1890' s . T h e i r  company, in which Durham was made a secret 
partner, then undertook rather more ambitious projects.
They built the twenty-five million dollar Torresdale water- 
filtration plant (1899-1907) and the Roosevelt Boulevard 
(1903-14) which opened up the north-eastern section of the 
city to automobile traffic and residential development, as 
well as the subway tunnel (1907-8) for the Market Street 
transit line, and the Ben Franklin Parkway (1918) which 
linked Fairmount Park to the city centre.1®
"Sunny Jim's" other interests included the Pennsylvania 
Company, which controlled a half a million dollar garbage 
disposal business, and the Filbert Paving and Construction 
Company which netted 310 city contracts, worth in excess of 
three million dollars, between 1903 and 1911. He was also
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the major stockholder in the Millard and Keystone 
Construction Companies which obtained a three million dollar 
contract for the construction of a new high pressure fire 
mains, the largest single contract awarded by the Department 
of Public Safety during the Reyburn administration of 1 907 
to 1911.19
The Vare brothers, George, Edwin and Bill, initially set up 
a small contracting business in South Philadelphia, hauling 
ashes, and collecting and dumping the city's garbage. Their 
company, however, quickly developed into a major street- 
cleaning operation, and between 1888 and 1921 they collected 
eighteen million dollars from fifty-eight street-cleaning 
contracts, usually covering the first, second and third 
districts of the city. In 1905, and from 1909-11 inclusive, 
they managed to obtain the contract for cleaning the entire 
city, ranging in cost from $950,000 in 1905, to $1,372,000 
in 1911. The Vares' also carried out ten million dollars 
worth of other public work, including sewer construction, 
bridge-building, resurfacing work and the development of 
League Island Park. In total Vare interests received 341 
public contracts worth over twenty eight million dollars 
(see Table 5.3).^0
Private work was also important to "the Contractor Bosses". 
In public testimony Edwin Vare admitted that by 1911 he had 
undertaken fifty million dollars worth of work for the city, 
fifteen million from public contracts and thirty-five 
million from sub-contracting work for private parties. The 
Vares' largest private contract was with the Bell Telephone
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Table 5.3
1888-1928
Public Contracts awarded to Vare Interests,
Number
of
Contracts
Total
Amount
$
No. of Estimated^ 
Contracts/ Value 
Value $ 
Unknown
Grand
Sum
$
Wilson 
& Vare 
(1888- 
1 895)
1 4 830,419 3 227,000 1,057,419
W.S. Vare 
(1891-3)
3 5,000 5,000
George 
Vare 
(1894- 
1 904)
98 816,149 28 326,452 1,142,601
Edwin 
Vare 
(1 890- 
1 922)
1 57 21 ,324,120 27 3,110,000 24,434,120
Vare 11 1 
Construction 
Company 
(1923-1928)
,409,042 1,409,042
280 24 ,379,730 61 3,668,452 28,048,182
Sources: Mayor's Annual Register of Contracts, 1888-1928,
Department of Records, City Hall, Philadelphia; City 
Contracts, Records Centre, City of Philadelphia.
^ Because of theft or fire it is not possible to trace all 
of the individual contracts at the Records Centre. In such 
cases an estimated value has been calculated, based on the 
average value of contracts awarded to the firm in the 
particular year when the individual contract could not be 
found.
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Company and involved the digging and laying of conduits 
throughout the city. McNichol enjoyed a similar deal with 
the United Gas Improvement Company. The "Contractor Bosses" 
could insist on a monopoly arrangement in private contract 
work, for these large utility companies could not complete 
any project without approval from the City Council and the 
Department of Public Works.
A brief examination of the procedure by which city contracts 
were awarded is sufficient to show that the city "boss" was 
able to exercise control over subordinates in public office. 
First impressions suggest that public contracts were awarded 
on an impartial basis, since it was city councils that 
determined (except when the state legislature dictated 
otherwise) what work was to be carried on within the city, 
and either granted permission to utility companies to 
proceed, or appropriated the necessary funds to government 
departments. Heads of departments, appointed by the Mayor, 
were then responsible for awarding public contracts and 
overseeing the satisfactory completion of both private and 
public work on behalf of the city.^^
In practice, however, this procedure was so tightly 
controlled by the "Organisation" that fair and open 
competition amongst contractors was stifled, and only those 
firms favoured by the city "boss" prospered. For example, 
since the bulk of the council's work dealt with matters of 
business routine and not general public policy, and given 
that (prior to 1919) it was a large and unwieldy body, all 
bills, resolutions, and petitions were considered by
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committees first, before open discussion in the chambers,
If any of these committees did not favour bills they 
obstructed them by simply holding them back. In 1912, for 
instance, although 311 bills were reported out for action by 
Councils, 2,084 had actually been referred to Committees. 
Significantly, Committee recommendations were almost never 
changed by Councils. Of the 254 bills reported favourably 
by Committee in 1912, only four were rejected and two 
hundred passed unanimously.^^
The "Organisation" always controlled the most important of 
the twenty-seven Council Committees, namely the Finance, 
Highways and Surveys Committees, which dealt with 75 percent 
of all Council work. In 1910-11, for example, 22 of the 53 
Councilmen who occupied the 72 positions on the three 
Committees, were members of the City Committee. Ward 
leaders, Frank H. Caven, Harry J. Trainer, Peter E.
Costello, and John P. Connelly, sat on all three Committees, 
with the latter being Chairman of the Highways Committee.
The Chairmanship of the Finance Committee was held by first 
ward leader Joseph R.C. McAllister who relied on an 
appointed postion as a real estate assessor for his 
livelihood, and owed his political career to the Vares 
Similarly, in 1911 when Vare received a contract to clean 
the entire city for $1,372,000, seven ward leaders sat on 
the Councils street-cleaning Committee that determined the 
size of the appropriation to the street-cleaning Bureau.
They included Neil MacNeill, Ferdinand G. Zweig, Harry J. 
Trainer and Kennedy Crossan, who were all members of Vare's
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mayoral campaign committee for the Republican primary 
election in 1911.^6
Over fifty percent of the appropriations allocated by the 
Councils went to the Departments of Public Works and Public 
Safety, the two largest departments in city government. In 
theory, the Mayor appointed the heads of departments but in 
practice, as he owed his election to the party, they were 
selected by the City Committee, because the "Organisation" 
had to be certain they would be willing to follow their 
instructions with regard to the awarding of contracts and
p 7
the appointment or removal of subordinates. These 
positions were sometimes filled by Committee members. For 
example, David Smyth, James B. Sheehan, Joseph H. Klemmer, 
Henry Clay, Arthur R. H. Morrow and Peter Costello, all 
served as either Director or assistant Director of Supplies, 
Public Works or Public Safety, under the Weaver and Reyburn 
administrations of 1903-11.^^ Ward leaders also occupied 
lucrative and influential offices within these departments. 
For example, when Morris L. Cooke took over as Director of 
Public Works in the Blankenburg reform administration (1912- 
16), he discovered that all the assistant Commissioners of 
the Bureau of Highways, drawing $2,500/year, were ward 
leaders who had no knowledge of highway e n g i n e e r i n g . ^9
It v/as these party workers in public office that ensured 
that city contracts were placed with firms favoured by, or 
controlled by, party leaders. Vare, for example, was 
awarded a $950,000 contract in 1905 to clean the entire 
city, by forty-first ward leader Peter Costello, Director of
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Public Works, on the recommendation of eighteenth ward 
leader Samuel Sutcliffe, Chief of the Street-Cleaning 
Bureau. Both these party workers had been elevated to the - 
City Committee by McNichol in the 1890's. In addition, 
eighth ward leader Robert Scott, magistrate Dennis F. 
Fitzgerald, and State Representatives Joseph Maclvor and 
Henry S. Myers were employed as district inspectors to see 
that Vare carried out the work properly (see Figure 5.1).^^
A conspiracy to defraud the city in the construction of the 
smallpox wing of the new municipal hospital, which was 
uncovered in October 1905, shows just how much the awarding 
of contracts was a tightly knit "Organisation" affair.
Those charged included Abraham L. English, the Director of 
Public Safety under Mayor Ashbridge (1899-1903), who awarded 
the one million dollar contract in 1903; City Architect 
Philip H. Johnson, who was Durham's brother-in-law; and two 
representatives of Henderson and Company, of which McNichol 
was a director. It was shown that they acted together to 
change the specifications of the contract after it was 
awarded and carried it out in their own way, with the aid of 
the building inspector, James D. Finley, a flour merchant 
who also happened to be Durham's cousin.^
The construction of the Torresdale water filtration system, 
between 1899 and 1907, provides perhaps the best 
illustration of the methods which were used by successive 
administrations to stifle fair competition amongst 
contractors, as all but two of the major contracts for this 
twenty-five million dollar enterprise were awarded to D. J.
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Figure 5.1. Philadelphia's Political Contractor System, 1919. This 
chart illustrating how the "Contractor Bosses" were able to maintain 
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McNichol and Company.
In June 1905, Mayor John Weaver fell out with Durham over 
the "boss's" proposal to lease the city's gas works to the 
United Gas Improvement Company. Weaver "turned reformer" 
and appointed "two of the country's foremost engineers,"
John Donald Maclennan and Major Cassius E. Gillette of the 
War Department, to head an inquiry into the awarding of 
contracts for the construction of the filtration plant. The 
engineers reported back to the Mayor that the favoured 
contractors, in collusion with city officials, had robbed 
the treasury of six million dollars, out of the eighteen 
million, spent on the filtration scheme by 1905, even when 
allowing the contractors a 20 percent profit m a r g i n . ^2
Their investigation into this "graft operation" revealed 
that a variety of methods had been used to "guide the 
contracts into the "right" hands," as the Public Ledger put 
it.33 These included: the inadequate advertising for bids; 
the insistence on lump sum bids (rather than itemising bids 
so that competitors could have made intelligent bids upon 
the different classes of work at unit prices) and the 
withholding, by the Filtration Bureau, of the relevant 
information (except to the favoured contractor) that was 
needed in order to calculate such an estimate; the awarding 
of contracts to McNichol's company on the basis that it was 
the "best" or most "responsible" bidder, rather than the 
"lowest" bidder, and on the grounds that his firm would 
complete the work in the shortest time; the readvertisement 
of some contracts when other competitors were the lowest
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bidders; and finally, the intimidation of competitors by 
contract specifications "which gave excessive and 
unnecessary power to city officials.
In the case of the latter, the filtration contracts 
contained a clause that gave the Director of Public Works 
authority to change the plans and specifications of 
contracts to an unlimited extent, and to fix the price of 
work as charged. The engineers claimed that the main 
purpose of this provision was to permit city officials to 
harass an unwelcome contractor without the latter being able 
to prevent it, or to secure legal redress.
The experience of George, C. Dietrich, who managed to obtain 
one of the two large contracts that eluded McNichol, 
suggests that the engineers were correct in their 
assessment. Dietrich attempted to build Lardner's Point 
Station No.2 for $532,000, leaving himself a margin of 
$120,000 as protection against accidents and delays, and to 
provide a reasonable profit, but as he had successfully 
underbid the McNichol firm, he incurred the wrath of the 
"Organisation". Chief of the Filtration Bureau, John W. 
Hill, who had been specially imported from Boss Cox's 
Cincinnati, told his inspectors to "keep after that Dutchman 
(Dietrich) - you must nail him down to a hair." In fact 
sixty-two material changes were made to the specifications 
of his contract and eighty-nine supplementary sheets of 
drawings were issued after the contract was let. Dietrich 
was forced into bankruptcy and left Philadelphia for
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Seattle, a ruined man.^^
In these circumstances it is perhaps not too surprising to
find that there was no competition for the five largest
contracts awarded for the construction of the filters, and
the provision of sand and gravel to fill them.
Contemporaries such as the reformer Rudolph Blankenburg
however were still bewildered that city work totalling
$9,400,000 could not attract other bidders:
It is an astonishing feature of the bidding for 
the sand contracts, which were the largest that 
had ever been awarded in Philadelphia or elsewhere 
in the U.S., that not a single firm of sand-dealers 
participated in the bidding, although there were a 
dozen or more reputable and thoroughly competent 
dealers in the article in the city.^7
It appears that the Vares obtained their street-cleaning 
contracts in a similar fashion to the way in which McNichol
secured the filtration contracts. Street-cleaning contracts
were awarded on a yearly basis only, which meant that 
prospective bidders had to take the risk of purchasing 
expensive vehicles and machinery, without any guarantee that 
their contract would be renewed. They were also not awarded 
until late November, which did not allow sufficient time for 
a new contractor to establish his own dumping stations 
throughout the city.^G in addition, bidders were
discouraged by two specifications which were never enforced
when Vare was awarded the contract; that is, the contractor 
had to "employ an extra 195 men as 'block men' to clean each 
city square" in the downtown district, and make sure there 
was "a sufficient number of men maintained on all asphalt, 
brick and wood block streets to keep them clean at all
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times."39
The wide interpretation that could be placed on the latter 
specification meant that officials of the Street-Cleaning 
Bureau could easily harass an unwanted contractor. This 
occurred in the case of Daniel Dooley, an independent 
contractor who suffered a similar fate as George C.
Dietrich. In 1903 Dooley obtained the street-cleaning 
contract in the third district for $59,000, under bidding 
the Contracting Combine by $112,000. From the outset, he 
was harassed as numerous complaints were filed with the 
Bureau that he was not fulfilling the contract 
specifications. He was compelled to pay fines totalling 
$9,084.50 or 15 percent of the contract value. Dooley was 
again successful in bidding for the 1904 contract, but the 
strain of events took their toll however, for he died in 
March that year, a victim of what his widow and the North 
American called "gang persecution".^0 After the Dooley 
episode, the Vares' picked up street-cleaning contracts on a 
regular basis and by 1911 they were the only bidders 
offering to clean the entire city for $1,340,000. The North 
American called the charade of awarding contracts "a 
Reyburnian Joke".^^
An important consequence of the ability of successive party 
leaders to subject subordinates, both in party and in public 
office, to a reliable system of control, was that the city 
"boss" was able to regulate the legislation that did (or did 
not) pass through the City Council. As George W. Norris,
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Blankenburg's director of wharves, docks and ferries 
complained, "the legislation that the Mayor wanted, the 
(Councils) refused. The legislation that he did not want 
they passed over his veto."^2 For example, when reformers 
persuaded the state legislature to pass a new housing code 
in 1913 that regulated health and safety standards in 
Philadelphia, the city Councils, guided by Edwin Vare, voted 
insufficient funds to pay for the hundred sanitary 
inspectors that would have to be hired to ensure that the
act was enforced.
In a similar vein, a decade earlier, Israel Durham 
repeatedly blocked the efforts of utilities financier, John 
Mack, to secure a council ordinance that would have allowed 
him to break the Philadelphia Electric Company's local 
monopoly on electric lighting. Mack, a railroad financier 
and street-paving and garbage disposal contractor, had been 
a close associate of Durham's at the turn of the century.
He was also President of the Keystone Telephone Company and 
interested in the idea of using the Company's extensive 
underground conduits to establish a new electric company.44 
Fearful of a potential rival, Joseph McCall, President of 
Philadelphia Electric, attempted to take over the Keystone 
Company in 1904. Durham acted as an intermediary for Mack, 
and negotiated a deal with McCall whereby Philadelphia 
Electric would purchase the Keystone conduits for two and a 
half million dollars. In addition, Durham promised McCall 
that Councils would approve an ordinance prohibiting the 
further stringing of electric light wires within the
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districts covered by the Keystone's conduits, thereby 
safeguarding the Company's future interests.
On returning from holiday Mack rejected the agreement and 
demanded that Philadelphia Electric pay three million 
dollars for the underground conduits. When McCall refused 
to increase his offer, Mack announced his intention to 
compete against Philadelphia Electric and promised 
prospective consumers a 20 percent reduction in electric 
rates. Meanwhile Durham, humiliated at the way Mack had 
cancelled his agreement, vowed that no ordinance giving Mack 
electric privileges would ever pass Councils. Mack attempted 
to secure an ordinance on several occasions but never 
succeeded. He was eventually forced to accept McCall's 
original offer, and worse still, his contract work for the 
city was substantially cut. Durham contemptuously dismissed 
him with the expression: "Why that man doesn't know what 
division he lives in and could not carry it with a million 
dollars."^5
As the boss's approval was necessary to pass legislation in 
Councils, communication and payment passed through him, 
rather than directly from private interests to subordinates. 
That is, when businessmen, or big corporations such as the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, sought legislative privileges, they 
channelled their requests and "contributions" (the "routine 
graft" or "oil" that kept the machine in running order) 
through the city boss's eleventh floor office in the Betz 
Building, which was situated adjacent to city hall. They 
rarely attempted to bribe councilmen on an individual basis
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as they had done in the past; nor did they bother to lobby 
the Mayor, the official head of government. Instead, 
private interests found that their needs were more easily 
met by dealing with a single overall boss, a leader of 
unofficial executive status, who could guarantee results 
because of his ability to control city government.
For example, when the Mutual Automatic Telephone Company 
secured franchise privileges in July 1894, it was obliged to 
distribute $363,000 of its stock to the "Organisation". 
Seventy-five Common Councilmen were each allocated six, 
fifty dollar shares, and twenty-five Select Councilmen, 
twenty shares each. This share distribution guaranteed a 
three-fifths- majority in- each Council chamber, enough to 
secure passage of the franchise in the event of a mayoral 
veto. Almost half of the shares, however, went to David 
Martin, and his associate Charles A. Porter, who each 
received 1525 shares valued at $ 7 6 , 2 5 0 . The local reform 
watchdog group, the Citizens' Municipal Association, 
acknowledged that as State Senators, Martin and Porter had 
"no official connection with Councils," but as leaders of 
the Republican party organisation "possessed notorious 
influence with members.
The "influence" which David Martin and his successors as 
party leaders exercised was, as we have seen, the ability to 
subject subordinates, in both party and public office, to a 
reliable system of control. It is this increased discipline 
within the (internal) party organisation which distinguishes 
genuine "boss" rule in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia from
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the party factionalism and ring rivalry that prevailed in 
the 1870's, when McManes and Stokley struggled for supremacy 
within the Republican party. Under Martin and his 
successors, the "Organisation" exhibited the internal 
cohesiveness and discipline which was characteristic of the 
mature political machine; that is, the Republican party 
organisation functioned as its centralised and hierarchical 
pyramid structure suggested that it should. What we now 
need to explain, however, is how this system of control and 
discipline was instituted; that is, how was power internally 
consolidated within the Republican "Organisation". This 
issue will be the subject of the following chapter.
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6. The Centralisation of the Republican "Organisation" of 
Philadelphia
In seeking to account for the centralisation of political
machines James Scott, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson
argue that if a political boss can monopolise the
distribution of patronage within his domain, he will quickly
be able to bring other politicians under his control because
he will be able to reward those who are loyal to him and
starve out those who are not.^ Patronage it appears also
seems to have been a key factor in accounting for the
consolidation of power within the Philadelphia Republican
"Organisation". Clinton R. Woodruff, Secretary of the
National Municipal League, for example, regarded the threat
of dismissal from public office as the lynch-pin of what he
called "the Philadelphia system." He noted
the completeness and thoroughness with which the 
Organisation took care of its workers and yet 
subjected each one of them to constant dependence
upon it for support and maintenance............ Each
ward leader with very few exceptions was given
an appointive position so that at any time at which 
he might prove recalcitrant he could be brought to 
terms by threatening removal. Councilmen were 
controlled by receiving clerkships in the 
administrative departments, or by having their near 
relatives, sons, daughters or others dependent upon 
them for livelihood, given appointive places.
In this way, or through subsidies to interests in 
which the ward leaders or councilmen were 
interested, the machine could depend at any moment 
upon the unquestioning fealty of its retainers. It 
did not have to discuss ways and means with them or 
secure their views. It knew that by the very 
simple process of threatening to cut off their 
bread and butter, they could bring them to support 
the most iniquitous or arbitrary measures.
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It is my contention, however, that the monopolisation of the 
distribution of patronage (itself a consequence of the 
administrative consolidation and centralisation of power and 
authority under the new city charter of 1887) provides only 
a partial explanation for the establishment of a reliable 
system of discipline within the "Organisation". The 
difficulties that McManes and Stokley faced in disciplining 
their subordinates, even when they did control substantial 
amounts of patronage in the city, indicates that the 
explanation for the centralisation of political machines 
favoured by Scott, Banfield and Wilson is not a fully 
satisfactory one.
We noted earlier in Chapter 3 that a critical source of 
McManes and Stokley's weakness was their inability to 
monopolise the recruitment of candidates to public office.
It was pointed out that this weakness was attributable to 
the fact that the Republican party organisation did not 
function as its centralised and hierarchical structure 
implied that it should. Indeed it was argued that the party 
organisation more closely resembled a feudal hierarchy 
rather than the business corporation or modern bureaucracy 
to which Scott, Banfield and Wilson liken the political 
machine.3 It was also indicated in the last chapter that a 
key distinguishing feature of machine rule in Philadelphia 
was that the state party leader Matt Quay and his successor 
Boies Penrose exercised a firm grip over the city's 
Republican party organisation.
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An adequate explanation for the centralisation of the 
Republican "Organisation" then must account, on the one 
hand, for Quay's ability to control party affairs in 
Philadelphia and, on the other, for the erosion of the power 
and influence of local party officials in their respective 
ward bailiwicks by the party leadership. It is my 
contention that the emergence of a fully fledged political 
machine in Philadelphia was due as much to a series of 
organisational innovations, initiated by the state and city 
party boss between the mid-1880's and the turn of the 
century, as it was to the monopolisation of the distribution 
of patronage.
In other words, the transformation in the functioning of the 
party organisation - that resulted from the the emergence of 
a centralised political structure in place of the feudal 
hierarchy - was not simply a natural and automatic 
consequence of the monopolisation of the distribution of 
patronage as the scholars listed above maintain. It was 
also due to a number of changes in party methods, rules, 
recruitment and finance implemented by the state and city 
party boss in a deliberate attempt to centralise power 
within the Republican party. How then did the party 
leadership manage to establish a reliable system of control 
and discipline?
QUAYISM AND PHILADELPHIA 
In order to provide a satisfactory explanation it is
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necessary in the first instance to focus on developments at 
the state level, for Quay's ability to influence party 
affairs in Philadelphia to his own advantage rested on his 
success in consolidating power within the state Republican 
party, a task which he undertook in the wake of James G. 
Blaine's defeat in the Presidential election of 1884.
Quay's biographer, James Kehl identifies this election as a 
key turning point in the development of the state Republican 
party, because Blaine's defeat finally convinced Quay of the 
inadequacy of the machine that Cameron, like other 
Senatorial oligarchs, had operated since the Civil War.^ A 
variety of factors, namely, the reluctance of President 
Grant's successors to supply adequate amounts of federal 
patronage to the Camerons; the implementation of the 
Pendleton Civil Service Act in 1883; the party factionalism 
(such as the twelve year rivalry between Stalwarts and Half 
Breeds) which resulted from the reliance on patronage; and 
the twin threat posed by the growing power of business and 
the rapidly increasing size of urban constituencies, led 
Quay to conclude that a power base in central government was 
"too vulnerable for effective boss rule."^
With Simon Cameron's approval Quay therefore decided,
not to repair the Cameron machine but to design a 
new model that shifted the locus of power from 
Washington to the individual states. In his 
blueprint federal patronage became subordinate to 
the power sources in the states that had been the 
focal units of party power prior to the era of the 
Stalwart bosses. Quay sought to return political 
emphasis to its normal political channel. In the 
process he revised the functions of his party 
organisation and made it more responsive to the 
demands of an expanding and increasingly 
industrial economy. In Pennsylvania, Quay
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personally became the connecting link between the 
"interests" and legislative approval of their 
growing demands.
In order to function as an efficient political broker
however, it was necessary for Quay to control the flow of
legislation and appropriations through the state
legislature, and this in turn was contingent upon his
ability to subject to his discipline party subordinates who
staffed the state government.
What enabled Quay to establish a reliable system of 
discipline among his followers was not just the monopoly of 
federal and state patronage at his disposal (which he 
regarded as a curse as much as a blessing) but also that of 
a regular and independent (of business interests) supply of 
money.7 This "income" derived from manipulating public 
funds in the state treasury enabled Quay to become in Kehl's 
words,
the new proprietor of Pennsylvania........... while
Governors and legislators directed the affairs of
Pennsylvania........ Quay manipulated the affairs of
governors and legislators. The power of the 
treasury often elected the officials who came to 
Harrisburg and just as often despatched them to 
their homes when they ceased to fulfill the 
purposes that Quay and his Harrisburg ring had 
designed for them. The treasury made and unmade 
men; by juggling the state's millions it could 
arrange personal successes or frame personal 
tragedies. °
While treasury funds enabled Quay to influence the outcome
of local elections to state office, it was the power to
h
withdraw patronage and to reduce or witl:^ld state 
appropriations (as well as the threat to make public any 
personal or political indiscretion which a legislator may
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have committed) which provided him with the means to ensure 
subordinates remained loyal to him during their term of 
office.9 Indeed so successful was Quay in inducing 
subordinates to accept his leadership that Independent 
Republican gubernatorial candidate John Wanamaker claimed in 
1 898,
the Republican party of Pennsylvania has well nigh 
lost its identity. So completely has Quayism taken 
possession of it that we almost look in vain for
any semblance to its former self.........The single
aim of those who control its organisation has been 
to drive principle, conscience and righteou^out 
and to let Quayism in.
The party organisation has been thoroughly 
subjugated and is now officered and directed for 
the benefit of one man and not the Republican 
party.10
The internal consolidation of power within the state 
Republican party and the control it, in turn, exercised over 
Pennsylvania government had important consequences not just 
for reform insurgents but also for the structure and 
organisation of party politics in Philadelphia. We have 
already seen how Quay, through the creation of the U.R.A. 
and by securing the passage of the Bullitt Bill, managed, at 
McManes' expense, to increase his influence over the 
Philadelphia Republican party and city government. The 
establishment of a reliable system of discipline within the 
state Republican party, combined with the ability to control 
the flow of legislation and appropriations through the state 
legislature, enabled Quay to extend his influence over the 
city's political affairs still further, to the point of 
being able to impose his personal choice as leader of the 
local Republican organisation.
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"From his seat in the U.S. Senate," as Steffens put it, Quay 
chose
David Martin for boss.......... he raised up his man
and set him over the people......Boss Martin picked
up and set down from above was accepted by 
Philadelphia, and the Philadelphia machine.
Martin was "accepted" because Quay, by discriminating in
granting or witholding support for appropriations to public
agencies, and for legislation designed to meet the needs of
corporate interests, made it clear to Philadelphia
businessmen, financiers, social service agents and
politicians, that the nineteenth ward leader was the correct
local "political channel" they should use to ensure that
their claims for government support would receive
preferential treatment.
Martin was not plucked from political obscurity by Quay as 
Steffens infers. He had held a variety of public offices 
such as County Commissioner, Mercantile Appraiser and 
sergeant-at-arms in the state and national House of 
Representatives as well as being a local Republican party 
ward leader when Quay "declared" him "to be the boss of 
Philadelphia."^^ Martin was however a Quay-made man in the 
sense that his promotion to city boss was due to the state 
party leader who subsequently made the former garbage 
collector "a full-time member of his state organisation and 
even advanced him to the Republican National Committee in 
8 9 1 . "14 was also through Quay’s intervention that
Martin was appointed to the prestigious federal office of 
Collector of Internal Revenue by President Harrison in May,
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1889. Indeed, it was through the judicious distribution of 
federal and state patronage that Martin struck the final 
blow against McManes by establishing control over the 
Republican City Committee. In gratitude for his elevation, 
Martin, as local party leader, willingly took orders from 
state boss Quay, that is, until 1895 when he felt 
independent enough to turn against his benefactor and join 
(with "boss" Chris Magee of Pittsburgh) in an unsuccessful 
state-wide bid to wrest control of the Republican machine 
from the party leader.
The way in which Quay responded to Martin's refusal to 
endorse Boies Penrose, his choice as Republican Mayoral 
candidate in 1895 ("one of the dirtiest and basest 
exhibitions of treachery in the history of the city's 
politics," according to the Times), illustrates very well 
the methods which the state boss could use to deal with 
potential rivals to his leadership and also at the same time 
influence political affairs in Philadelphia to his own 
advantage.1G Initially he attempted to embarrass and 
discredit his political opponents, firstly, by launching a 
scathing "personal attack" on the Philadelphia party leader 
"from the floor of the U.S. Senate" accusing him of being a 
tool of big business; and then, by persuading the state 
legislature to set up a Committee of Inquiry to investigate 
(and confirm) allegations of misgovernment in the 
Commonwealth's two largest cities.
He then sought to undermine their political influence 
locally by redistributing federal and state patronage
1 89
positions in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in favour of those 
subordinates who had remained loyal to him and by attempting 
to revise the respective charters of these two cities in 
such a way as to benefit his embattled supporters.^®
Finally he astonished his opponents (and supporters) by 
adopting yet again the role of reformer. On this occasion 
Quay committed himself to implementing (but ultimately not 
delivering) civil service reform in all branches of 
government in the state. The adoption of a reform strategy 
though was sufficient to boost his own personal popularity 
with the electorate at the expense of his opponents.
Indeed this strategy, combined with the other initiatives, 
eventually enabled the "roaster of corrupt politics" to not 
only emerge triumphant in the struggle with "his 
recalcitrant pupils" but also to install seventh ward leader 
Israel W. Durham, Penrose's campaign manager, as the new 
Philadelphia Republican party leader in the process.^0
"IZ" DURHAM AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
Unlike Martin, Durham and his associate "Sunny Jim"
McNichol, were quite content to reap the rewards that
political control of a burgeoning metropolis like
Philadelphia had to offer, while submitting to the dictates
of Quay and Penrose in the state arena. Penrose's
biographer maintains that "Iz"
was the kind of subordinate with whom a state boss 
could feel comfortable. Unlike McManes and Martin, 
he had no ambitions to enlarge his kingdom but 
demonstrated an indefatigable dedication to success
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at the local level.
Such was Durham's preoccupation with local politics that 
even though he attended every Republican National convention 
between 1896 and 1908 as a city delegate, he was often
quoted as saying, "What do I care who is President, so long
as I can carry my ward?"^^
It was also under Durham's regime that a number of
Innovations were implemented in the way that the Reublican 
party conducted its affairs; changes which were to 
fundamentally transform the way in which the party 
organisation functioned. The first organisational change 
involved an alteration to the party rules which radically 
affected the membership of the Republican City Committee and 
made it, rather than the wards, the prime unit of the 
organisational structure. When Stokley and McManes were 
engaged in their struggle for factional superiority. 
Republican party rules provided that representatives on the 
City Committee were to be elected at the ward level, and 
that they could only be removed from office by a two-thirds 
majority vote of their respective ward executive 
committees.23 in the wake of Martin's demise at the turn of 
the century, Durham altered these rules in such a way as to 
permit him to dictate who should sit as ward representatives 
on the City Committee. This was achieved by dropping the 
requirement that ward representatives had to be existing 
members of their ward executive committees, and by extending 
the eligibility of those entitled to sit on the party's 
central body to all public officeholders and party workers.
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The practical consequence of these amendments to the party 
rules, was that the party leadership was able to impose its 
own representatives on the City Committee by designating as 
ward leaders those party workers it favoured, rather than 
those who believed themselves to be the legitimate agents of 
Republican interests in the various w a r d s . ^4 As the Press 
pointed out:
Under the rule the City Committee is vested with 
power which stifles independence in ward politics.
The City Committee has had power in fact to step 
in and dictate the affairs of any one or all of the 
42 ward organisations. This power was finally 
extended so that the City Committee was able to say 
who should and who should not sit in its Councils 
as the representative of a ward.
The rules of the Organisation were drafted and 
amended from time to time, to fortify Durham against 
possible attack. He personally dictated the 
changes to the rules. It was the fountain-head of 
his system of making and unmaking ward leaders in 
a single night. Under his system, a ward leader 
was a ward leader only when the City Committee 
said so.
Old ward leaders of known strength in their 
respective wards were gradually crowded out at the 
direction of Durham and their successors seated in 
the City Committee by that body itself. Without 
the approval of the City Committee a ward was barred 
from naming its representative in that Committee.
The City Committee was Durham: Durham was the City
Committee.25
Under the amended party rules then, Durham and McNichol 
purged recalcitrant politicians from the "Organisation". A 
comparison of the City Committee's membership for 1905 with 
that of 1895 (the year of the Martin-Magee revolt), reveals 
that only eleven of the thirty-seven ward representatives 
survived the leadership purge (see Table 6.1).
Independent "free wheeling types" such as Charles Kindred, 
Edward W. Patton and Theodore Stulb, were replaced on the
1 92
City Committee by new "organisation men" such as Peter E. 
Smith, George J. Van Houten and John Klang. Other examples 
of the new generation of politicians, hand-picked by the 
party leaders to sit on the City Committee, included John K, 
Myers, Elias Abrams, Samuel Sutcliffe, Charles T. Preston, 
William McKinley, Thomas S. Wiltbank, Frank H. Caven and 
Oscar Noll.27
In order to ensure that these new representatives remained 
loyal to the "Organisation" and would not resist dictation 
from the centre, Durham insisted that most of them be given 
appointive positions on the public p a y r o l l . 2 8  An 
examination of the City Committee for 1905 shows that 
(besides Durham and McNichol), twenty-three ward 
representatives held appointive positions, while only 
fifteen had recognised occupations outside of politics (see 
Table 6.1).
The control that the party leadership exercised over the 
membership of the party's local units extended to the 
division level, since division leaders, even though elected 
by the party's registered voters, were in practice 
subservient to the selected ward leaders. This was because 
ward leaders, by the judicious distribution of minor 
patronage positions and campaign funds, and the exercise of 
careful discrimination in responding to requests for favours 
from voters, could usually ensure that their particular 
choices as committeemen were adopted as the party's 
divisional representatives.29
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Table 6.1. The Republican City Committee, 1905
Ward Representative Elective
Office
Appointed Occupation 
Position
William S 
Vare
Recorder 
of Deeds
contractor
Harry C. 
Ransley
Harry J. 
Trainer
Robert J. 
Moore*
President, President,
Select Council Mercantile
Appraisers
Select
Councilman
Magistrate
Mercantile
Appraiser
clerk,
"Row" office
store
merchant
horseshoer
Samuel G. 
Maloney
Charles
Getzinger
Israel W. 
Durham*
State
Senator
Harbour Master
clerk. City 
Controller's office
State Insurance 
Commissioner
1 0
Edward A. 
Devlin*
John K. 
Myers
James P. 
McNichol*
ex-Magistrate
State
Senator
Mercantile
Appraiser
Assistant Chief, 
Highways Bureau
contractor
1 1 Joseph H. 
Klemmer*
Register of 
Wills
ex-tax auditor
1 2
1 3
John
Klang
James L. 
Miles
Select
Councilman
Sheriff
saloon - 
keeper
attorney
1 4 Jacob
Wildemore*
City
Commissioner
15 Charles L. 
Brown
State
Senator
Counsel,State attorney 
Dairy & Food 
Commission
1 6 Elias
Abrams
Assistant Highway 
Inspector
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17 David S . 
Scott*
18 Samuel 
Sutcliffe*
19 David 
Martin*
Magistrate
State
Senator
clerk,
City Hall
Chief, Bureau of 
Street-Cleaning
20 David H. 
Lane*
Educational
Commissioner
21 Charles T. 
Preston
22 Jesse S. 
Shepard
23 William 
McKinley
2 4 Thomas S. 
Wiltbank
State
Senator
Select
Councilman
Assistant Chief, 
Highways Bureau
Collector
real estate 
broker
25 Wilbur-F. 
Short
26 Arthur R. H, 
Morrow
27 George J.
Van Houten
Select
Councilman
Common
Councilman
Assistant 
Director 
of Supplies
Court
Officer
hosiery
m/fer
j ournalist
28
29
George 
Sterr Jr.
Peter E. 
Smith
Assistant Chief, 
Highways Bureau
Sergeant-at-arms, 
Select Council
30 John
Smith*
Assistant Engineer, 
Bureau of Fire
31 Horatio B. 
Hackett*
State
Senator
32 William H. 
Berkelbach
33 John B. 
Lukens*
34 Frank H. 
Caven
Select
Councilman
Inspector, Street 
-Cleaning Bureau
Mercantile
Appraiser
upholstrey 
m/f er
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35 George A. 
Castor
Congressman
36 Hugh
Black
City
Commissioner
teamster
37 Oscar E. 
Noll
Assistant Chief, 
Highways Bureau
38 James E. 
Walsh
Select
Councilman
insurance
agent
39 George A. 
Vare
State
Senator
contractor
40 Harry D. 
Beaston
Receiver 
of Taxes
Supervisor 
of the Census
coal
merchant
41 Peter E. 
Costello
Director of 
Public Works
contractor
42 Henry
Homiller
Inspector, 
Water Bureau
Sources: Press, Jan. 12, 1895; Public Ledger, June 18,
1905; North American, June 19, 1905; Record, June 20, 1905; 
Gopsill's Philadelphia City Directory for 1905 
(Philadelphia, 1905).
* indicates those who were members of the Republican City 
Committee in 1895.
The second of the party leadership's innovations resulted in 
party nominations for public office being subjected to 
strict control by the City Committee and the various ward 
committees. One of McManes and Stokley's main weaknesses, 
it will be recalled, was their inability to ensure that 
their particular followers would be nominated for public 
office. Nor were they able to prevent their opponents from 
securing the party's nominations. This weakness was due to 
the fact that the City Committee did not function as a 
centralised and powerful institution. It was not capable of 
extinguishing dissent, or of controlling the candidate
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selection process, either city-wide or at the ward level.
Party conventions consequently were therefore arenas of 
intense rivalry as the various factions struggled to secure 
party nominations for public office. As a successful 
nomination depended on factions obtaining the largest number 
of delegates, conventions were occasionally rowdy and 
violent as disputes arose, particularly over the admission 
of delegates when seats were contested by the rival 
factions.
In order to resolve such disputes, the party rules provided 
for boards to try contests. These boards were comprised of 
the President and Secretary of the local party association 
and the other three divisional officers who had been 
responsible for compiling the register of those eligible to 
vote in the divisional primary elections.
It was often because these divisional boards failed to 
function as impartial tribunals for the settlement of 
contested seats, that party nomination conventions
~3 -1
subsequently became rowdy and violent. As contemporary 
political scientist, Walter Branson, pointed out, these 
boards were "characterised by incompetence and venality" and 
tended to "create rather than decide contests.
Given "the notorious partiality of the contest boards," the 
party's rules were ultimately amended, in May 1898, in order 
to grant the City and ward committees the right to issue 
tickets of admission to the convention hall to the primary 
delegates whom they considered to be properly elected.
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Although "this practice" was "apparently begun in good
faith," according to Branson it
opened the way for flagrant abuses. It has enabled 
the faction in control of the party organisation to 
make up the roll of a convention in an arbitrary 
manner giving itself a majority even when defeated
at the primaries.34
Divisional representation at nomination conventions was thus 
rendered an "abstract principle," as Frank W. Leach put 
i t . 3 5
It was this alteration to the party rules that provided the 
party's leadership with the (institutionalised) means by 
which it could control the candidate selection process for 
public office. Since the party leadership exercised control 
over the membership of the City Committee and the various 
ward committees, the implementation of the new party rule 
meant that in practice, any Republican politician who 
desired public office in Philadelphia, could not secure it 
without the "boss's" endorsement. So long as a prospective 
candidate obtained an endorsement "from the proper source" 
(Durham), Leach suggested, then "the thing is done. His 
nomination is assured." He "can rusticate in Florida or 
luxuriate at the Hot Springs until the convention 
adj ourns."3^
Reformers, not surprisingly, protested that the Republican 
party organisation, under Durham and McNichol, had become "a 
system of absolute despotism, a menace to free government" 
that "totally destroys and makes subservient the popular 
will."37 The Municipal League of Philadelphia also
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complained that:
Party primaries and nominating conventions have 
been made a farce. They are in no sense represent­
ative, they simply register the wishes of the 
"bosses" declared days and weeks beforehand. 
Deliberation has been abolished, as has 
consideration. Automationism has taken their place 
and independence of thought and action by party men 
has been almost unheard of, or where manifested has 
been speedily punished.
It is important to stress that it was not just the party 
nominations that the party "bosses" could guarantee but 
also, since the "Organisation" (as we shall see in the next 
chapter) was able to control the electorate, almost certain 
victory in the general election to public office.
The "Organisation" was thus able to virtually guarantee that
(unlike the 1870's and early 80's when a Republican
politician could win office by running as an independent 
candidate) its endorsement alone was not only necessary but 
also sufficient for a party supporter to hold public office 
in Philadelphia. That is, not only did the "Organisation" 
control Republican party nominations for public office at 
city and ward level, but it also assured the successful 
nominee of winning a reliable majority in the general 
election. By the late nineteenth century then, the
Republican party boss, unlike his predecessors, was able for
the first time to enjoy a monopoly over the recruitment of 
candidates to public office.
A third organisational change, which stemmed directly from 
the first two, was the systématisation and centralisation of 
party revenues. For example, as we saw in the last chapter.
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the city "boss", like Quay, became a political broker; the 
connecting link between corporate interests and legislative 
approval of their growing d e m a n d s . W h e n  businessmen or 
corporations needed legislative privileges from city 
government, they channelled their requests and 
"contributions" (the "routine graft" or "oil" that kept the 
machine in running order) through the city "boss's" office 
in the Betz Building, situated adjacent to City Hall. Since 
the "boss" was able to control the flow of legislation and 
appropriations through the City Council, they no longer used 
lobbyists to bribe legislators or government officials on an 
individual basis as they had done in the past. This new 
arrangement represented an important shift towards party 
centralisation, for the money or company stock that private 
interests had formerly paid for favours or protection no 
longer went to party subordinates but directly into the 
pockets of the party "boss".
Also important in this respect, and again noted earlier, 
were the exorbitant profits that party leaders enjoyed as a 
result of the virtual monopoly which firms they controlled 
or invested in, exercised over public contract work.^O The 
consistent regularity with which these favoured firms 
obtained contract work was, like the ability of the "boss" 
to function as a political broker, a direct consequence of 
the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within 
the "Organisation".
The willingness of public officials to divide the 
perquisites of office with the "Organisation", and the
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insistence of party leaders that they should do so, reflects 
this important shift towards central control of party 
revenues. For example, when the "Organisation" was hard 
pressed, as during the period of City Party insurgency 
(1905-7), public officeholders were obliged to raise a 
campaign "pot" amongst themselves. In 1906 William S. Vare 
and Joseph Klemmer donated their annual salaries of $10,000 
and $5,000, as Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills 
respectively, to the "Organisation's" coffers. State 
Senator Clarence Wolf and Insurance Commissioner David 
Martin both gave $5,000 each, and before the "pot" reached 
the twentieth contributor, over $100,000 had been collected 
for the election c a m p a i g n . The significance of this 
gesture by these various public officeholders is that it 
indicates that party workers - unlike in the earlier period 
of "individualism and ring rule" - were more inclined to 
accept that their commitment and obligation to the party 
organisation was not exhausted once they were elected to 
office. In sharp contrast to those individuals who 
collected fees on State House Row in the 1870's, 
"Organisation" men at the turn of the century regarded 
public office not so much as their own personal property, 
but something they occupied on behalf of the party 
leadership. It was not just coincidence, I would suggest, 
that the Bardsley Treasury defalcation scandal of 1891 was 
the last occasion, under "Organisation" rule, that an 
elected official was removed from office for abusing his 
position for personal financial gain.42
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The systematic and comprehensive way in which the 
"Organisation" levied "political assessments" on patronage- 
holders was also indicative of the centralised control that 
was exercised over party revenues. It appears that, in the 
first decade of this century, approximately 94 percent of 
all city employees paid assessments to the Republican 
"Organisation", even though it was against the law to 
solicit these subscriptions.^^ These "voluntary 
contributions" were either deducted at source from job­
holders* wages or collected by way of the postal s e r v i c e . ^4 
They ranged from $350,000 in 1903 to $500,000 in 1910, and 
totalled over three million dollars between 1903 and 1913. 
The "Organisation" employed a "progressive system of 
taxation" requiring the lowest paid job-holders on $900/year 
or less to contribute one percent, and the highest paid 
earning $6,000/year or more, four percent, of their salary 
to the City Committee, twice a year, before each election. 
Job-holders also gave an additional sum to their ward 
committees equivalent to half the amount they had donated to
the City Committee.^5
Such was the rigour with which these extra-legal income 
taxes were collected, that reformers proclaimed them to be 
"one of the vicious features of machine control."46 city 
employees were subject no less, to "the galling yoke of the 
political gangster," as Rudolph Blankenburg put it.47 There 
is a certain irony about these comments, in the sense that 
they actually constitute an unintended compliment to the way 
in which the leadership of the "Organisation" financed party
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operations. We should not find this too surprising however, 
for reformers apparently saw no contradiction in their 
condemnation of political machines not only for the grand 
inefficiencies of spoils, but also for the extraordinary 
efficiency with which they levied political assessments.
The fourth, and final, innovation of the party leadership's 
involved a shift in the methods by which the functionaries 
who staffed the party apparatus were compensated; changes 
which were intended, in effect, to maintain the 
"Organisation" in a healthy state of efficiency. In the 
case of patronage, for instance, it will be recalled that in 
the 1870's and 80's, when the majority of the thirty 
separate government agencies which were responsible for city 
services reported to Councils, political appointments were 
shared out by the majority party, regardless of faction, to 
all Councilman on an individual b a s i s . T h e  introduction 
of the Bullitt city charter in 1887 however, had important 
consequences for the control and distribution of political 
appointments, for not only was the new system of government 
characterised by administrative consolidation and the 
centralisation of power and authority in the Mayor, it also 
made the chief executive, in conjunction with the other 
eight heads of department, responsible for formulating rules 
prescribing a uniform and systematic method governing the 
selection and promotion of city officials. In addition, the 
Mayor was also given the power to appoint the civil service 
examining board whose duty it was to implement these 
recruitment procedures. The Mayor's power of appointment
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also extended to the key position of Secretary of the civil 
service examining board; the official who was responsible 
for co-ordinating the activities of the various sub­
committees of the board, and for drawing up the eligible 
lists of those applicants who had achieved the required 
standard to be employed by the city.^S
So long as the Mayor remained faithful to the "Organisation" 
then, party leaders were in a position to exercise strict 
control over the appointment of city officials. That they 
invariably did so (apart from Weaver's temporary break with 
Durham in 1905), is reflected in the character of the 
appointments that they made to the civil service examining 
board itself. The key position of Secretary for instance, 
after 1887, was usually filled by a senior figure on the 
Republican City Committee, such as former Clerk of the 
Quarter Sessions Court, James W. Latta, twenty sixth ward 
leader Arthur H. Morrow, or Rolla Dance, a protege of 
McNichol's who had succeeded "Sunny Jim" as Select 
Councilman for the tenth ward.^O Such stalwarts of the City 
Committee as Harry C. Ransley and Walter T. Bradley were 
also appointed as civil service examiners and were 
responsible for interviewing prospective public employees 
such as policemen, park guards, prison officers, messengers, 
doorkeepers, janitors and w a t c h m e n . Given the enduring 
loyalty of successive Mayors to the "Organisation", local 
reformers could legitimately claim, as indeed they did, that 
the function of the civil service examining board was in 
fact not to insulate public office from party influence but
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"to keep out those who were objectionable to the bosses.
The establishment of a virtual monopoly over public 
patronage meant that party leaders could now control the 
distribution of political appointments. Instead of sharing 
out these appointments in an equitable fashion among 
individual councilman, the party leadership introduced a new 
criteria for their distribution; namely they were to be 
doled out on the basis of the number of "Organisation" votes 
that each ward leader could produce. In other words, the 
amount of patronage that a ward leader could receive was to 
be p e r f o r m a n c e - r e l a t e d .53 This system of distribution was 
so rigidly adhered to that records were kept in government 
departments of the political residence of every city 
employee and the latter were not allowed to move from one 
division to another until permission was obtained from the 
Chief of the Bureau in which they worked. This was not 
granted until it had been approved by the Head of the 
Department, after he had taken the issue up with the ward 
leader where the employee happened to l i v e .54 This method 
of distribution may not have produced the most suitable 
appointments for the city, but it maintained the 
"Organisation" in a constant and healthy state of 
efficiency, because its emphasis on productivity had a 
galvanising effect on ward leaders and c o m m i t t e e m e n . 55
Positions on the public payroll were not the only incentive 
used by the party leadership to encourage dedication to duty 
among the rank-and-file. Public office also seems to have
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been used as a reward for those who laboured long and hard 
for the "Organisation". An examination of the Republican 
delegation to the State House of Representatives in 1920, 
for instance, reveals that one-third were lawyers, and that 
the majority had a long record of service to the 
"Organisation". They included Leopold Glass, counsel for 
the City Committee, ward leaders like Sigmund Cans, Matthew 
Patterson and John K. Scott, as well as John Drinkhouse and 
Richard Curry who had each served on their respective ward 
committees for over twenty y e a r s . A  similar survey of the 
delegation in 1890 shows in sharp contrast that there were 
four school directors, six ward committee members and one 
former magistrate among the twenty-nine Republican 
representatives. The other eighteen were engaged in a wide 
cross-section of occupations and did not have any record of 
service to the party, though two did have distinguished war 
r e c o r d s . 57 The monopoly, that the "Organisation" 
established in the 1890's, over the recruitment of 
candidates to public office, cannot by itself account for 
the differences in the length of party service between the 
two delegations. What also seems to have been significant 
is the reluctance of party "bosses" in Philadelphia to 
permit significant positions (except on occasions when 
political tickets required hasty "window-dressing" or the 
unusual lustre of some amateur's reputation) to go to men 
with less than a decade of party experience.
In addition to the incentives provided by political 
appointments and public office, members of the
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"Organisation" were also compensated for their loyalty by 
the opportunity to participate in what George Washington 
Plunkitt termed "honest g r a f t " . T h e  planning and 
development of the ten mile long NorthEast (Roosevelt) 
Boulevard through open farm lands to the isolated suburb of 
Torresdale provides a classic example of "honest graft" in 
practice. In 1902, the Philadelphia Land Company was 
incorporated and its representatives, employed by John Mack, 
began to buy up cheap land between Torresdale and the city 
centre. Meanwhile Peter Costello, forty-first ward leader 
and Chairman of the Councils Finance Committee, who owed his 
position to Durham and McNichol, introduced an ordinance for 
the construction of a boulevard from Broad and Cayuga 
Streets to Torresdale. This was in spite of the fact that 
there was no apparent need for such a thoroughfare, for 
although the thirty-fifth ward, the main beneficiary of the 
proposed boulevard, contained almost 25 percent of the 
city's land area, it had only 8,614 inhabitants of whom 
fewer than one in five lived or owned property close to the 
route. The route, however, cut through the farm property 
that had recently been acquired by the Philadelphia Land 
Company, and after the ordinance was passed the company's 
associates made a handsome profit through the sale of their 
land to the city.^^ For example, in September 1903, the 
Company bought 105 acres from Mary J. Anderson for $23,550 
and 212 acres from Henry C. Thompson for $99,700. These 317 
acres were assessed in 1908 at $93,550 a rate of $300 per 
acre, yet the city paid $50,496 for 20 acres, a rate of 
$2,500 per acre.^O
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In addition to the sale of land, damages totalling
$1,380,000 were also awarded by road juries, often up to
fifteen times in excess of the assessed value of property
along the route. This was an outright gift in as much as
the improvements, instead of damaging the property, actually
increased its value. The North American was convinced that
these land operations  have in fact, followed
the lines of a definite system....a combination of 
land speculators and politicians operating through 
the scandalous road jury system dipped into the 
city treasury at a rate in excess of one million 
dollars a year.°
City Solicitor, James Alcorn, and his assistant, John
Monaghan, legal counsel to the "Organisation", as well as
City Committee members Harry J. Trainer, Harry C. Ransley,
James B. Anderson, Charles F. Kindred, Kennedy Crossan and
James Dorney, all received large awards.
Indeed such was the "Organisation's" control over the 
venture it was possible to change the proposed route at will 
almost overnight. In 1903, for example, David Martin 
reconciled his differences with the "Organisation" at the 
same time as Mack fell out with Durham and M c N i c h o l . T o  
mark the occasion, the original line of the Boulevard was 
changed by about one and a half miles so as to include some 
of Martin's property at the expense of John Mack's (see 
Figure 6.1). When land was taken by the city for the 
Pennypack Creek Park, which was part of the general N. E. 
Boulevard scheme, thirty acres on Martin's 202 acre 
property, which he had bought in 1895 for $65,374, was 
condemned. Martin received $77,980 in damages, and his
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Figure 6.1. The "McNichol Boodlevard" : As well as the change in the original line of the Boulevard to benefit 
Martin at Mack's expense, the diagram also shows the lots owned by the Philadelphia Land Company. The n u m b e r  4,5 
and 6 refer to the construction of the Boulevard. All of these contracts were ultimately awarded to D J McNichol 
and the McNichol Paving and Construction Company, even though the work was given out on a sectional basis, hence 
Blankenburg's derisory nickname for the thoroughfare. [Source: The Bulletin, Oct. 11, 1911, Committee of Seventy 
Scrapbook, Urban Archives, Temple University. City Contracts, 20037 20704 (1903), 21566 C1904), 25528 (1907), 
26883 (1908), Records Centre, City of Phi 1 adelphia.]
remaining property was assessed at $103,100.^4 Not
surprisingly these activities prompted Blankenburg to regard
the N.E. Boulevard as
the culmination of "Organisation" effrontery and 
thievery...which...is open to curves as crooked as 
its projectors. Boulevards are generally supposed 
to run in a straight line but this scheme of the 
grafters is planned to run for ten miles at all 
kinds of angles in the direction of and past the 
lands acquired by the "Gang" increasing the value 
of their holdings immensely.
As McNichol received the $1.4 million contract for building
the Boulevard by the same methods he obtained the water
filtration contracts, Blankenburg dubbed the enterprise the
"McNichol Boodlevard" and concluded that:
The Torresdale Boulevard was conceived for graft 
purposes solely and when completed will be one of 
the most striking a^ well as costly monuments of 
the phenomenal graft administration of Samuel H.
Ashbridge.oo
Opportunities to participate in "honest graft", and the 
prospect of public office or positions on the public payroll 
as rewards for hard work on behalf of the party, provided 
not only incentives that kept the "Organisation" in a 
healthy state of efficiency, but also encouraged a terrific 
sense of loyalty among the rank and file. This is not 
surprising since party workers were far more likely to 
support a political structure that rewarded its members in a 
"democratic fashion" on the basis of their performance, 
rather than one which elevated politicians because they 
possessed personal resources (such as wealth, social 
standing or popularity) which could be utilised in election 
campaigns.
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Indeed the disbursement of rewards by the "Organisation" on 
a productivity basis, led over time to the recruitment and 
promotion of leaders of a different stamp than those who had 
played a dominant role in Republican politics during the 
factional era. With the monopolisation of the recruitment 
of candidates to public office (and also the 
"Organisation's" ability to control the electorate) a 
prospective career in local politics was converted from a 
high risk one into a low risk one in the sense that the 
"Organisation" could guarantee favoured candidates virtually 
an unlimited tenure of o f f i c e . T h i s  fundamental change in 
the condition of local politics had important consequences 
for the character of the men who sought and were elevated 
into public office. Not least, independent "free-wheeling 
types" who chafed under any restraint, tended to be weeded 
out in favour of "Organisation men"; that is, party workers 
who accepted that political loyalty and regularity were 
primary virtues over and above their own individual 
feelings.
By the time William Vare acceded to the mantle of party 
leader in the 1920's, the politicians who staffed the 
Republican "Organisation" were of a new political 
generation; a generation, formed under Durham's reign, whose 
members did not find the notion of party discipline so novel 
and hence so chafing. A contemporary political scientist, 
John T. Salter, pointed out "the most striking single 
identifying quality" of Republican party division leaders 
was their
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loyalty. These men are loyal to their leaders, 
just as their leaders are in turn loyal to their 
own leaders and the Organisation. It is personal 
rather than civic loyalty. This loyalty pattern 
is a habit of mind among the overwhelming majority 
of the members of any successful party 
organisation. It is so implicit in normal times, 
that one must turn in nature to a highly trained 
bird dog to find its counterpart, or to a young 
child's faith in its parent.
In a free moment, these men unhesitatingly describe 
themselves as "order men". They take orders and 
ask no questions.°
The establishment of a reliable system of control and
discipline may have had important (internal) consequences
on the character of men who staffed the party apparatus but
it was also dependent as has already been suggested on the
"Organisation's" ability to control votes.
Having explained how the centralisation of the 
"Organisation" was accomplished - through a series of 
organisational innovations (in addition to the 
monopolisation of the distribution of patronage) that 
enabled the Republican party organisation to function as its 
centralised and hierarchical structure suggested it should; 
thereby replacing a system of "individualism and ring rule" 
with one in which the party leadership was able to exercise 
reliable discipline over the city's Republican politicians - 
it is necessary now to consider who supported the Republican 
political machine and why.
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7. The Electoral Foundations and Functions of the 
Republican Machine
In order to provide a fully satisfactory explanation for the 
increased (internal) discipline within the Republican party 
organisation it is also necessary to explain how the 
"Organisation" was able to overwhelm its (external) 
electoral opponents, for as Edward Banfield and James Q. 
Wilson have pointed out, the former was dependent upon the 
latter. As they simply put it, "the existence of the 
machine depends upon its ability to control votes."1
The "Organisation's" ability to control the electorate was 
extremely impressive since, apart from the occasional defeat 
in 1905 and 1911 when reform elements were successful, the 
Republican party secured all city and county offices in 
Philadelphia (except where statute in the form of minority 
representation required otherwise) between 1887 and 1933. 
Indeed it was not unusual for the "Organisation" to roll up 
enormous majorities in local elections. For example, 
mayoral candidates Ashbridge, Weaver, Moore and Kendrick in 
1899, 1903, 1919 and 1923 respectively, all polled well over 
80 percent of the votes cast (see Table 7.1).
The question, then, that presents itself is how was the 
"Organisation" able to command the support of the electorate 
so regularly? In the literature on urban politics, there is 
general agreement among scholars that political machines
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Table 7.1. The Republican Party Vote in Philadelphia
Mayoral Elections, 1887-1931
Year Candidate Percentage
of
Total Vote
Total Vote 
in
Election
1 887 Fitler 58.7 155,045
1 891 Stuart 60.9 178,891
1 895 Warwick 63.8 215,981
1 899 Ashbridge 84.7 167,745
1 903 Weaver 83.7 201 ,550
1 907 Reyburn 57.6 211,585
1 91 1 Earle 49.4 265,579
1 91 5 Smith 63.4 265,067
1 91 9 Moore 80.5 283,094
1 923 Kendrick 86.5 330,970
1 927 Mackey 66.8 444,215
1 931 Moore 90.2 407,343
Sources: Election statistics published in the Inquirer,
Feb. 16, 1887; Feb. 21, 1895; Feb. 22, 1899; Feb. 19, 1903; 
Feb. 20, 1907; Nov. 9, 1911; and the Manual of Councils, 
1916, pp. 301-337; 1920, pp. 274-5; 1927, pp. 285-6; 1931, 
pp.297-8; as well as the Eighteenth Annual Report of the 
Registration Commission, (Philadelphia, 1923), pp.18-19.
were supported disproportionately by the poor and by voters 
of immigrant stock.^ There is some disagreement, however, 
over why immigrants supported the machine, and consequently 
which immigrants were particularly likely to vote for the 
machine.
For example, scholars such as Richard Hofstadter, Edward
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Banfield and James Q. Wilson, and Nathan Glazer and Daniel 
P. Moynihan, have placed the concepts of "political culture" 
or "political ethos" at the centre of their analyses of 
machine politics. Banfield and Wilson, following 
Hofstadter, have argued that nineteenth century politics was 
grounded in a struggle between two different systems of 
political ethics; namely, an immigrant political ethos which 
was at odds with middle class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
values. They suggest that it was the "individualist" or 
"private-regarding" values of immigrant voters which led 
them to accept the patronage, favours and "friendship" 
offered by machine workers, while the "unitarist" or 
"public-regarding" values of middle class native Protestant 
voters induced them to insist on honesty and attention to 
the public weal.^ Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan have 
similarly suggested that the attachment of voters to the 
machine was an expression of primordial ethnic loyalties. 
Thus Glazer and Moynihan, along with Hofstadter, Banfield 
and Wilson, subscribe to the view that it was the pre­
migration heritage of the immigrant which explains why he 
supported the machine.^
The experience of migration itself is central to James 
Scott's analysis of the social context within which 
political machines flourish. Scott argues that political 
machines found their strongest support among "disorientated 
new arrivals" to the American city. He suggests that recent 
immigrants were particularly likely to pursue individual 
interests in politics because they were experiencing
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profound social disorganisation as a result of immigration, 
urbanisation and economic change.^
Richard Wade, Oscar Handlin, William Whyte and Robert Merton 
focus upon the post-migration experiences of the immigrant 
and have suggested that the machine should be viewed as an 
expression of the patterns of social life in the city's 
tenement districts, a natural product of the social 
structure of the inner city.^ In initiating the so-called 
Periphery Theory, Wade, for example, argued that by the 
outset of the Progressive period, the classic conflict of 
the city against the country had been replaced by the 
struggle within the city itself. "The boss system was 
simply the political expression of inner city life."®
In a similar vein, sociologist Robert Merton has claimed 
that the "needs" of immigrants, the poor, and of businessmen 
in an expanding city, accounted for the tendency of these 
groups to support the machine. Merton was primarily 
concerned with developing theory for social science and with 
directing attention to the basic human behavioural patterns 
which underlie all forms of social action including 
politics. From the standpoint of the "functional analysis" 
to which he was contributing, Merton argued that the machine 
was successful because it served functions that were "at the 
time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and 
structures.
Merton's analysis was both functional and structural. 
Initially a "structural context" is established: a general
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setting or environment in which, for one reason or another, 
the "need" for such an establishment as the political 
machine has arisen. The principal element in the 
environment is the diffusion and fragmentation of power - 
and therefore of responsibility - which tends to be inherent 
in a transitory, non-authoritarian, elected, democratic 
officialdom. It is easy to see how this could emerge as a 
critical limitation in the mushrooming cities of the United 
States in the late nineteenth century, amid an urban life 
proliferating in complexity and tangled with a bewildering 
maze of conflicting needs and claims. Here an alternative, 
informal focus of responsibility was located in the "boss", 
a leader of unofficial executive status who had a freedom 
and flexibility made possible by his ability to work, as it 
were, in the back room.^^
In this setting, Merton argues that the machine system 
performed a number of "latent functions" in relation to the 
various subgroups making up its constituency. The first of 
these functions included various kinds of welfare services 
for the immigrant, the poor, and the powerless; such 
services would include the widest range of things - food, 
jobs, intercession with the law in times of trouble, and so 
forth. The price for these services quite logically would 
be votes.
A second type of function which the political machine 
fulfilled was that it operated as a channel of social 
mobility. Merton suggests that for certain critical ethnic
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groups, and for groups situated in lower social brackets
generally, the machine provided avenues for personal
advancement, which would doubtless otherwise be closed. For
example, the availability of careers in politics served as a
significant safety valve for the surplus social energies of
the New York Irish from the 1870's on. Again, the price
which these groups were asked to pay was, from their
viewpoint, hardly excessive: unquestioning devotion and
loyalty to the organisation. Thus the political machine
operated as virtually the only agency which facilitated the 
And
political^economic integration of immigrants into the 
1 1community. This conclusion reached by Merton ties in 
neatly with Banfield and Wilson's analysis, for they argue 
that the decline of political machines is explained by the 
movement of immigrant groups up the class scale and their 
consequent assimilation into the middle class political 
ethos.  ^2
Before considering the extent to which those various 
hypotheses are able to account for the distribution of 
electoral support for the Republican "Organisation", it is 
important to point out that the city experienced significant 
population changes during the period of the "Organisation's" 
institutionalisation. For example, as the city's population 
continued to grow up to the 1920's at approximately the same 
rate (20%) as was established in the early post-bellum 
period, its size almost doubled from just over one million 
in 1890 to almost two million by 1930 (see Table 7.2).
Immigrants made a significant contribution to the increase
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Table 7.2. Population of Philadelphia, 1880-1930
Year Total Number Percent Increase
1 880 847,170
1 890 1,046,964 23.6
1 900 1 , 293,697 23.6
1 91 0 1 ,549,008 19.7
1 920 1 ,823, 779 17.7
1 930 1 ,950,961 7.0
1880-1930 1 30.3
Sources: Census Office, Census of Population: 1880, v. 1,
"Population," pp. 454-465; idem. Vital Statistics of Boston 
and Philadelphia covering a Period of Six Years Ending May 
31, 1890 (Washington, D.C., 1894), pp. 118-9; idem. Census 
of Population: 1900, v. 1, "Population," pp. 241-2, 677;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1910, v. 3, 
"Population," pp. 605-8; idem, Census of Population: 1920,
V .  3, "Population," pp. 896-99; idem. Census of Population: 
1930, V .  3, "Population," pp. 688-707.
in numbers. One in two Philadelphians were either first or 
second generation immigrants in the period between 1880 and 
1930, and the foreign-born population alone accounted for 
almost one-quarter of the city's total population between 
1880 and 1920 (see Table 7.3). The composition of 
Philadelphia's ethnic population also changed markedly over 
the period 1880 to 1920. For example, the proportion of the 
city's foreign-born population that was either Irish or 
German fell from over three-quarters in 1880, to just over 
one-quarter by 1920. By this time Russian Jews were the 
largest foreign-born group in the city, and there were 
almost equal numbers of foreign-born Italians and Irish
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Table 7.3. Ethnie Composition of Philadelphia: 1880-1930
(As Percent of Total Population)
1880 % 1910 % 1920 % 1930
%
Blacks 31,669 3.7 84,459 5.5 134,229 7.4 11.3
Ireland
Born 101,803 12.0 83,196 5.4 64,590 3.5 2.7
2nd 126,655 15.0 115,809 7.5 6.8
Stock 228,463 27.0 199,005 12.9 9.5
Germany
Born 55,769 6.6 61,480 4.0 39,766 2.2 1.9
2nd 80-,700 9.5 • 89,1 87 5.8
Stock 136,469 16.1 150,667 9.8
Italy
Born 1,656 0.2 45,308 2.9 63,723 3.5 3.5
2nd 28,942 1.9 5.8
Stock 74,250 4.8 9.3
Russia
Born 276 0.03 90,697 5.9 95,744 5.3 4.5
2nd 45,650 3.0 5.3
Stock 8.9 9.8
Other
Foreign
Born 45,826 5.3 104,026 6.7 134,104 7.4
2nd 48,366 5.7 217,197 14.0
Stock 94,192 11.0 20.7
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Total
Foreign
Born 204,335 24.1 384,707 24.7 397,927 21.8 18.9
2nd 255,721 30.2 496,785 32.1 591,471 32.4 31.7
Stock 460,056 54.3 881,492 56.8 989,398 54.2 50.6
Total
Population
847,170 1,549,008 1,823,779 1,950,961
•Sources: The same as for Table 7.2, plus Theodore Hershberg
(ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family and Group 
Experience in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1981), 
p.465.
living in Philadelphia (see Table 7.4).
It is worth noting, however, that when compared with other 
large northern cities, Philadelphia did not receive its 
proportionate share of new immigrants, despite its size and 
industrial importance. Philadelphia's percentage of 
foreign-born residents was the lowest of all large northern 
cities averaging one-quarter of the total population from 
1870 to 1920, compared with one-third in Boston, 40% in New 
York and even higher percentages in newer cities like 
Cleveland, Detroit and C h i c a g o . T h i s  characteristic 
feature of Philadelphia's population did not escape the
attention of contemporary observers, for as Lincoln Steffens
pointed out in July 1903, "Philadelphia with 47 per cent of
the population native-born of native parents is the most
American of our greater cities.
Although Philadelphia's foreign-born representation was 
small when compared to that of other cities, its black
221
Table 7.4. Ethnie Groups in Philadelphia, 1880-1920
(As Percent of Total Ethnic Population)
1 880 1 890 1910 1 920
Foreign Born
English 12.9 14.4 9.6 7.8
German 27.3 27.8 16.1 10.0
Irish 49.8 41 .2 21 .8 16.2
Italian 0.8 2.5 1 1 .8 16.0
Russian 0.1 2.9 23.7 24.1
Other 9.1 1 1 .2 17.0 25.9*
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Second Generation
English 4.2
German 29.0 18.0
Irish 45.5 23.3
Italian 5.8
Russian 9.2
Other 25.5 39.5
100.0 100.0
Sources : The same as for Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
* The largest ethnic group in this residual category were 
the Poles who comprised 7.8 percent of the city's foreign- 
born population in 1920.
population was large: almost 5 percent of the city's total 
population in 1900, and over 10 percent by 1930 (see Table
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7.3). In 1900 Philadelphia housed a larger black community 
than any other northern city, and by the 1920's had a 
greater percentage of blacks than any other large city in 
the country, except for St. Louis amd Baltimore.
Having noted the significant changes in Philadelphia's 
population over the period of the "Organisation's" 
institutionalisation, we can now turn to the data reported 
in Table 7.5. This data permits us to test the ability of 
the various hypotheses, outlined above, to account for the 
distribution of the "Organisation's" electoral support. The 
entries in the table are unstandardised partial regression 
coefficients (and the accompanying standard error) generated 
by a series of multiple regression equations for the 
Philadelphia mayoral elections 1865 to 1931.^^ The 
dependent variable in each equation is the percentage of the 
ward's total mayoral vote in the general election that was 
cast for the Republican party's candidate. The independent 
variables in these equations measure the demographic 
characteristics of the ward. The variables German, Irish, 
Italian and Jewish, for instance, indicate the proportion of 
each ward's population whose mothers were born in Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and Russia - that is, the percentage of the 
ward's population that is first or second generation German, 
Irish, Italian or Jewish. The Other Foreign variable is a 
residual category which indicates the percentage of the 
ward's population whose mothers were born in some foreign 
country other than Germany, Ireland, Italy or Russia. (The 
All Foreign variable has been used in those equations where
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TabTe 7.5. Ethnicity, Social Class and The Republican Party Vote, Philadelphia Mayoral Elections, 1865-1931
Year Black German Iri sh Jewish Ital1 an Other
Foreign
All
Foreign
Soci al 
Class
1865 -.96^ .65 .37
(26)* (.3) (.81)
1868 -.83^ .32
(28) . (.27)
1871 -.48 -.92^ -.42 .34
(29) (.36) (.29) (.64)
1874 .23 - .73b -.69 .31
(29) (.31) (.25) (.54)
1877 .43 -.39 -.31^ -.47 -.15 .54
(31) (.23) (.49) (.13) (.3) (.11)
1881 .26 - .59b -.23 -.82^ -.18 .58
(31) (.23) (.19) (.14) (.31) (.12)
1884 .88^ -l.sçf -.29 -.59 -.42^ .57
(31) (.28) (.6) (.16) (.37) (.13)
1887 .2 -1.41® -.45 -.1.36® .51 .82
(31) (.19) (.21) (.38) (.22) (.5)
1891 .41^ -1.68® -.ecf -1.03® .2 .83
(35) (.18) (.18) (.32) (.2) (.46)
1895 .29 -.58^ -.62 -.68^ .47 .41
(37) (.22) (.22) (.38) (.24) (.56)
Year Black German Iri sh Jewi sh Italian Other
Foreign
All
Foreign
Social
Class
r 2
1907 .52^ .21 -1.07 .39^ .29 .86 -.61^ .61
(45) (.24) (.36) (1.07) (.18) (.3) (.57) (.23)
1911 .8^ .31 1.8 .43 .31 1.04 -.26 .63
(47) (.32) (.46) (1.42) (.24) (.4) (.74) (.29)
1919 .43^ .27 .15 .63^ .78^ .11 .38
(48) (.15) (.96) (.21) (.27) (.28) (.24)
1923 .23^ -.2 -.18 .12 .43^ .48^ - .5b .40
(48) (.1) (.69) (.69) (.17) (.21) (.2) (.16)
1927 .64* 1.68® .65
(48) (.13) (.33)
1931 .86* .37® -.83* .52
(48) (.04) (.09) (.06)
* N » the number In brackets; that 1s the total number of wards In the city at the time each mayoral election was held
The figures in this table are regression coefficients; those in parentheses are standard errors.
< .001 
%  < .01 
S < .05
the information provided by the decennial census permitted 
only a limited breakdown of the population based on colour 
and nativity). The final independent variable is a 
measure of the class composition of the ward's population.^®
These regression coefficients estimate the impact - 
controlling simultaneously for all other variables included 
in the equation - of a unit change in the variable in 
question upon a ward's voting behaviour. A coefficient of 
.63 on the Italian variable in the 1919 election, for 
example, indicates that, holding all other independent 
variables constant, as the first and second generation 
Italian proportion of a ward's population increased by 10 
percent, the Republican share of the ward's mayoral vote 
increased by 6.3 percent. Conventional methodological 
wisdom suggests that unstandardised regression coefficients 
are the measures least likely to run the risk of the 
ecological fallacy. The table also reports the explained 
variance when all variables are entered in the equation.
What conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the 
coefficients? Firstly, the magnitude of the coefficients of 
determination (R^) of these equations indicates that the 
various factors mentioned in the hypotheses discussed above 
are indeed relevant to explaining the distribution of 
support for the Republican "Organisation". A knowledge of 
the class and ethnic composition of the city's wards enables 
one to explain in the usual statistical sense (R^) from 31 
to as high as 83 percent of the variation among the city's 
neighbourhoods in the votes cast for the Republican party's
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candidates.
Secondly, the regression coefficients in these equations 
indicate a watershed at the turn of the century in the 
distribution of electoral support for the Republican party. 
The coefficients in the equations for 1865 to 1895, for 
instance, indicate that ethnicity is strongly negative and 
independently related to Republican party voting, while 
social class is not. The coefficients of the All Foreign 
variable in the equations for the elections held between 
1865 and 1874 are all very large, negative and significant 
at the .01 level. Similarly the coefficients of the 
ethnicity variables in the equations for the elections held 
between 1877 and 1895 are again generally large, negative, 
and in almost two-thirds of the cases, significant at the 
.05 l e v e l . B y  contrast, in only one (1884) of the ten 
elections held between 1865 and 1895 does a regression 
coefficient of the social class variable pass this test. 
From these results I would infer that up to 1895 the 
Republican party was supported overwhelmingly by the native- 
born population, irrespective of social class, and 
vigorously opposed by the ethnic population which, during 
this period, was composed largely of Irish and German 
immigrants.
The regression coefficients in the equations for 1907 to 
1931 reveal quite a marked change, however, in the 
distribution of electoral support for the Republican party. 
They indicate that social class is strongly negative, and
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independently related, to Republican party voting. They 
also show a clear distinction among the ethnicity variables 
between "new" immigrant and "old" immigrant groups. The 
coefficients of the social class variables in these 
equations are generally large, negative and, in three out of 
five elections, significant at the .05 level. By contrast, 
the coefficients of the Jewish, Italian, Other Foreign and 
All Foreign variables are moderate to large, positive and, 
in half of the cases, significant at the .05 level. None of 
the coefficients for the German and Irish variables, 
however, pass this test. Finally, the coefficents of the 
Black variables in the equations for 1907 to 1931 are 
generally large and positive, and all of them are 
significant at the .05 level. These results suggest then 
that it was at the turn of the century that the Republican 
party began to exhibit the characteristic electoral base 
that one would expect of the classic political machine, as 
portrayed by conventional wisdom. That is, the 
"Organisation" was supported by the poor, the black, and the 
"new" immigrant population, and was opposed by wealthy, 
native-born white Philadelphians.
How do we account though for the difference in the voting 
behaviour of the various ethnic groups, and what was it 
about thé city's new foreign stock and poor voters that 
inclined them to vote for the "Organisation"? The strength 
of immigrant opposition to the Republican party in the 
immediate post-bellum period is not difficult to understand, 
for several reasons. Firstly, immigrants, and in particular
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the Irish, were unlikely to support a party identified with 
antislaveryism, for they were often in direct economic
n  1
competition for jobs with blacks. Secondly, they were 
also likely to have been repelled by a party which, in order 
to broaden its electoral appeal, advocated not just an 
economic program of protectionism based on the tariff but 
also nativist policies as well.^Z Finally, as Dennis Clark 
has pointed out, immigrant support for the Republicans was 
unlikely, given the long-standing affinity that existed 
between the immigrant population and the Democratic party in 
ante-bellum Philadelphia.^3
Why "new" immigrants should abandon the voting habits of 
their predecessors and offer their support to the 
"Organisation" is a question which can be resolved by using 
the data reported in Table 7.5 to assess the merits of the 
various theories that scholars have proposed to explain why 
immigrants were especially likely to vote for political 
machines. The ethos theory of Banfield and Wilson does not 
stand up very well under the tests to which the data permits 
us to subject it. Philadelphia’s Italians (the majority of 
whom were young, unskilled labourers who came from Sicily 
and Southern Italy) came from a culture in which, according 
to Banfield, "amoral familism" is a dominant theme, and from 
a social structure whose patterns of patronage and 
particularist loyal^ties are similar to those that underpin 
machine p o l i t i c s . T h e  Jewish population of Philadelphia, 
on the other hand, came from a culture that emphasises 
community responsibility,^^ an outlook, said by Banfield and
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Wilson, to be quite the reverse of the one that provides the 
moral basis of the backward society of Southern Italy. 
Indeed, they suggest that this Jewish cultural attitude lies 
much closer to the WASP than to the immigrant ethos.
If Banfield and Wilson are correct we would expect there to 
be a close resemblance between the political behaviour of 
Jews and WASPs, or at least a significant difference between 
Jewish and Italian voting patterns. This expectation is not 
borne out by the data, for the patterns of Jewish and 
Italian voting behaviour are similar, rather than divergent. 
It would appear then that the differing political ethoses of 
the Jewish and Italian immigrants in the city were not the 
dominant force shaping their political behaviour.
It is not possible to reach any conclusive result with 
regard to the hypothesis that "disoriented new arrivals" 
were particularly prone to support the urban political 
machine, because unfortunately problems of co-linearity 
prevent one from entering, as distinct variables in the 
regression equations, the first and second generation 
segments of the "new" immigrant, groups in the city.
However, recent historical research on the migration process 
has cast serious doubts on the traditional social breakdown 
and assimilationist viewpoint which forms the basis of 
Scott's argument. Historians of immigration and ethnicity 
such as Rudolph Vecoli, William DeMarco and Caroline Golab, 
have shown that, rather than weakening under the strains of 
migration and modernisation, the ties of family, kinship and 
community among immigrants remained strong in the industrial
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c i t y .26 Their depiction of an urban nation with vibrant 
peasant cultures flourishing in the American city has 
seriously challenged the traditional view that newcomers 
suffered social disorganisation and the destruction of 
traditional culture before rapid assimilation into the 
American mainstream. In her study of Poles in Philadelphia, 
for example, Caroline Golab notes that "the Poles 
settlement and work patterns wherever they went strongly 
reflected their feudal past and peasant c u l t u r e ."2^ In 
view of this recent scholarship, it does not seem likely 
that Scott's argument can provide us with a credible 
explanation for the attachment of ethnics to the Republican 
"Organisation".
In order to test the validity of the final hypothesis 
mentioned above - Wade and Merton's argument that the 
political machine should be viewed as an expression of the 
patterns of social life in the city's tenement districts - it 
is necessary to proceed rather differently than we have so 
far, because there are two strands to this post-migration 
theory. That is, Wade, Merton, Handlin and Whyte suggest 
not only that support for the political machine will be 
strongest in the congested inner city areas, but also that
immigrants who reside in the urban core will vote for the
machine in significantly greater proportions than their
counterparts in outlying suburban districts.
The former claim can be evaluated by examining the 
geographical distribution of electoral support for the
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Republican "Organisation" as reported in Table 7.6, which 
provides a breakdown, by city district, of the party's vote 
in Philadelphia mayoral elections between 1887 and 1931. 
Indeed, an examination of the data indicates that from the 
mayoral election of 1903 onwards, support for the 
"Organisation" was consistently stronger in the city centre 
and South Philadelphia ("The Neck") - that is the area 
sandwiched between the Schuylkill and Delaware rivers (see 
Figure 7.1) - than in any other section of the city. 
Confirmation that support for the "Organisation" was indeed 
strongest in the inner city is suggested by Table 7.7, which 
reveals that from the mayoral election of 1899 onwards, the 
Republican proportion of the total vote was consistently 
greater in the urban core than in the ring wards.
The hypothesis that the relationship between ethnicity and 
machine voting is not the same in all areas of the city can 
be tested by partitioning the wards of the city into two
groups - the poorer half and the wealthier half - and by
estimating a separate regression equation for each subset of 
wards. Unfortunately limitations of data prevent one from 
generating significant regression equations for each subset 
of wards; that is given the small sample size none of the 
equations generated passed the appropriate F test at the .05 
level. However, Professor John L. Shover's recent research 
helps us to clarify this issue, for he used Philadelphia as 
a case study in his efforts to test empirically the
influence of persistent ethnic loyalties on voting 
behaviour.28 In the process of his rigorous quantitative
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Table 7.6. The Republican Party Vote in Philadelphia Mayoral Elections, by District, 1887-1931
(As Percent of Total Vote In District)
Year 1887 1891 1895 1899 1903 1907 1911 1915 1919 1923 1927 1931
Centre 66.4 69.7 66.8 87.8 89.1 68.9 78.0 88.0 93.1 95.7 86.8 96.1
South 52.0 58.1 58.5 81.3 87.9 70.9 60.8 79.0 84.7 93.5 85.6 94.1
West 64.4 65.3 62.5 82.5 75.6 46.7 42.2 52.4 72.8 85.0 59.8 89.1
North West 63.5 63.2 64.3 86.5 81.8 51.7 45.1 58.6 82.8 85.6 59.4 91.8
North East 53.4 56.1 65.5 84.4 82.5 58.1 44.2 62.6 77.6 88.4 65.2 91.3
Sources: The same as for table 7.1. The five districts into which the city has been divided are the same as those
used by John Daly and Allen Weinberg in their Genealogy of Philadelphia County Subdivisions, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), 
pfi^-100; that is. Centre City comprising of wards 5,6,>,8,9 and 10; South Philadelphia (1,2,3,4,26,30,36,39,48);
West Philadelphia (24,27,34,40,44,46), and that area to the Northwest (13,14,15,20,21,22,28,29,32,37,38,42,47) and 
Northeast (11,12,16,17,18,19,23,25,31,33,35,41,43,45) of the downtown core.
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Figure 7.1. Ward Map of the C ity of Philadelphia, 1914, [Source: John 
Daly and Allen W ein berg Gen e a l o g y  of P h il adelphia C oun ty Subdivisions 
2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), p . 84.]
Table 7.7. The Republican Party Vote in Philadelphia 
Mayoral Elections, by Ring and Core Wards, 1887-1931 
(As Percent of the Total Vote cast in Ring or Core Wards)
Year
Total
Vote
Ring
Percent
Repub.
Core
Total
Vote
Percent
Repub.
1 887 92,442 61 .2 61 ,599 55.1
1 891 125,495 63.0 53,396 55.9
1895 158,893 64.8 57,088 61 .2
1 899 63,396 82.9 104,349 88.1
1903 70,928 78.8 130,622 86.4
1.907 66,810 49.8 144,775 61 .2
1 911 99,476 39.7 166,103 55.2
1915 117,770 51 .0 147,297 74.0
1 91 9 91,234 77.4 191,860 81 .9
1 923 96,981 82.1 233,989 88.3
1927 162,866 52.1 278,084 76.3
1 931 151,788 90.3 248,531 92.6
Sources : the same as for Table 7.1. For each mayoral electi
the city's individual wards were categorised as either ring or 
core wards by using John Daly and Allen Weinberg's Genealogy of 
Philadelphia County Subdivisions 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, 1966), 
pp.73-84. For the 1891 election for example, the city's 33 wards 
were divided into 16 ring (1, 18-29, 31-33) wards and 17 core (2- 
17, 30) wards. In the case of the 1919 election the city's 48 
wards were more unevenly divided into 11 ring (21, 22, 23, 34,
35, 40, 41, 42, 46, 48) wards and 37 core (1-20, 24-33, 36, 37, 
43, 44, 45, 47) wards.
analysis of local elections between 1924 and 1933, Shover 
notes that,
each ethnic group reflects a similar pattern; the
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lower the economic status, the higher the 
Republican vote: ethnic divisions in core wards 
voted rnore Republican than in ring and border 
wards.
In a subsequent article, Shover elaborates that,
this can be explained by the inevitable equation of 
machine control with the slum infested river and 
centre city wards...it is an index of the strength 
of the Philadelphia Republican machine.
But what was it about the social environment of the inner 
city that led "new" immigrants to support the "Organisation" 
so strongly? Why were "new" immigrants in inner city areas 
more inclined to vote for the political machine? "New" 
immigrant groups such as East European Jews, Italians and 
Poles constituted just over half of the city's foreign-born 
population in 1910, and almost two-thirds by 1920 (see Table 
7.4). However, although they arrived in Philadelphia at 
approximately the same time, they had different reasons for 
settling in the city. As Caroline Golab has pointed out, 
each immigrant group possessed unique characteristics and 
these qualities were reflected in the nature of the 
particular group's emigration.
The East European Jews, for example, were quite literally 
forced from their homelands by poverty and pogroms and came 
to America with the intention of staying permanently. Their 
previous work experience in the cities of western Russia and 
Poland as either factory operatives, skilled artisans, or 
small merchants, equipped them to fill these occupations in 
American cities. Thus it was "the unique character" of the 
Jews immigration,
their fugitive status, their poverty, their
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intention to leave Europe indefinitely, their urban 
orientation and their possession of skills and 
crafts..[which]....explains why the Jews were 
concentrated in the large cities of the East; why 
they were not geographically mobile, and why once 
landed in Philadelphia they tended to go no 
further.
By contrast, the Italians who settled in Philadelphia came 
initially with the intention of earning enough money to 
improve their status back home in the small village 
communities of Sicily and Southern Italy. These "birds of 
passage" regarded their visits to America as work junkets 
rather than a permanent commitment to a new life. They 
often arrived without their families and usually gained 
seasonal employment as unskilled general labourers in the
3 O
construction industry.
Although Philadelphia's Jews and Italians came from very 
different backgrounds and had different reasons for 
emigrating, as well as having obvious cultural differences 
in terms of religion, language, dress and so forth, they 
also had a number of common features. For example, not only 
did both groups arrive in the city at the same time, they 
were also both economically disadvantaged, subject to 
discrimination, and when compared to "old" immigrant groups, 
rather more residentially segregated in the inner city.^^
With regard to the latter, Philadelphia's urban form at the 
turn of the century closely resembled Ernest Burgess's model 
of urban spatial structure in which the socio-economic 
status of the population increases with increasing distance 
from the centre of the city.^4 "New" immigrants and blacks
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congregated in the zone surrounding the manufacturing and 
retailing core. In 1910, two-thirds of the city's first and 
second generation Italian immigrant population lived in 
wards two, three, four, and twenty-six, situated in South 
Philadelphia (see Table 7.8). Together with Russian Jews, 
they made up between two-thirds and four-fifths of the total 
population of wards two, three, and four. Russian Jews also 
accounted for over half of the population in the city's 
first ward, though as a group they tended to be rather more 
dispersed than the city's Italian population. Even so, over 
two-thirds of Philadelphia's Russian Jewish population lived 
in South Philadelphia and the wards adjoining the Delaware 
river, in 1910.
The bulk of Philadelphia's black population lived in close 
proximity to the "new" immigrants, but unlike the latter, 
they were excluded from industrial work. The city's blacks 
continued to earn their living as they had done in the mid­
nineteenth century, in menial domestic and largely unskilled 
low-paying jobs, usually in hotels, restaurants and white 
h o u s e h o l d s . T h e  heaviest concentration of blacks was in 
the seventh and thirtieth wards where they accounted for 
approximately half of the total population by 1920 (see 
Table 7.9). Other black clusters (significant for the 
present day) were discernible just to the north (wards 14, 
15, 20 and 47) and west (wards 24 and 27) of the city centre 
by the turn of the century.
The "new" immigrant and black communities not only had a 
common residential pattern but also had similar needs.
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Table 7.8. Geographical Distribution of New Immigrant 
Groups, 1910, 1920
Area
of
City
Ward
Foreign
Born
Italian
2nd Percent 
of ward's 
population
Italian
Foreign Percent 
Born of ward's 
population
1 91 0 1 920
(S) 1 2,346 1 ,858 8.8 6,623 1 4.5
(S) 2 11,527 8,064 48.3 9,334 26.5
(S) 3 6,538 4,149 41 .5 4,782 22.4
(S) 4 3,732 2,575 28.2 2,352 14.0
(S) 26 7,274 5,083 22.6 13,863 22.2
Total 31,417 21 ,729 36,954
Percent of 
City's 
Italian 
Population
69.3 75.1 58.0
Area
of
City
Ward
Foreign
Born
Russian
2nd Percent 
of ward's 
population
Russian
Foreign Percent 
Born of ward's 
population
1 91 0 1 920
(S) 1 16,398 7,596 50.3 9,918 21 .6
(S) 2 8,427 3,668 29.9 3,590 10.2
(S) 3 5,093 2,543 29.7 2,084 9.8
(S) 4 5,269 3,095 37.5 2,184 13.0
(C) 5 5,149 2,535 45.2 2,376 19.6
(C) 6 1 ,533 656 34.4 582 14.3
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Area Ward 
of 
City Foreign
Born
Russian
2nd Percent 
of ward's 
population
Russian
Foreign Percent 
Born of ward's 
population
1 91 0 1 920
(NE) 11 2,863 1 ,228 35.2 1 ,306 14.1
(NE) 12 3,658 1 ,559 34.4 2,404 19.5
(NW) 13 4,1 73 1 ,684 29.6 4,157 21 .9
(NE) 16 1 ,941 928 17.7
(S) 39 7,522 4,605 21 .3 19,171 23.2
62,026 30,097 47,772
Percent of 
City's 
Russian 
Population
68.4 65.9 49.9
Sources: the same as for Table 7.2.
Above all, these sub-groups needed the means of physical 
existence: jobs, loans, rent money, contributions of food or 
fuel, to tide them over and the like. They also needed a 
buffer against an unfamiliar state and its legal minions; 
help when they or their offspring were in trouble with the 
police; help in dealing with inspectors, in seeking pushcart 
licenses or in other relations with the public bureaucracy. 
Finally, they also needed the intangibles of friendship, 
sympathy and social exchange.
The urban political machine, as Merton, Wade, Handlin and 
Whyte have argued, was well equipped to satisfy these needs.
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Table 7.9. Geographical Distribution of Black Population,
1880-1920
Area Ward 1890 
of
City No. %
1 900 
No. %
1 91 
No.
0
%
1 920 
No. %
(C) 4 2,592 12.7 2,875 12.7 2,542 11.4 2,619 15.6
(C) 5 2,368 13.9 1 ,251 7.4
•<C) 7 9,002 29.8 10,462 37.2 11,553 42.1 12,241 46.6
(C) 8 3,031 17.9 2,464 15.6 1 ,839 13.2 1 ,579 13.1
(NW)1 4 1 ,398 6.7 1 ,961 10.1 3,085 15.8 4,946 27.0
( NW ) 1 5 1 ,751 3.3 2,423 4.8 2,698 5.7 3,766 8.4
(NW)20 1,353 3.0 2,821 6.5 4,500 9.9 8,269 17.6
(W) 24 2,049 3.1 2,193 4.1 3,958 7.3 8,152 13.5
(S) 26 1,416 2.3 2,874 6.3 5,191 9.5 5,71 5 9.8
(W) 27 2,193 6.7 3,173 9.9 3,195 13.2 2,927 12.1
(S) 30 1 ,806 5.9 5,242 18.2 9,999 34.2 15,481 52.5
(S) 36 1 ,955 4.2 5,840 9.5 13,291 24.1
(NW)47 3,880 12.9 9,21 1 27.9
Total 28,959 39,694 58,280 88,197
Percent
of City's 71.1
Black
Population
62.0 69.0 65.7
Sources : the same as for Table 7. 2.
and if the claims of contemporary "Organisation " politicians
are to be believed , then it seems likely that the Republican
"Organisation" in Philadelphia did in fact fulfill the role
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that these scholars have ascribed to political machines in 
general. For example, David H. Lane, "Peerless Leader" of 
the twentieth ward, explained why the city's foreign-born 
population voted for the Republican ticket, in the course of 
an election address to division leaders in the 1901 
campaign:
Poles, Hungarians, Italians and other foreigners 
when they come here, vote for the Republican 
ticket. Why? Because we have the offices and they 
expect favours from officeholders.
In New York, they vote for Tammany for the same 
reason. Our Organisation bears the same relation 
that Tammany does to New York.
Similarly, a quarter of a century later. Mayor A. Mackey
testified before a U.S. Senate Committee that "the genius of
the success of the Republican Organisation in Philadelphia
is personal service to the individual v o t e r . I n  his
autobiography William Vare also claimed that,
the Philadelphia Organisation is in fact one of the 
greatest welfare organisations in the United States.
It must stand for something worthwhile, or otherwise 
how could it maintain its firm hold on the suffrages 
of the Philadelphia public through many decades and 
win repeated victories. The answer is this. The 
Philadelphia Organisation is successful because it 
serves the people.
......The Philadelphia Organisation gives a real
social service, and one without red tape, without 
class, religious or colour distinction. It is 
natural that with the Organisation thus responsive 
- and undoubtedly more so than any other social 
agency in the entire community - the public should 
indicate its appreciation by supporting these 
political forces at the elections.
In sum then, it seems reasonable to conclude that in the
case of Philadelphia, those scholars who view the political
machine as arising out of the patterns of social and
economic life in the districts of the inner city, provide us
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with the most likely explanation for the attachment of 
ethnics to the Republican "Organisation".
ROBERT K. MERTON AND THE LATENT FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL 
MACHINE
Although this post-migration theory helps us to identify why 
immigrants supported the machine and which immigrants were 
especially likely to vote for the machine, the scholars who 
subscribe to this view are not just concerned with 
accounting for the distribution of electoral support for the 
urban political machine. Robert Merton, in particular, as I 
suggested earlier in Chapter 1, has been responsible for 
establishing a more positive image of the role played by the 
political m a c h i n e . S c h o l a r s  such as Oscar Handlin, Eric 
McKitrick, Elmer Cornwell, Alexander Callow, Seymour 
Mandelbaum, Zane Lee Miller and John Allswang have all 
incorporated Merton's functional model in their analysis of 
the political machine; so much so, in fact, that in the last 
thirty years bosses and reformers have undergone a role 
reversal in the literature on urban politics.
The urban bosses are now depicted as "good guys" who served 
the needs of the otherwise unorganised urban poor, while the 
reformers, it is alleged, were business and professional men 
intent on imposing economic and cultural control over the 
lower orders. But how valid is Merton's analysis of the 
relationship between the machine and its supporters; did the 
machine fulfill the functions that Merton suggests that it
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did; how well does Merton's model fit the reality of 
Republican "Organisation" rule in Philadelphia?
The short answer is not very well at all. The current 
preference for bosses over reformers is rooted in the 
conviction that the reformers were unresponsive to the poor 
when they championed programmes from motives of efficiency, 
and bosses won the support of the poor whose lives they 
understood when they attacked reformers' programmes. The 
problems with this approach, however, are illustrated in 
John F. Baumann's study of the Philadelphia Housing 
Commission between 1911 and 1915.^^ Baumann criticises the 
reformers for imposing efficiency on slum dwellers when they 
secured the Heidinger Housing Act of 1913 which created a 
hundred sanitary inspectors to regulate health and safety in 
Philadelphia's poor housing. Edwin Vare, popularly known as 
the "Apostle of the Poor" then served his constituents, 
Baumann appears to argue, by blocking funds to pay the 
inspectors and by emasculating the housing law in the next 
l e g i s l a t u r e . T h e  reformers may have wanted to inspect 
housing because they were inspired by the need for 
efficiency, but it does not follow that poor slum dwellers 
opposed inspections that would improve the health and safety 
of their homes. Indeed, since the Housing and Sanitation 
Division of the city's Health Bureau was at this time 
receiving two hundred complaints a day concerning violations 
of existing laws, it seems more plausible that poor slum 
dwellers would have welcomed inspections as a way of 
improving housing conditions.43
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Baumann's argument, however, leaves us with having to accept 
the highly improbable assertion that the urban poor 
preferred the boss's system of regulation whereby slumlords 
and manufacturers could provide unsafe and unhealthy living 
and working conditions in exchange for buying off the 
machine's inspectors. If we were to extend Baumann's 
argument to other issues raised during Blankenburg's reform 
administration (1912-16), for example, the reformers* efforts 
to lower food and gas prices in the city, and to institute a 
public works programme during the depression of 1914 to 1915 
- initiatives which were all thwarted by the 
"Organisation"^^ - we would be left with the incongruous 
proposition' that the urban poor preferred a system of boss 
rule which maintained high food and gas prices and 
unemployment.
What in fact Baumann's study demonstrates, I would suggest, 
is that bosses gave as much aid to slumlords and 
manufacturers who got rich off the urban poor, as they gave 
to the poor themselves. In the case of Philadelphia, the 
Republican "Organisation", at the same time as it was 
providing a "personal service" for the immigrant poor, was 
also aiding and abetting those interests - the saloon and 
gambling-house keepers, tenement-house owners, utility 
entrepreneurs, land developers and manufacturers - who were 
making large profits as a result of urban growth, often at 
the expense of the working classes.
It should also be emphasised that the "personal service"
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provided by the "Organisation" was simply just that; 
favoured individuals received such benefits as buckets of 
coal, Christmas turkeys, summer trips to Atlantic City or 
jobs on the public payroll, but these favours constituted 
the sum total of the "Organisation's" welfare p r o g r a m m e .
In other words, the "Organisation's" petty welfare system 
only provided a social service on a sketchy, unsystematic 
and haphazard basis.
In fact, the "Organisation" did little to promote genuine 
social reforms that would have met the real needs of its 
constituents; for example, programmes which would have 
provided decent housing, good schools and hospitals, clean 
water, full employment, racial integration and so on.^7 
Instead it focused its energies on "giving the people 
something they could see." Essentially practical, the 
"Organisation" reasoned that the ordinary citizen judged a 
government by tangibles which he could view with his own 
eyes. It thus supported ambitious building projects - such 
as the Ben Franklin Parkway, the Roosevelt (North-east) 
Boulevard, the League Island Park and the Municipal Stadium 
- which were aimed at promoting civic improvement while at 
the same time beautifying the city. Such schemes provided 
the "Organisation" with new allies in the business community 
and led to more jobs, patronage and profit for the 
machine.
Some contemporaries were not beguiled by the 
"Organisation's" strategy. Political satirist Edmund Sage, 
for example, noted in his novel the Masters of the City,
246
published in 1909, that the products of "Organisation" rule 
lay,
in driveways and distant parks, in Temples of 
Justice and public buildings, in fanciful lamps
and freak decorations but all of these things
do not reach the mass of the people. It does not 
give seats in schools, take the dirt from off the 
streets, give the tired man and woman a rest in 
the trolley or train, keep down rents, abolish 
crowded tenements, provide playgrounds, supply 
drinking fountains and public lavatories for the 
people.
Most projects were downtown oriented to bring traffic to the 
downtown, to beautify it, and to raise or maintain downtown 
business property values. It left too little funds and too 
little energy for other things.
The tradition of the "boss" from Vare down to Daley has been 
that of "giving people what they wanted", but in practice 
this has meant what the machine has perceived as what the 
people wanted. The real question is whether the needs of a 
large urban centre and its people would not have been better 
met if more money had been spent on less glamorous 
programmes such as proper police and fire protection, better 
housing and sanitation.
In the 1960's, Sam Bass Warner Jr. conducted an examination 
of Philadelphia's urban development in an attempt to 
understand why contemporary America was facing an urban 
crisis. His conclusion was that the long tradition of 
excessive reliance on private institutions and private 
wealth as the basic mode of social organisation in the city, 
was responsible for the "ills" that afflicted contemporary 
urban America. "Privatism" (which was, as Warner
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subsequently explained, actually "capitalism" and the 
culture it spawned) was the enduring legacy which "each 
Philadelphia" had bequeathed its s u c c e s s o r . ^0 As Warner put 
it, the industrial metropolis of the early twentieth 
century,
like the colonial town and big city which had 
preceded it was a private city and the public 
dimensions of urban life suffered accordingly
 In 1 930, Philadelphia like all large
American cities stood as a monument to the 
traditions of the private city....[Consequently]
....the Philadelphia of 1930 can be viewed as 
the typical inheritance of today's American 
cities.^
Ultimately "in the end" though, according to Warner, "the
failure of the industrial metropolis was political." Local
and state professional political leaders,
utterly avoided dealing with the mounting social 
welfare and economic and physical development 
issues which constituted both the disorders and the 
potential of the metropolis.... the whole negative 
attitude toward government which characterised the 
Republican ....leadership encouraged a least-cost, 
low-quality orientation toward all public 
institutions and programs whether they were police 
departments, or schools, hospitals or highways.
Warner suggests that
the most conscientious research would be required 
to arrive at a judicious estimate of which of these 
two groups of professional political leaders did 
the most damage to the city of Philadelphia.
It is difficult to disagree with Warner's assessment for the 
tradition of "privatism" dovetailed neatly with the self- 
serving instincts of the "Organisation". That is, the 
"Organisation" was unlikely to undermine the traditional 
reverence for private enterprise since, as we shall see 
later, it was ideally situated to cultivate and benefit from
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quid pro quo arrangements with private interests.
Besides, bossism as a political situation was innately 
conservative and defensive, and by its very nature tended to 
avoid controversy and division. Thus ideological issues and 
the public interest were placed well behind the need for 
political organisation and self-preservation; a viewpoint 
nicely encapsulated in Durham's remark, "What do I care who 
is President, so long as I can carry my ward."^^
The North American's obituary of "Iz" Durham emphasises the
self-serving nature of bossism and its failure to promote
the public welfare:
of the qualities of statemanship he had none. He 
had no ideals. His ambitions were all selfish.
He leaves no monument in the shape of a good 
statute or ordinance or any piece of constructive 
legislation....... no civic improvement or better­
ment .
According to Warner, the Vare brothers too "after almost 
forty years of power and effort...could boast of very little 
constructive results for Philadelphia."^^ Harold Zink 
credits the brothers for encouraging all sorts of public 
works measures that benefitted their South Philadelphia 
constituents, and for their support as state legislators of 
such progressive reforms as child labour laws, limitations 
on women's hours of work, workmen's compensation and 
mothers' assistance welfare payments. He also praises Edwin 
Vare for his personal generosity to various charitable 
institutions and to individuals seeking aid.^8
A closer examination of the Vare brothers activities, 
however, reveals that they only supported these social
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reforms in the final stages of their passage; an astute 
political ploy on their part since not to have supported 
this legislation would have meant damaging their reputations 
with their local constituents. The brothers did not 
initiate any of these social reforms, probably for the quite 
logical reason that such legislation represented a direct 
threat to the "Organisation's" system of "personal 
s e r v i c e " . 59 With regard to their support for various local 
public works measures, Zink neglects to mention that it was 
the Vares' who benefitted from such schemes in the form of 
public contracts, and that they could well afford to be 
generous benefactors to the poor since they made exorbitant 
profits from such work.^O
If the biographers of the state political leaders are to be
believed, then Matt Quay and Boies Penrose also proved no
more useful to the city's welfare than Durham or the Vare
brothers. Indeed, the former appear to be carbon-copies of
their urban counterparts. For example, James A. Kehl
concluded his assessment of Quay's career with the comment
that although the state "boss" had been
bold and innovative in party methods, he did not 
apply his creativity to policy issues. If he had 
displayed the same vision toward the issues that 
he displayed toward party organisation, he might 
have become a statesman. Quay and his fellow 
politicians preferred to treat social and economic 
dysfunctions with verbal patches and legislative 
bandages, instead of forward-looking statesmanship.
By supplying superficial responses they permitted 
many of society's most crucial decisions to 
gravitate from the realm of party and government 
into the hands of the rising industrial complex.
Thus the party system failed to function as an 
effective catalyst when the nation desperately 
needed solutions to basic problems.
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Like Quay, Penrose appears to have devoted himself to the
service of his party, and invested little energy in tackling
the pressing social and economic problems of the day. As
Walter Davenport has so colourfully put it.
You may scan the records of Pennsylvania's 
legislature until vertigo threatens and fail to 
find more than a meagre scattering of his personal 
contributions to the political or social fabric of 
his state.
As later in the U.S. Senate, Penrose originated 
little or nothing of importance. His whole 
energies went into the service of his party in 
its struggle to perpetuate itself; or to his 
faction of the Republican party; or to those great 
business interests which provided him and his 
following with the funds with which to smother 
opposition. Penrose as a legislator, a contributor 
to government, was as colourless and unappealing 
as a sleeping walrus. Potentially until 
dissipation, sloth, prejudice, and narrow 
partisanship crippled his fine mind he was a 
statesman. Actually he was a glorified district 
leader and he remained just that, even through all 
his years in the U.S. Senate.
Few people will need convincing that bosses were self- 
serving and devoted to their party organisation, but what 
these assessments of the city and state's political 
leadership also point to, I would suggest, is that bossism 
was destructive of functioning government for the vast 
majority of immigrants and low-income people who needed 
government the most. While Merton argues that the machine 
was successful because it served functions that were "at the 
time not adequately fulfilled by other existing patterns and 
structures," I would maintain that its main contribution has 
been a dysfunctional one. That is, rather than being a 
natural functional substitute for government as Merton (and 
Max Weber) have claimed, the boss and his machine, I would
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argue, have prevented political parties and governments from 
devising, initiating and implementing programmes that could 
have dealt with the critical social and economic "ills" that 
have so bedevilled the modern American city.
In Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, it was the Republican
party organisation itself which was the subject of local and
state election campaigns as questions of honesty and
propriety in government took precedence over such difficult
and important matters as economic development and social
w e l f a r e . W h e n  in office, the "Organisation" concentrated
on "giving the people something they could see," rather than
attempting to fulfill the real needs of its supporters. It
also prevented other groups from implementing programmes
which attempted to meet those needs, as the Womens League
for Good Government wearily pointed out in 1919:
the "Organisation" is a sinister force that forms 
part of our "invisible government". If we attempt 
to analyse it, it seems to be more than anything 
else a tacit understanding of mutual helpfulness 
between men who make a business of using the
machinery of popular government for the further­
ance of their own personal ends. It is difficult 
to locate it. Like the hurricane we cannot always 
tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth, but we 
see the results clearly enough. It results in 
filling public offices with men who are at the 
best poorly fitted for the place, sometimes 
actually dishonest: in extravagance and misuse of 
public funds; in the passing of unnecessary laws 
that create "jobs"; in the quiet thwarting of 
measures urged by the public for the public good.
As often in life, the innocent suffer for the
guilty.64
Indeed, while Merton has argued that the machine, 
centralised and disciplined, developed as an alternative to 
the confused, decentralised nature of formal government, it
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is worth noting that in Philadelphia, the Republican 
"Organisation" rather than "bringing order" to the city, 
actually perpetuated the diffusion and fragmentation of 
power. This can be seen in the "Organisation's" reaction to 
structural reform. In 1919, for example, the Vare brothers 
unsuccessfully resisted the passage of a new city charter 
which set up a stream-lined unicameral system of government 
in place of the large and unwieldy bicameral version that 
had developed under the Bullitt Charter of 1887.^5 what is 
surprising about the brothers' opposition, however, is that 
back in 1905 they had supported, for the city's education 
system, the very kinds of reforms they subsequently fought 
against in municipal government. The 1905 school law, for 
instance, created for the cities and towns of Pennsylvania a 
modern, centralised, bureaucratic management of schools. In 
Philadelphia, power was taken from the forty-two ward school 
boards and placed in the hands of a small central Board of 
Education and a strong Superintendent of Schools.
There is a simple explanation for the Vare brothers^ apparent 
paradoxical behaviour in 1905 and 1919. In 1905, the 
brothers were faithful supporters of Durham and Penrose's 
campaign to maintain a centralised and city-wide Republican 
party organisation. Durham was a keen supporter of the 1905 
school reform because, by abolishing ward school boards and 
with them the local public office of school director, the 
law helped the city "boss" centralise authority within the 
Republican party by breaking down the independent strength 
of the party's ward organisations.^^ By 1919, however, the
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Vares' were engaged in factional warfare with Penrose's 
supporters for control of the Republican City Committee, and 
indeed it was the state "boss" who was largely responsible 
for the passage of the new city charter. The brothers 
opposed the new charter because it broke down their power 
base in the oldest parts of the city (as Penrose intended it 
to) and fixed more rigidly, accountability and 
responsibility in local government.^®
The actions of the state and local party leaders in 1905 and 
1919 suggests that these "bosses" had a pragmatic approach 
towards reform. Some scholars, notably J. Joseph Huthmacher 
and John D. Buenker, have argued that urban political 
machines made a significant contribution to the social and 
structural reforms that characterised the progressive era in 
the United States. Indeed, Buenker suggests that political 
bosses were partly responsible for the development of a new 
ideology which he terms "urban liberalism".®^
To label party "bosses" in Philadelphia "urban liberals" 
would, I suggest, be inappropriate and very misleading.
Their behaviour would seem to indicate that they were power- 
brokers who were interested primarily in maintaining control 
over their affairs, and who were prepared to support (or 
oppose) reform measures when it was in their interest to do 
so. In other words, the selective approach adopted by 
Republican "bosses" towards social and structural reforms 
illustrates that they were not so much "for" or "against" 
reform, as they were concerned with their own self-interest
254
and the life of their party machine. Calling these 
Republican "bosses”, "urban liberals" would entirely miss 
the point of their activity. The same can be said of 
Merton's functional analysis, in the sense that it greatly 
exaggerates the importance of the boss's services to the 
immigrant poor, while failing to recognise that the 
political machine, in fact, functioned as a blight on the 
system of government.
Merton also suggests that one of the machine's latent 
functions was to operate as a channel of social mobility for
the urban immigrant poor. Again, it seems that in
Philadelphia, the Republican "Organisation" did not fulfill 
this role. "For example,' in his analysis of the relationship 
between ethnicity and voting behaviour in Philadelphia, John 
L. Shover conducted a survey of the recipients of political 
patronage positions in local government between 1916 and 
1938. He discovered that county non-civil service jobs 
requiring no special skills were overwhelmingly allocated to
persons with English, Scottish and German surnames. In 
1916, only 5% of these positions were held by persons with 
Jewish or Italian names. By 1932, according to Shover, Jews 
and Italians still held only 8% of such jobs.^®
The "representative sample" of division leaders published by 
"The Young Republicans" in 1926 also provides us with an 
insight on those who staffed the party organisation at the 
grass roots level, when the Republican machine was at the 
peak of its power and when the city's Jews and Italians were 
well established as the largest foreign-born groups in
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Philadelphia. I found that 62% of these party committeemen
were job-holders, and that, like Shover, less than 5% of
them had Italian, Jewish or Polish n a m e s . T h e s e  findings ,
would seem to indicate that far from providing a career
ladder for the immigrant poor, the Republican "Organisation"
in Philadelphia slighted its strongest supporters - the
7 ?city's Italian, Jewish and black population.
Finally, Merton's claim, and Banfield and Wilson's 
suggestion, that the political machine facilitated the 
integration of immigrants into the community (and thus their 
consequent assimilation into the middle class political 
ethos), is also not tenable in the case of Republican 
Philadelphia, for as Shover has demonstrated, ethno­
religious political consciousness, far from diminishing, 
actually flourished in the city in the 1930's. He shows 
that by 1936, when the Philadelphia version of the New Deal 
coalition had taken shape, with only native whites remaining 
Republican, the city's ethnic and religious groups, although 
acculturated in terms of language, value systems and 
lifestyle, responded to vital political choices as blacks, 
Jews, Germans or Catholics, and not as Americans grouped
7 3cross-culturally by occupation, class, or neighbourhood.
Merton's functional analysis then, in my view, does not 
provide, at least in the case of Republican Philadelphia, an 
accurate interpretation of the relationship that existed 
between the political machine and its poor immigrant 
supporters. Moreover, his functional theory is
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unsatisfactory in providing an explanation for the functions 
of the political machine, because it rests on a faulty 
premise; that is, the machine, according to Merton, 
originated as a response to "needs" and demands which other 
institutions failed to satisfy. We have already seen, 
however, that by the time the bulk of "new" immigrants were 
arriving in Philadelphia at the turn of the century, the 
"Organisation" was already a fully fledged political 
machine; a political institution in fact that dominated the 
government and politics of the city.
It follows then, that the Republican machine was not the 
creation of the "new" immigrant masses, or a product of 
immigrant culture and ethnic conflict. It emerged, in fact, 
as a consequence of changes in the organisation and 
structure of party politics in the city, and not as a result 
of responding to the "needs" of various social groups.
From the functional viewpoint then, the "Organisation" 
operated as a centralised political structure which 
assimilated most of the city's sub-groups as they arrived in 
Philadelphia. In doing so, however, it exploited the urban 
immigrant poor as much as it helped them. Indeed, its role, 
if anything, was of a dysfunctional nature - depriving 
immigrants and low income groups of an effective local 
government that could cater to their real needs.
In arguing that the only "needs" the "Organisation" served 
were its own, however, I am not suggesting that historians 
should again embrace the contemporary reform caricature of 
the political boss. But what I am saying is that the
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positive image of the boss that prevails, largely due to 
Merton's seminal work, in the current literature on urban 
politics, stands in need of revision. In my view, 
recognition is long overdue of the fact that political 
bosses, rather than being cultural pluraliste, were as 
culturally narrow as the most nativist reformer.
ONE-PARTY POLITICS
This analysis so far has concentrated on examining the 
"Organisation's" electoral base and discussing the validity 
of Merton's functional model in helping us to understand the 
role that the political machine has fulfilled in the 
American city. However, we have yet to explain fully why 
the Republican party enjoyed such an extraordinary degree of 
electoral success during the period between 1887 and 1933. 
The key to the "Organisation's" electoral supremacy did not 
just lie in the "personal service" it provided to the 
individual voter. It also rested on the "Organisation's" 
ability to nullify electoral opposition by exploiting the 
weaknesses of, and divisions between, the Democratic party 
and the nonpartisan reform movement.
With regard to the former, the minority party experienced a 
phenomenal decline between the 1880's and 1920's, in both 
leadership strength and grass roots support. The Republican 
"Organisation" benefitted from three major turning points in 
the fortunes of the Democratic party, two concerned with 
national party policy, and the other with a localised
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factional struggle. Firstly, there was the nationwide shift 
towards the Republican party in 1894, for the Democrats, as 
the incumbent administration, were blamed for the severe 
economic depression affecting the country. In Philadelphia 
this was reflected in a major change in the voting pattern 
of the Third Congressional District, traditionally the 
bulwark of the Democratic party. In 1894, this normally 
Democratic stronghold returned a majority for the Republican 
gubernatorial nominee for the first time in the city's 
history.
Secondly, the local consequences of the national party split 
over the free silver issue and Bryan's candidacy for the 
Presidency in 1896, stripped the city's Democratic 
leadership of many socially prominent families who could all 
trace their party lineage to before the Civil War. Local 
"blue-bloods" like John Cadwalader Jr., George W. Norris and 
John and William Bullitt as well as such men of substance as 
company director Henry D. Welsh, newspaper publisher William 
Singerly and lawyers Emmanuel Furth, George F . Baer and 
Henry M. Dechert, all participated in the "Jeffersonian 
bolt" from the party in 1896.^^
Finally, Samuel Jackson Randall's death in 1890 precipitated 
a factional struggle for control of the (3rd) district he 
represented in Congress. The principal protagonists 
included Randall's staunch ally lawyer William F . Harrity, 
who was supported by the sixth ward leader, Thomas J. Ryan 
and Charles P. Donnelly, Chairman of the Democratic City
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Committee, against the combination of State Senator William 
McAleer and Judge James Gay G o r d o n . ^7
The "Organisation" skilfully exploited this rivalry by 
initially supporting the Gordon-McAleer faction, and then 
switching allegiance to the Harrity faction while making 
inroads on them both, and ultimately capturing the Third 
District for the Republican party.78 In the 1890's, David 
Martin successfully sponsored McAleer's bid for Congress 
against Harrity's nominees, and in return McAleer supported 
Republican candidates in local elections. The most infamous 
McAleer defections from the regular Democratic ticket 
occurred in the Mayoralty election of 1895, and the 
Shrievalty élection of T896, and as a reward McAleer was 
given the Republican nomination for Congress in 1898.79 
This proved to be his undoing, however, for with his own 
party hopelessly fragmented, McAleer polled more Republican 
than Democratic votes in every ward in the district. The 
"Organisation" therefore decided to drop him from their 
ticket in 1900, as they no longer needed the support of a 
superannuated Democrat. In 1900 McAleer carried only the 
sixth and seventeenth wards, while Bryan gained a majority 
in the sixth in the Presidential election. By the turn of 
the century the old Randall Democratic stronghold had 
disintegrated.
Having dropped McAleer the "Organisation" negotiated a new 
arrangement with Tommy Ryan. Ryan agreed to aid the 
Republican "Organisation" in exchange for political immunity 
for his sixth ward and control of minority patronage
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resources. The basis for this bi-partisan agreement lay in 
the section of the state constitution that guaranteed 
minority representation,®^ Since the "Organisation" could 
control the distribution of appointive minority posts and 
had sufficient votes at its disposal to determine which of 
the minority candidates were to be elected, however, this 
type of bi-partisan arrangement weakened the Democratic 
party, ultimately destroying its independence.®^ "Under the 
vicious system of 'minority representation', the Democratic 
party," reformer George W. Norris observed in 1915, "has 
become little more than a bi-partisan adjunct of the 
Republican Organisation, trading votes in return for a few 
salaried positions." Consequently "the straight Democratic 
vote has naturally shrunk to negligible proportions" from 39 
percent of the total vote in the 1891 mayoral election to 
fewer than 4 percent in the 1915 election.®®
The party's "redemption" and the re-emergence of a 
competitive two party system did not occur in fact until the 
municipal election of 1933, and until then it continued to 
function as a "kept minority", or as reformer Thomas Raeburn 
White put it, as "a mere corrupt annex of the Republican 
'Organisation^."®4 When Ryan's successor Charlie Donnelly, 
for instance, proved wayward in his loyalty to the 
"Organisation", he was replaced in 1924 as Chairman of the 
Democratic City Committee by John O'Donnell, one of Bill 
Vare's closest friends and a fellow South Philadelphian.®® 
O'Donnell's response in 1932 to a fellow Democrat who 
suggested that he break with Vare, indicates the extent to
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which the Democratic party was subservient to the Republican 
"Organisation" during his tenure of office. The Democratic 
party chairman refused on the grounds that he could not "do 
that to my old friend who has kept me on his payroll for so 
many years. Vare has been paying the rent on Democratic 
Headquarters. I can't bite the hand that feeds me."®^ The 
provision of minority representation then, instead of 
strengthening the opposition party by guaranteeing that it 
would always have some patronage, fostered a system of 
politics that institutionalised the impotency of the 
Democratic party.
With the establishment in effect of one party rule in 
Philadelphia from the mid-1890's to the early 1930's, the 
initiative among the "Organisation's" opponents was seized 
by groups outside the party system, in particular by the 
non-partisan reform movement. Again though, the 
"Organisation" was usually triumphant in overcoming this new 
source of electoral opposition. It employed a number of 
different strategies to undermine the strength of the reform 
movement. One of the "Organisation's" favourite ploys was 
to emphasise the importance of national issues and national 
party policy, at the expense of local affairs. In 
particular, it exploited the fears of the city's business 
community over such matters as the tariff and the currency 
issue, by suggesting that voting any other way than for the 
Republican party in local elections would weaken the party 
nationally. A typical "Organisation" circular, for example, 
published during the 1901 campaign, addressed voters in the
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following terms:
Dear friend, neighbour and businessman,
........... prosperity over the last five years has
been due to Republican principles, both nationally 
and in the city.
Pennsylvania and Philadelphia are the greatest 
manufacturing state and city of a great country.
Will you by your vote at the request and harangue 
of a few so-called reformers who have joined 
themselves together under various titles such as 
"the Municipal League", "Union Party", "Reform 
League" and other insidious and high-sounding 
titles be led astray into the camp of the enemy to 
give them aid and comfort in order to rejuvenate 
and encourage those who in the past have been most 
active in upholding Bryanism, free silverism, free 
tradeism and the other isms so strongly advocated 
by the Democratic party.
An examination of the names of the most prominent 
people who head the opposition to the regular 
Republican candidates in this city, will show 
that it is the same old political fleas who jump 
from one party to the other, one year supporting 
Lincoln and Grant, then Harrison and Cleveland, 
and finally the low estate of Bryanism....
In addition to appealing to national partisan sympathies, 
ward leaders, such as David Lane, also suggested to party 
supporters that if they were dissatisfied with the leaders 
of the local Republican organisation then "the proper method 
of procedure" would be to seek "reform within the party" and 
not to support reform insurgency movements outside of 
traditional party lines.®®
This emphasis on party loyalty and national issues appears 
to have paid the "Organisation" handsome dividends for 
reformers, on a number of occasions, claimed that their 
defeats were attributable to the syndrome of "party 
regularity".®9 Indeed, it seems that even the reformers
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themselves could be "duped" by the cry of "party regularity"
as the eminent publisher John C. Winston, chairman of the
Committee of Seventy, admitted to a City Party public
meeting in 1 905 :
I have tried by hard work in the Committee of 
Seventy, to atone for all my folly as a blind 
voter...Never again will I permit myself to be 
lulled into a political trance by the purring 
cry of "party regularity". No man shall ever 
again make me believe that it is high treason 
to vote for a good man on any municipal ticket.
I have sat on a low bench in a practical 
political school...and I wish every hide-bound 
"regular" could see the light as I see it now.^^
The "Organisation" also engaged in extra-legal practices to 
thwart well-intentioned reformers. These included the 
invasion of reform party ranks to secure nominations the 
"Organisation" could control, and ticket-splitting on 
election days to give enough votes to the Democratic party 
to keep it, rather than a reform third party as the official 
minority p a r t y . A  good example of the latter practice 
occurred in February 1905, when fifteen magistrates, or more 
than half of the entire minor judiciary, wi^ re due to be 
elected. On this occasion, the "Organisation" not only 
elected its own candidates but deliberately and successfully 
transferred 55,000 votes, over one-quarter of those actually 
polled, to the Democratic ticket, thus ensuring its triumph 
as a minority over the City Party ticket. The election 
returns indicate that the "straight" ballot, based on the 
number of votes received by the Republican and Democratic 
candidates for the City Solicitorship, was 180,000 and
24,000 votes respectively. However, in the magistrates 
contest the ten machine Republicans polled between 30,000
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and 5 0 , 0 0 0  votes less ( 1 3 1 , 0 0 0  to 1 5 1 , 0 0 0 ) ,  and the five 
Democratic nominees over 5 0 , 0 0 0  votes more ( 7 4 , 0 0 0  to 
8 0 , 0 0 0 ) ,  than their respective party candidates in the City 
Solicitorship election. If a "straight" ballot had taken 
place in the magistrates contest, then the City Party's 
nominees ( 2 9 , 0 0 0  to 3 6 , 0 0 0 )  would have been elected as the 
minor judiciary, rather than the Democratic party's 
candidates.
The "Organisation" repeated this ticket-splitting exercise 
again in 1 9 2 1  so as to ensure that its subservient 
auxiliary, rather than the Independent Republicans, occupied 
the minor judicial offices once more.^3 it also implemented 
similar ticket-splitting schemes in 1 8 9 9 ,  1 9 2 3  and 1 9 2 7  in 
order to make certain that its own favoured candidate was 
elected to the minority County Commissionership, 
particularly since the bulk of the minority patronage 
available in the city was at the disposal of this 
o f f i c i a l . 94 in 1 9 2 3 ,  for example, the "straight" ballot 
based on the number of votes polled by the Democratic party 
candidate in the mayoral election, was 3 7 , 0 0 0  votes. In the 
minority County Commissionership contest of that year, 
however, John O'Donnell outpolled Edgar Lank by 8 0 , 0 0 0  votes 
to 3 5 , 0 0 0 ,  largely because the "Organisation" switched over
4 0 , 0 0 0  Republican votes to elect the "Vare Democrat" to the 
office, rather than Charlie Donnelly's associate (see Table
7 . 1 0 ) . 9 5
Occasional ticket-splitting ventures and astute methods of
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Table 7.10. Ticket Splitting in Selected Controlled Wards:
A Comparison of the County Commissioner and Mayoral
Elections of 1923
Party
Candidates
2
Wards
3
and Vote Totals 
8 12 13 1 4
Total
Vote
Mayoral Election (the "straight vote")
Kendrick (R) 6,189 3,471 2,973 3,067 5,035 3,878 24,433
Raff (D) 110 70 1 01 73 89 1 86 629
County Commissioner Election (the "split vote )
0'Donnell(D ) 2,256 1 ,448 2,250 1,169 1 ,025 1 ,594 9,742
Lank (D) 1 07 62 87 58 71 1 69 554
Kuenzel (R) 6,132 3,449 2,769 2,182 4,079 2,472 21 ,083
Holmes (R) 4,036 1 ,992 651 2,860 4,979 3,871 18,389
0'Donnell's 
lead over 
Lank
2,149 1 ,386 2,163 1,111 954 1 ,425 9,188
Number of 
Votes 
"dropped" 
by Holmes
2,096 1 ,457 2,108
8,638
Number of 
Votes 
"dropped" 
by Kuenzel
678 900 1 ,399
Source: Eighteenth Annual Report of the Registration
Commission (Philadelphia, 1923), pp.18-21 •
campaigning provide only a partial explanation for the
"Organisation's" electoral success. According to Clinton
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Rogers Woodruff, Secretary of the National Municipal League, 
the real "secret of the machine's ability to continue itself 
in power" was the control it exercised over the entire 
election machinery.
The "Organisation" exercised this control through a variety 
of extra-legal and illegal practices. The former included 
control over key public bodies that were meant to be 
impartial and were responsible for safeguarding the purity 
of the ballot; for example, the registration boards whose 
duty it was to draw up lists of qualified voters; the 
divisional election boards who were responsible for ensuring 
that proper procedures were adhered to on election day, and 
finally the*County Commissioners who made all the 
preparations for the holding of elections, including the 
selection of polling places and the certification of 
watchers.
With regard to illegal practices, this usually involved 
registration frauds such as the wrongful issue of poll tax 
receipts to qualify voters for registration, and the padding 
of assessors lists and registration books. In the period 
prior to the 1906 Personal Registration Act, local 
newspapers and reformers estimated that the number of 
fraudulently registered voters in the city varied from 
between 30,000 to 8 0 , 0 0 0 . As late as 1926, however, the 
Reed Senate Committee investigating William Vare's election 
to the U.S. Senate, found almost 25,000 false entries in 
registration books across the city. The forged signatures 
included dead people, non-naturalised foreigners and
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c h i l d r e n . 99 The Senate Inquiry also found evidence of 
election frauds such as the voting of phantoms (non­
registered voters), multiple voting (repeating), the 
miscounting of votes, the altering of ballots and ballot-box 
stuffing in election divisions throughout the city. Such 
mal-practices the Committee concluded meant that the average 
chance of a Philadelphia voter having his vote for the U.S. 
“Senatorship contest properly recorded was one in e i g h t . ^90
A final illegal practice was the coercion of voters as they
entered polling places. Reform groups and contemporary
observers, like political scientist Professor Maynard
Kreuger, maintained that it was,
a notorious custom in Philadelphia for political 
workers to force voters who have no disability 
whatever to accept "assistance" with the result 
that many ballots are marked by the same person 
and the secrecy of the ballot becomes a mockery. ^
An inquiry conducted in the wake of the 1909 city election
by the "watchdog" reform group Committee of Seventy, for
example, revealed that 38,000 votes, or more than 15 percent
of the total votes cast, were marked by persons other than
the voters,  ^92
In addition to the control it exercised over the election 
machinery, the "Organisation" also benefitted from the 
problems that beset its opponents, one of which was public 
apathy. The Municipal League even claimed that "the 
criminally indifferent citizen" was a "more formidable" 
problem than that of "fraudulent v o t i n g " . ^93 its annual
report for 1901-2, the League observed that.
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the machine can always depend upon its vote; partly 
through the perfection of its organisation; partly 
through its almost absolute control of the election 
officers; but its great source of strength we might 
almost say its bulwark is the indifference and 
apathy of the independent voter. ^
League secretary, Clinton R. Woodruff, also conceded that a
"revival of interest on the part of the 'stay at home'
voter" was a "greater need" than "protection from the
fraudulent vote."^^^ Woodruff and the Municipal League drew
this conclusion from the observations they made on the
voting turnout figures in local elections. They noted, for
example, that in the mayoral elections of 1899 (47.6%) and
1903 (57.6%) only approximately half of the electorate
bothered to turn out to vote.^^^
More significant, however, had been the electoral survey 
they conducted in various selected wards of the city, which 
revealed that in "respectable divisions" in "independent 
wards", "less than 50 percent of the voters took the trouble 
to vote," while in the "machine divisions", "we find that 
the number of voters represent from 80 to 100 per cent of 
the assessment." "Throughout the city," the League 
concluded, "it will be found that the day labourer and man 
of moderate means is much more diligent in the exercise of
his franchise."107
Leading civic reformers such as Rudolph Blankenburg and 
Herbert Welsh, and muchraking journalists like Lincoln 
Steffens and Theophilus Baker, all agreed with the League's 
a s s e s s m e n t . 108 Blankenburg, for example, writing in January 
1905 suggested that
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one of the crying evils of the hour is the 
lamentable indifference of the average citizen to 
his public duties and the easy-going spirit with 
which he permits his municipal or state servant to 
become his master and ruler....
....we have in our midst a quarter of a million 
honest, well-disposed men who could rescue the 
city if they would cultivate and arouse the 
dormant public spirit within them, if they would 
once awaken from the political turpitude and moral 
lethargy, that has, almost continually for a 
generation, been their voluntary lot.'09
Public indifference and lethargy was what struck Lincoln
Steffens when he visited the city in July 1903 and this was
reflected in his damning indictment of Philadelphia as being
"corrupt and contented".^^0
At exactly the same time as Steffens was carrying out his
investigation of municipal corruption, fellow journalist
Theophilus Baker was also dissecting the "Philadelphia
character" which he believed to be a
patent contradiction of a high private and low
public morality...... there is what may be called,
for want of a better name, a sort of moral 
locomoter ataxia, an inability to put into action 
the community's really high sense of right and 
wrong conduct. The citizens lack the virtue 
militant, that individually disagreeable, but 
socially valuable quality - pugnacity - the 
quality that leads an Englishman to spend £20 to 
avoid the illegal exaction of a shilling. They 
are law abiding, conservative to the point of 
allowing a rogue to rob them, if he only preserves 
the appearances and technicalities of legality.
Such comments from outsiders helped to give Philadelphia a
national reputation (that still endures) of being a city
that was conservative, complacent and dull.
"Sinful contentment," as Blankenburg put it, proved to be 
short-lived, however, for the "better elements" were shaken 
out of their complacency partly as a result of Steffens'
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stinging rebuke, but mainly because of Durham's proposal in 
April 1905 to lease the municipal gas works to his friend 
Thomas Dolan's United Gas Improvement company on a long term 
basis, and at generous terms to the private corporation.
The so-called "gas steal" provoked such an outburst of 
public indignation against the "Organisation" that it 
sparked off a decade of insurgent reform activity in the 
city
This popular protest was also reflected in the substantial 
increase in the number of voters who went to the polls. For 
example, the turnout of voters for the mayoral elections of 
1907, 1911, 1915 and 1919 was 84.4, 71.6, 86.7, and 79.5 
percent respectively.11  ^ Yet in spite of "the revival of 
interest on the part of the 'stay at home' voter" the 
reformers had little to show for all the increased activity 
at the polls. Their only victories were in November 1905 
when the City Party managed to elect its entire ticket in 
the election for county offices, and in November 1911 when, 
as a result of a temporary split within the "Organisation", 
Keystone Party candidate Rudolph Blankenburg was elected
1 1 c
Mayor by the narrow majority of 3,333 votes.
The reformers lack of electoral success, it appears, was due 
to the fact that they faced a more formidable problem than 
that of public indifference, and that was the local strength 
of Republican partisanship. It was this obstacle which 
provided opponents of the "Organisation" with their greatest 
difficulty. The reformers themselves, even though they
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claimed to be non-partisan, had problems in shaking off 
their Republican identity. For example, third parties like 
the City (1905-7), Keystone (1910-15), Washington (1912-16) 
and Franklin (1915-16) party, were all Republican in 
orientation at least in national politics.^Moreover, 
although Thomas R. White claimed that non-partisanship was 
the key to the City Party's victory in 1905, he also noted 
that many City Party members had argued "that the candidates 
ought not to be named as City Party candidates but as 
Republican candidates, nominated by an independent wing of 
the p a r t y . L i n c o l n  Steffens also described the 
Philadelphia reformers as loyal Republicans. He told Teddy 
Roosevelt that, "they are Republicans and they are friends 
of yours and their plan is to make the City or Lincoln 
Republicans the real Republicans of Philadelphia."^^®
Similarly in 1911, Blankenburg's election as Mayor, at the
head of the Keystone Party ticket, was hailed as a victory
for Republicanism as well for reform. The Public Ledger, an
anti-"Organisation" journal that supported Blankenburg,
argued that the success of the reformers,
indicates the unalterable devotion of Philadelphia 
to the genuine principles of the national 
Republican party. It shows that the voters 
recognised in Mr. Blankenburg a better Republican
 than his opponent... and that they have finally
reached the conclusion that the principles of 
Republicanism.... are far safer in the hands of a 
Blankenburg, than in those of a candidate named by 
the McNichol machine.
Again in 1915, the Evening Ledger, supporting the Franklin
Party ticket, declared that George Porter's election as
Mayor would "be a triumph for Philadelphia Republicanism of
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the best type and an inspiration to Republicanism throughout
the nation."120
This recurring display of Republican partisanship, on the
part of the local press and third parties, rankled many
anti-"Organisation" Democrats who were potential supporters
of reform groups. The Democratic Record complained that the
prevailing view among Philadelphia reformers in regard to
local politics was that.
If the city is to be saved from the contractors, it
must only be by Republicans Evidently no help
in municipal reform is desired from persons who do 
not care what happens to the Grand Old Party, and 
from those who are perfectly satisfied to have it 
indefinitely out of power.
The short-lived Franklin party was, in fact, the last third
party to claim that it was non-partisan in local affairs.
By the 1920's all reform activity remained within party
ranks. Independent Republicans in suburban wards battled
with the "Organisation" only at party primaries and not in
general elections. When a disagreeable candidate obtained
the Republican nomination and was opposed by a Democrat in
the general election, the Independents either maintained
their party regularity by voting for the candidate named in
the primary, or did not participate in the contest at all.
And yet potentially, in combination with the estimated
30,000 "anti-Organisation" Democrats in the city.
Independent Republicans in the ring wards could have
provided William Vare with formidable opposition, but such
an alliance never materialised. The Independents stubbornly
refused to leave the Republican party even if it meant the
continuation of the "Organisation's" a s c e n d a n c y . 1^2
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Indeed from 1919 onwards they actually fought against the
Democrats in general elections when minority positions were
at stake. Thus rather than seeking to "fuse" with the
Democrats in opposition to "Organisation" (as they had done
in the past, in 1911, 1913 and 1917), the Independent
Republicans forced the Democratic party into a position of
1 7dependence on the Republican machine. By refusing to
.holt party ranks and by attempting to secure minority
representation, the Independent Republicans aided the
"Organisation" in the sense that their actions prevented the
formation of a substantial united opposition to machine
rule. The behaviour of the Independent Republicans in the
1920's indicates that they were more Republican than
Independent, a characteristic which did not escape the
notice of the Record. In September 1923, the Record printed
a lengthy editorial entitled "What's the matter with
Philadelphia?" in which it asked why Philadelphians had
continued to vote for the "same group of unscrupulous
political bosses who had robbed them for so many years."
"The answer," it suggested,
is to be found in the childish unreasoning belief 
that obsesses the average Philadelphian, that all 
governmental virtue reposes in the Republican 
party. This belief is fostered from childhood, 
handed down from generation to generation, and 
unquestionably accepted as an article of faith in 
most households. Men who apply their well- 
developed reasoning faculties to all other problems 
of life blindly refuse to consider the truth or 
falsity of the creed that permeates the 
Philadelphia atmosphere.
In Philadelphia you must be a Republican, just as 
you must eat, sleep, keep your body clean, and be 
courteous to women. It matters not that the 
precepts of the Republican and Democratic parties
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have no more to do with municipal government than 
have the tenets of Buddhism, and that a Democrat 
is fully as capable of satisfactorily filling a 
municipal office as a Republican without prejudice 
to the application of Republican policies in the 
execution of the nation's business; the belief is 
fixed in the typical Philadelphian mind that the 
election of a Democrat to any important city office
 would be reactionary, ruinous and in effect
equivalent to a municipal disaster.
We diagnose the case as almost hopeless addiction 
to Republicanism; habitual overdosing with partisan 
-ship...The strength of the Republican party in 
Philadelphia is the cause that blights our city, 
imposes upon it unnecessary burdens of taxation, 
hampers its development and enables venal 
politicians to fritter away its substance to their 
own personal enrichment. That's what's the matter 
with Philadelphia.
"Hopeless addiction to Republicanism" then was a key
feature, though not the only one, of the "Organisation's"
success in controlling votes.
In sum, the "Organisation's" ability to overwhelm its 
electoral opponents rested on a number of factors, namely: 
public apathy; the demise of the Democratic party; the 
control it exercised over the election machinery; its astute 
methods of campaigning, and the "personal service" it 
rendered to the individual voter; in addition to the local 
strength of Republican partisanship. Taken together, they 
account for the remarkable degree of electoral success that 
the "Organisation" enjoyed during the period of its 
"institutionalisation".
This ability to control the electorate was, as pointed out 
at the start of this chapter, a necessary prerequisite for 
the establishment of a reliable system of discipline within 
the "Organisation"; a development which in fact was
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explained in the last chapter. But what still remains to be 
considered, however, is who benefitted from, and supported, 
the creation of such a centralised political structure, and 
who opposed it. This will be the subject of the final two 
chapters.
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8. The Utility Monopolists
One of the main beneficiaries and supporters of the creation 
of a centralised political structure in Philadelphia seems 
to have been a major segment of the local business 
community, for the emergence of a fully fledged political 
machine at the turn of the century coincided with the 
consolidation of the public utilities industry in the city. 
More specifically, just as power was consolidated in the 
local polity, the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company and the 
Philadelphia Electric Company both managed to establish 
monopoly control over the city's street railway and 
electricity supply systems respectively.^ In addition, the 
United Gas Improvement Company established virtual control 
over the local gas supply system when it successfully 
managed to obtain a long term lease of the municipal gas 
works in 1897.^
Although the relationship between consolidation in the local 
economy and in the urban polity was apparently coincidental, 
it needs to be emphasised that the centralisation of 
political power on the one hand, and the consolidation of 
the public utilities industry on the other, was to the 
mutual benefit of both utility entrepreneurs and also the 
party "boss". In the case of the former, for instance, it 
was to their benefit to have political power highly 
centralised since their particular industry was heavily 
dependent upon, and vulnerable to, governmental action.
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Indeed, so long as the polity remained fragmented, utilities 
companies (which had very substantial fixed assets) were 
subject to, and vulnerable to, extortionate demands, from 
legislators. The creation of a system of discipline over 
public officials was therefore very much in the interest of 
utility companies, since dealing with a single party leader 
who could control the flow of legislation that they were 
vitally interested in, was preferable to the chronic discord 
and legislative blackmail that prevailed under a system of 
rampant factionalism.^
The consolidation of the public utilities industry was also 
in the interests of a prospective party "boss" since so long 
as it remained fragmented, entrepreneurs, in competing with 
one another for favours from government, would be driven to 
offer bribes to secure such legislative privileges. Bribery 
may (or may not) have produced the desired result as far as 
these entrepreneurs were concerned, but what it also 
invariably did, was to subvert the ability of the party 
"boss" to discipline his subordinates. What 1 would suggest 
then is that if an arrangement could be struck between 
utility entrepreneurs and the political "boss", then the 
interests of both would be served.
It seems in fact that such an arrangement between the two 
was indeed reached in Philadelphia in the late nineteenth 
century, for the state government under Quay, and the city 
government under Martin and Durham, displayed considerable 
favouritism towards those utility companies which were
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controlled by such entrepreneurs as Peter A. B . Widener, 
William L. Elkins, William H. Kemble and Thomas Dolan.^
This group of capitalists were, according to E. Digby 
Baltzell, "the last of the great nineteenth century business 
Titans in P h i l a d e l p h i a . T h e y  also had several other 
things in common. Nearly all of them, for example, were 
born in the 1830's in poor circumstances. They were all 
educated to the high school level and all went to work in 
their 'teens in retail establishments; Widener in his elder 
brother's butcher's shop; Dolan and Kemble in general dry 
goods stores and Elkins as a grocery clerk. None of them, 
despite their eligibility, served in the Union Army during 
the Civil War. Instead they proceeded to pile up 
considerable fortunes in commerce, industry and banking.^
Widener (1834-1915), for example, quickly acquired his own 
meatshop and during the Civil War received a lucrative 
contract, courtesy of Simon Cameron's War Department, to 
supply mutton to all troops within ten miles of 
Philadelphia. With the $50,000 profit from this contract, 
he opened a chain of meat stores throughout the city, bought 
several strategically located streetcar lines and began to 
invest in suburban real estate. Also actively involved in 
local politics as a member of the Republican twentieth ward 
executive committee, Widener was elected to several minor 
offices before being appointed City Treasurer in 1873. 
Failing to secure successive party nominations for the State 
Treasuryship and the Mayoralty of Philadelphia in 1877, 
however, Widener forsook his political ambitions in favour
279
of his business interests.^
With Elkins and Kemble he worked out a strategy for 
combining, consolidating and mechanising all the streetcar 
lines in Philadelphia. After their Philadelphia Rapid 
Transit Company secured a local monopoly, the trio, in 
partnership with William C. Whitney and Thomas Fortune Ryan, 
proceeded to use the same strategy to monopolise control of 
street railway systems in New York, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, 
Chicago and more than a hundred other cities across the 
country.® In addition to his traction interests, Widener 
helped to organise both the United States Steel Company and 
the American Tobacco Company. He was also a large investor 
in the Pennsylvania Railroad, Standard Oil and the United 
Gas Improvement Company. When he died in 1915, Widener left 
an estate of approximately one hundred million dollars, the 
largest single fortune in the city.^
Widener's closest friend and associate William L. Elkins 
(1832-1903) also enjoyed similar initial success in 
retailing, though as a grocer rather than as a butcher. 
However, after ten years running his own produce business in 
New York and Philadelphia he, like many others, was struck 
by the "Oil Fever" which broke out following the discovery 
of oil in western Pennsylvania in 1859. Over the next 
twenty years Elkins acquired many prosperous wells and 
pioneered the refining of crude oil for illuminating 
purposes and for gasoline. In 1880 he sold his business to 
the Standard Oil Company and thereafter, in partnership with 
Widener, concentrated on building up his interests in street
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railways, gas, electric lighting and suburban real estate.
At the time of his death in 1903, he was the director of 
twenty-four companies and his personal fortune was estimated 
to be twenty five million dollars.
The eldest member of the group William Kemble (1824-1891)
"accumulated a large fortune" by successfully combining a
1 1career in business with one in politics. Kemble, like
Widener, was an activist in local politics as a Republican
committeeman. He served as an agent for federal revenue
stamps during the Civil War and was subsequently elected
state treasurer for the first of three successive terms in
1865. It was Kemble in fact who pioneered the "treasury
system" which became such an important component of Quay's
1 9state organisation. He also ensured that the largest 
recipient of state money was the "pet" institution he 
founded, the People's Bank of Philadelphia. Kemble's 
manipulation of public funds was such that he has acquired 
immortality in the annals of Pennsylvania history as the 
author of the famous political maxim: "Addition, division 
and silence."T3 As well as pocketing his share of the 
spoils, Kemble was also active in the Philadelphia street 
railway industry. He served as Secretary of the Union 
Passenger Railway Company, for instance, one of the largest 
streetcar lines in the city, before joining up with Widener 
and Elkins to consolidate Philadelphia's street railway 
system. A close associate of both Quay and Cameron, it was 
Kemble who acted as the "connecting link" between the 
utility financiers and the state Republican organisation.^^
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The final member of the group, Thomas Dolan (1834-1914), was 
like the others a self-made man; a sales assistant who 
became, according to Baltzell, "one of Philadelphia's 
greatest nineteenth century business t y c o o n s . D o l a n  made 
his fortune as a manufacturer of men's wear, fancy-knit 
goods and hosiery. He began the manufacture of "Germantown 
Goods" in 1861, and speedily built up a prosperous trade 
until, at the close of the Civil War, although still only 
thirty years old, he was one of the (11th) wealthiest men in 
the city.TG By 1871 his Keystone Knitting Mills was doing 
one million dollars worth of business a year, an annual 
turnover that established Dolan as one of the largest 
producers of men's wear in America, and paved the way for 
his election to the Presidency of the National Association 
of Manufacturers.
As well as being a prosperous textile manufacturer, Dolan 
also played a major role in organising and directing gas and 
electric companies. Indeed, he became a national figure in 
the utility field when the company he organised along with 
Widener and Elkins in 1882, the United Gas Improvement 
Company, became within a decade America's largest public 
utility concern. It was also under Dolan's leadership that 
the "U.G.I." leased the city's gas works in 1897.^^ Dolan, 
like Kemble, also had close links with Quay's state 
Republican machine. In 1882, for instance, supported by 
Quay, he was elected chairman of the State Republican party. 
Again, backed by Quay, he served as an adviser to the 
Republican National Committee in the 1890's. When he
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eventually died in 1914, Dolan's personal wealth in the city 
was exceeded only by that of Widener's.
As a group - Dolan, Widener, Elkins and Kemble -
constituted, according to contemporary journalist Burton J.
Hendrick, "a federation of capital" that was mutually bound
together by a maze of interlocking business interests.
Writing in 1907, Hendrick observed that
in the last thirty years working separately or 
working together, they have entered city after 
city. State after State, acquired street rail­
ways, gas and electric lighting companies and
developed them on an enormous scale upon them
at least ten million people or one-eighth of the 
nation's population are dependent for such daily 
needs as electric transit, and gas and electric
lighting.20
These capitalists were in fact, as Baltzell points out, "men 
of America's first plutocratic generation," the great 
organisers who were creators of, and products of, the 
general "organisational revolution" that was taking place in 
late nineteenth century America.21 They were essentially 
financiers, though their financial activities were not great 
speculative ventures such as those of Jim Fiske and Jay 
Gould, but rather carefully orchestrated moves involving 
limited risk and yet yielding enormous return, as in the 
case of the phenomenal growth of the "U.G.I.".
These utility financiers who founded newer and fabulously 
wealthy family lines were different from those families of 
earlier wealth in Philadelphia, not just in terms of their 
poor origins, limited education and the manner in which they 
accumulated their wealth, but also in the way in which they
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behaved and the place where they chose to live. The city's 
"First Families" of the Revolutionary period, and the 
banking, business and industrial elite of the mid-nineteenth 
century, tended to reside in fashionable downtown 
neighbourhoods such as Independence and Rittenhouse Square, 
or in suburbs along the Main Line and in Chestnut Hill to 
the west of the city. The new plutocrats, in defiance of 
Proper Philadelphia's popular convention that "Nobody lives 
north of Market" (the main east-west thoroughfare connecting 
the Delaware and Schylkill rivers), built tremendous 
Victorian mansions at the corner of Broad Street and Girard 
Avenue, a full twelve blocks, north of Market Street.^2
Aesthetic differences between the plutocrats and the 
aristocrats further compounded the geographic split between 
the two. Whereas mansions in Rittenhouse Square, for 
instance, tended to be simple, restrained and conservative 
in their design, the ones that Widener and Elkins built were 
"an overwhelming confection" that gave "an architectural 
definition to Thorstein Veblen's famous phrase, 'conspicuous 
consumption'";23 a "pecuniary canon of taste" indeed that 
led Baltzell to conclude that the newly rich Philadelphians 
"were typical of America's Renaissance Princes of the 
'Gilded Age'
A final difference, and from our viewpoint perhaps the most 
important one, between the plutocrats and the aristocrats, 
was in their attitude towards local affairs and politics.
Put briefly, the utility financiers, unlike earlier men of 
substance, were simply not interested in governance.
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Instead, they were primarily concerned in power as a means 
to personal wealth, and if that meant that Pennsylvania and 
Philadelphia were ruled by the likes of Quay, Martin,
Durham, McNichol and the Vare brothers, then so be it. They 
were prepared to accept and support machine rule in 
Pennsylvania and Philadelphia because, like party workers, 
they secured material rewards under such a system.
In what ways were these utility entrepreneurs favoured by 
the various party "bosses"? How did they benefit from the 
creation of a centralised political structure in 
Philadelphia and (given that local affairs were subject to 
state interference) also Pennsylvania? That the utility 
entrepreneurs received legislative favours from the state 
government under Quay, and the city government under Martin 
and Durham, can be demonstrated by examining the way in 
which the companies they controlled were able to establish 
monopoly control over the city's street railway, gas and 
electricity supply systems.
In the case of street railways, Kemble, Widener and Elkins 
united, rationalised and mechanised Philadelphia's street 
car lines into an electric-powered system which eventually 
monopolised local transit.^5 That they managed to establish 
such a monopoly was attributable not only to their skill, 
vision and ability as entrepreneurs, but also to the 
alliance they forged with the state and city Republican 
machines.
Kemble, as one of the original incorporators of the Union
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Passenger Railway Company in 1864, had been the first member 
of the group to get involved in street railways. Headed by 
state treasurer William McGrath, and numbering politicians 
Jacob Ridgway and William Leeds among its directors, the 
Union quickly became one of the city's successful roads.
With valuable north-south and east-west lines it connected 
northern suburbs with the developing central business 
district and the Delaware river front.
It was while serving as Secretary of the Union company that 
Kemble began to develop a strategy for combining the city's 
twenty-odd competing horse-car lines into one. He based his 
strategy on the model provided by the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
As a lobbyist for "The Pennsy" in the early 1870's, Kemble 
had observed how the railroads managers had assembled a 
self-sufficient regional system, by creating a trunk and 
branch network through merging other roads and then leasing 
them to its main line. He also noted how they had divided 
the railroads into divisions and developed a line and staff 
structure to administer them.^G
Kemble sought to apply the same techniques to the city's 
street railway system. He envisaged that the Union would 
become the trunk line for a system which would run through 
the heart of the business district and branch into the 
northern and western suburbs of the city. When his 
associates on the Union Board balked at his scheme, Kemble 
teamed up with Widener and Elkins and formed a rival 
(Continental) company with the intention of capturing
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control of the Union, and then implementing his strategy of 
combination.27 However, in order to protect themselves from 
political raids by their opponents, and to ensure the 
passage of appropriate legislation, the trio also needed to 
recruit the necessary political expertise. It was for this 
reason that Quay was added to the group. Together these 
four men formed "a combine that became the most powerful 
single force in the city's street railway industry."2®
At the time the "Combine" entered the transit field in 1873, 
some twenty-seven separate passenger railway companies had 
(in the absence of a general law for the incorporation of 
street railways and in the belief that competition was the 
best regulator of the public interest) been granted charter 
rights by the state legislature to operate horse-car lines 
in P h i l a d e l p h i a . I n  practice, the unco-ordinated and 
unsystematic development of street railways aroused 
considerable public opposition and hostility. Public 
criticism focused not just on the failure of company owners 
to co-operate over the provision of routes, schedules and 
new technology, but also on the process by which they 
secured charters in the first place. For example, 
Philadelphians were indignant about the fact that since 
local affairs were subject to state interference, they had 
no control, and nor were they consulted, over the conferring 
of charters that made a gift of the use of their city's 
streets for private profit.^0 The passage of the so-called 
"Railway Boss Act" of 1868, which prohibited the city from 
regulating street railroads without specific authorisation
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from the assembly, only added to their sense of injustice. 
Such resentment was aggravated even further by the discovery 
that prospective companies often secured their charters 
through bribes, stock-options and other favours, and that 
greedy legislators had willingly sacrificed the city's 
interests for such inducements.^2
Concerted public protest over inadequate local control and 
about special influence in charter grants brought limited 
reform. The new state constitution of 1874 attempted to 
reduce legislative corruption by prohibiting, among other 
things, special charters for railways. It also provided 
that any further street railway construction was to be 
subject to municipal approval.^3
This initiative to promote local regulation counted for 
little in practice, however, because reformers enacted no 
general law to permit the incorporation of additional lines. 
Indeed, since the Constitution did not affect existing 
companies, it did not take long for the traction magnates to 
realise that by preventing the passage of such a law they 
could consolidate their positions without having to worry 
about the appearance of additional competitors.^4 in fact, 
because of their close relationship with Quay, they were 
able to delay the passage of a general incorporation law for 
fifteen years, by which "time, of course,"as Harold E. Cox 
and John F. Meyers have pointed out, "it was too late to 
preserve competition - if indeed that was a purpose of the 
Act of 1889."35
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Cox and Meyers suggest that,
the rapidity with which [they] succeeded in .... 
consolidating their positions in Philadelphia, 
while at the same time exploiting their favoured 
position within the state legislature... commands 
even a cynic's respect.
Indeed, the way in which the "combine" turned "the new
Constitution to their advantage," Cox and Meyers conclude,
amounted to "the prostitution of an ideal.
Cox and Meyers formed this opinion on the basis of how the 
"Combine" established its traction monopoly; namely through 
"legislative manipulation."^8 That is, by way of the state 
legislature, under Quay's influence and direction, regularly 
"delivering" (or not) the necessary legislation that 
permitted the group to monopolise the city's street railway 
systèmes
In 1883, for instance, the "Combine" was in an awkward 
dilemma. It had established a powerful system by capturing 
control of the Union company in 1880 and that of the West 
Philadelphia railway in 1881. However, since companies 
under their respective charters were restricted to horse 
traction and had limited capitalisation, the group could not 
meet the growing demand for transportation by substituting 
cable technology and mechanical power for horsepower, 
without the passage of a general incorporation law and the 
risk of additional competition. The state legislature, in 
order to,
get around [this] very obvious impasse... obligingly 
legalised the creation of a corporation that might 
in future be easily converted into a m o n o p o l y . 40
That is, the state assembly enacted a motive power law which
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permitted the creation of an entirely new category of
company: the traction motor company. Specifically, the bill
provided for the formation of corporations,
for the construction and operation of motors and 
cables or other machinery for supplying motive 
power to passenger railways and the necessary 
apparatus for applying the same.
In addition these companies were,
permitted to motorise any existing railway company 
not previously covered by existing charters and 
franchises, to sell their services to existing 
companies, operate lines under contract, and lease
lines.41
This bill, as Cox and Meyers point out, had "obvious
advantages" for the "Combine", for not only did it permit
the group to construct a cable line, it also did not
interfere with the existing restriction against the
establishment of new passenger railway companies in
P h i l a d e l p h i a . 42 since the "Combine", at the time of the
passage of the Act, was the only group in Philadelphia that
had the financial capability to construct a cable line, Cox
and Meyers argue that,
the law was made to order for this organisation; 
and it was no accident that the first company under 
the Act was the Philadelphia Traction Company, 
controlled by the syndicate. Using this new 
company as a base of operations, the syndicate 
unified the Union, West Philadelphia and 
Continental Companies into a single system to which 
they added other properties from time to time.
Syndicate control was exercised through nine 
hundred and ninety-nine year leases - in effect, 
perpetual leases - under which the majority of the 
more lucrative and strategically located properties 
in Philadelphia were consolidated. ^
By the time that a general incorporation law was finally 
passed in 1889, "it was too late to preserve competition" or
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"significantly affect the march.... toward total monopoly,"
because by then virtually all the main thoroughfares in
downtown Philadelphia were occupied by rail lines, so
"constructing new lines was neither feasible nor
n e c e s s a r y . "44 The "Combine" in fact,
turned even this apparent defeat to their 
advantage. The group simply created companies 
which built additional trackage in Philadelphia 
under its control. The effect of this building was 
to widen the network of street railways and with it 
syndicate control of the street railway industry 
while at the same time discouraging competition by 
small isolated companies in Philadelphia.
By the mid-1890's only three important companies - the 
Philadelphia Traction (with 203 miles of track), the 
Electric Traction (130 miles), and People's Traction (73 
miles), in addition to one small independent line, the 
Hestonville, Montana and Fairmount Railway Company (24 
miles) - had survived the city's traction wars (see Table
8 .1).46
However, when following the conversion from cable to 
electric traction, renewed rivalry threatened to ruin all 
three companies, "the state legislature was once again 
called upon; and once again it d e l i v e r e d ."4^ In 1895, the 
State Assembly passed the legislation necessary to allow a 
consolidation to take place. The company heads quickly 
chartered a new organisation, the Union Traction Company, 
which assumed complete control of the assets and Habilites 
of the three competing traction companies. This merger 
virtually completed the combination of Philadelphia's street 
railways. Within two years, the "Combine" assumed direction
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of the new company, and soon after the Union absorbed the 
remaining independent line, the Hestonville Company, thus 
uniting the city's street railways into an powerful monopoly 
(see Table 8.1).
It could be construed from the discussion so far, as indeed 
contemporary observers such as Lincoln Steffens and Moisei 
Ostrogorski, and more recent scholars like Matthew 
Josephson, Richard Hofstadter, Robert Merton, E. Digby 
Baltzell, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson have argued, 
that the reason why the utility entrepreneurs were able to 
secure legislative favours from the state assembly was 
because they themselves controlled the legislature; that in 
fact the party "boss" and his machine were mere 
functionaries of the new plutocrats.^9
An examination of the infamous "franchise grab" of 1901 
(when the "Combine" had already consolidated its economic 
position) suggests, however, that this would be an erroneous 
judgement to make.^O The "franchise grab" was a direct 
consequence of the deterioration that followed Kemble's 
death, in the political (rather than economic) position of 
the "Combine". With the loss of the "chief connection" 
between the traction syndicate and the Republican machine, 
relations between Quay and the remainder of the group - 
Peter Widener, his son George, William Elkins and Thomas 
Dolan - declined sharply and temporarily ruptured when the 
elder Widener refused to support the state "boss" during a 
period of political crisis at the turn of the century.
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Table 8.1. The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company and its 
subsidiaries*
Philadelphia
Rapid
Transit
Company
(1902)
<
Union 
Traction 
Co. (1895)
Electric 
Traction 
Co. (1893)3
<
Hestonville, 
Mantua & 
Fairmount 
(1859)
Peoples 
Traction 
Co. (1893)
Philadelphia 
Traction 
Co. (1895)
Sources: Frederic W. Speirs, The Street Railway System of
Philadelphia: Its History and Present Condition 
(Philadelphia, 1897); Clinton R. Woodruff, "Philadelphia's 
Street Railway Franchises," American Journal of Sociology 7 
(1901-2), pp. 216-233; Edmund Stirling, "Inside Transit 
Facts," Public Ledger, February 10 - March 13, 1930; Harold 
Cox and John F. Meyers, "The Philadelphia Traction Monopoly 
and The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874: The Prostitution 
of and an Ideal," Pennsylvania History 35 (October 1968), 
pp. 406-423.
The subsidiaries listed were all passenger railway 
companies unless otherwise stated.
The figure in parentheses indicates the date of the 
company's incorporation.
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Table 8.1. contd.
fcitizens' North End (1894)
JFrankford & Southwark(1854) 
\Citizens' East End (1894) 
Brown & Parrish Sts. 
Clearfield & Cambria
(1894)
St. (1894)
Citizens' (1858)
------2nd & 3rd Sts. (1858)
Lombard & South St. (1861)
•Fairmount
Fairmount
Fairmount
Peoples
Aramingo Ave.
East Aramingo Ave.
& Arch St. (1858) Green & Coates Sts.
Germantown 
(1892) Northern
Centennial 
Girard Ave.
1 873)---------------------- Cheltenham& J'kintn
Hillcrest Ave.
Park &
(1858) 
Haddington
1 894) 
1 894) 
1 858) 
1858) 
1 890) 
1 889) 
1 894) 
1 892) 
1 896)
<
Catherine & Bainbridge Sts. (1889)
Philadelphia Suburban (1894)
West Philadelphia (1 857)-----------Phila. City
Union (1 864)------------------------ Kessler St.
Continental
Phila. & Gray's Ferry (1858)------ Schuylkill River
Ridge Avenue (1 859)---------------- Girard College
13th & 15th Sts. (1859)
Ridge Ave. Connecting R. Co. (1892)
Walnut St. Connecting R.Co. (1890) Chelten Ave. 
Huntingdon St. Conn. R. Co. (1894) Frankford & Fairm
32nd St. & Allegheny Ave. (1890) Fishers Lane
Southern (1889) G 'town & Fairm't
Marshall St. (1889) Lindley Ave.
(1859)
(1892)
(1873)
(1866)
(1858)
(1889)
t(1894)
(1899)
Pk(1895)
(1899)
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Following his re-election to the U.S. Senate and his 
acquittal on charges of misappropriating state funds, Quay 
determined to exact revenge on the ungrateful Widener by 
entering "a marriage of convenience" with paving contractor 
John Mack, and supervising the passage of legislation that 
would destroy the "Combine's" monopoly of the street railway 
business in Philadelphia.^^
Capitalising on public demands for rapid transit, and on 
Widener and Elkin's absence on a European holiday. Quay, in 
May 1901, sponsored two bills through the state legislature 
which provided for the creation of yet another category of 
street railway company. The rapid transit companies created 
under the provisions of the Focht-Emery bills were also 
granted the right to enter upon street railway lines already 
built and to have unlimited power to borrow money on bonds. 
In addition, their franchises were to be exclusive and 
perpetual.
The bills, as Clinton R. Woodruff observed, "came like a 
bolt of thunder out of a clear sky" and were "literally 
jammed through" the state legislature and Philadelphia City 
Council "with unprecedented and reckless s p e e d . T h e  
"whole process" (the passage of the bills and the issuing of 
charters for thirteen companies in Philadelphia, all 
controlled by Mack) took just sixteen days, even though the 
legislation had far-reaching implications for every 
thoroughfare in the city and threatened the security of 
every existing transit f r a n c h i s e . ^5
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Wanamaker argued that these "ripper bills" were "little 
short of public p l u n d e r , w h i l e  Woodruff claimed that they 
constituted,
a new and hitherto unparalleled record of franchise 
looting and defiance of public opinion. I doubt if 
ever in the history of a state or a city, public 
opinion has been more openly or impudently defied; 
if ever the machinery of government has been more 
brazenly prostituted to private ends and profit; if 
ever there has been a more conscienceless betrayal 
of public trust.^
Since the Mack group had little capital and no plan for
construction, local reformers were outraged by the "ripper
bills", not so much because they sympathised with the
"Combine's" Union Traction Company, which as Woodruff
acknowledged "was getting a dose of its own medicine," but
because "the public interest" was being sacrificed for the
sake of "macing" (blackmailing) Widener, Elkins and Dolan.
The "Combine", given the threat that the Mack group could
sell its franchises to a potential rival, was thus
reluctantly forced, and at considerable expense, to
compromise with Quay's new associate.
What the "franchise grab" of 1901 demonstrates then, in my 
view, is not just a betrayal of "the public interest" or the 
ability of the "boss" to control the behaviour of his 
subordinates in public office, as was argued in Chapter 5.
It also indicates that, contrary to received wisdom, the 
Republican political machines, at both the state and city 
level, were independent of, and not subservient to, utility 
interests; that in fact legislative concessions were the 
prerogative of the party "boss" for him to confer or 
withhold as he deemed appropriate.^0
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Apart from occasional differences such as the one that 
precipitated the "franchise grab", relations between the 
utility entrepreneurs and Republican party "bosses" were 
generally smooth. The preferential treatment that their gas 
and electric companies received at the hands of city 
government, also suggests that the utility monopolists were 
favoured beneficiaries of Republican machine rule.
In 1897, for instance, the "Combine's" "U.G.I." company 
managed to secure, "in the face of great public hostility" 
and "at a time when the tide of American public opinion " 
was "setting strongly toward enlarging municipal activity," 
a thirty year lease of the municipal gas works, due to the 
efforts of "boss" Dave Martin, a close friend of Dolan's.
Reform groups and local newspapers argued against the 
proposed lease because it constituted "a bad financial 
bargain" since it was "estimated upon a depreciated value 
(of the works) based upon the earning capacity of a plant 
that has been inefficiently m a n a g e d . I n  addition, given 
the length of the lease and the fact that the gas works were 
a profitable thirty million dollar public asset, reformers 
claimed that local citizens would receive "inadequate 
compensation," whether in the form of annual rental payments 
to the city treasury or in lower gas prices to the 
consumer.^3
Reformers were also concerned about "the far-reaching 
principles" that the issue raised, and not just the 
"material aspects" of the l e a s e . F o r  example, they argued
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that the city's gas works should be run "for the benefit, 
not of the few stockholders of a private corporation but, of 
the citizens who live within its b o u n d s . T h e y  were also 
worried that the creation a "a great private monopoly in gas 
supply" would increase the risk of "political corruption."^6
Finally, and most damaging of all, according to Henry C.
Lea, the passage of the proposed lease would constitute,
an open admission that we are not competent to 
govern ourselves....we shall have renounced our 
right to self government and shall have placed 
ourselves under the tutelege of a syndicate of 
capitalists.
None of these arguments, however, failed to persuade 
sufficient Councilmen not to sacrifice the city's long-term 
interests for short-term gains, and the lease was duly 
passed in November 1897.^®
In 1905, Durham and Dolan negotiated a new agreement which 
was designed to benefit both the "Organisation" and the 
"U.G.I.". Put simply, in return for cancelling the existing 
lease in favour of a new seventy-five year one, the 
"U.G.I.", instead of paying rentals, was to contribute 
twenty-five million dollars to the city treasury over a 
period of three years. This arrangement suited both 
parties, since on the one hand it provided Durham with a 
"handsome kitty" with which to reward his faithful 
followers, and on the other allowed Dolan to secure long­
term control of the gas works by "paying only a fraction of 
the real value of the lease.
Durham's plan back-fired, however, for he made a "serious
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blunder" in attempting to "railroad" the ordinance through 
the City C o u n c i l . T h a t  is, he "ignored the charged 
atmosphere"^^ in the city that followed Steffens' indictment 
of Philadelphia as being "Corrupt and Contented", and by 
acting "in, such a high-handed manner, provoked public 
sentiment in opposition."^2 "As the nature of the Gas Steal 
became evident, a wave of indignation swept throughout the 
city" and "caught the Organisation by complete surprise."^3 
Mayor John Weaver vetoed the new proposed gas lease, broke 
with Durham, and temporarily joined the ranks of the new 
independent party in the city.^^ Such was the strength of 
reform fever and popular indignation that Durham was 
ultimately forced to concede defeat in the "gas war".^^
The significance of the so-called "gas steal" is that it is 
usually regarded as the incident which ignited "a decade of 
insurgent reform activity in both city and s t a t e , b u t  
what it also indicates (and this has tended to be 
overlooked) is the depth of the mutual interdependent 
interest that bound the "Organisation" and the utility 
entrepreneurs together.
The political favouritism that was displayed by the party 
"boss" towards the "Combine's" electric companies, provides 
a third and final example of the collusion that existed 
between the "Organisation" and the utility monopolists. For 
instance, when Dolan's Brush Electric Light Company (1881) 
consolidated with Widener, Kemble, Quay and Elkins' United 
States (originally Maxim) Electric Lighting Company (1881),
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to form an "Electric Trust" in 1886,^^ in order "to minimise 
competition, standardise rates and increase their earning 
p o w e r , "78 these companies also entered into "a secret 
combin a t i o n " ^ ^  with electric light companies controlled by 
David Martin and Charles Porter, so that they could farm out 
among themselves the work of lighting the city's streets 
with electricity.
At the same time the city's Edison Electric Light Company 
was effectively "frozen out of competition for city lighting 
because its ordinance prohibited the company from furnishing 
current for arc lights."^0 Consequently, with the Edison 
company unable to compete, and the other "nine ostensibly 
separate companies furnishing arc lights" either under the 
control of the "Electric Trust" or Martin and Porter, the 
cost of public lighting, it was alleged, was "twice as much" 
as it should have been.®^ This was because the nine 
companies formed "a public electric light monopoly" since 
they had "a tacit understanding and agreement not to compete 
in each other's territory"®^ and were therefore able to 
"maintain excessive profits by avoiding competition."®^
In view of the growing unpopularity of the "Electric Trust", 
however, and the increasing demands for a municipal electric 
lighting system, Martin Maloney, one of Dolan's closest 
associates, reasoned that a fresh initiative was needed to 
overcome both public agitation and the other problems that 
faced the city's electric light companies, notably their 
diverse systems of light and power distribution, ruinous 
competition, and the confusion and waste attendant upon the
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Table 8.2. The Philadelphia Electric Company of New Jersey 
and its subsidiaries*
Pennsylvania 
Light & Power 
(N.J. 1898)
Philadelphia 
Electric 
Company 
(New Jersey, 
1899)3
National 
Electric Co. 
(1899)
Co.
<
Pennsylvania 
Heat, Light 
& Power Co. 
(Pa. 1895)
<
Edison (1886)
Brush (1881)
U.S. (1881 )
Phila. (1882)
Columbia (1892)
Northern (1885)
Pa. (1887)
West End
Hamilton 
Electric 
Co. (1896)
Powelton 
M\fer's 
<[ Suburban 
Diamond
(1 890) 
(1890) 
(1 890) 
(1 890)
Germantown 
Keystone 
Bala & Merion
Wissahickon( 1 893)
(1884)
(1886)
(1891)
Southern (1890) 
Beacon (1896)
Overbrook (1893) 
Cheltenmam (1890)
Kensington Electric Co. (1893)
Delaware 
County 
Electric Co. 
(1909)
<
Philadelphia Suburban
Faraday
Citizen's
Media
The Philadelphia Electric Company (Pennsylvania,
1 902)
Sources: Nicholas B. Wainwright, History of the
Philadelphia Electric Company, 1881-1961, (Philadelphia, 
1961); E.M. Patterson, A Financial History of the 
Philadelphia Electric Company, (published as an Appendix to 
the Annual Report of the Director of Public Works, 
Philadelphia, 1914), Department of Records, City Hall, 
Philadelphia.
* all the subsidiaries listed were either electric light
or heat and power companies.
3 the figure in parentheses represents the date when the
company was incorporated.
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duplication of service.
Maloney established a new corporation, the Pennsylvania 
Heat, Light and Power Company (1895) which he envisaged 
would use culm (waste coal) in a revolutionary way to 
generate cheap electricity. Martin and Porter, as a favour 
to Dolan, provided Maloney's company with the necessary 
franchise to allow it to compete in the city. The party 
"bosses" then sold off their companies to "Penn. Heat" which 
also acquired control of the Edison c o m p a n y . ^5 Maloney also 
reached agreement with the "Electric Trust" and within a few 
years established a monopoly of the city's electricity 
supply system under "The Philadelphia Electric Company" 
(1902), a Pennsylvania corporation that included Dolan, 
Widener, Elkins and Mack on its board of directors (see 
Table 8.2 ).86
While acknowledging that the monopolisation of the city's 
electricity supply system, like the street railway system 
before it, was in large measure due to the skill, enterprise 
and foresight of entrepreneurs such as Maloney, Dolan, 
Widener and Elkins, and that the process of consolidation 
required a high degree of technical, financial and 
administrative expertise, it is also the case that it could 
not have been achieved without the necessary political 
support. Quay, Martin and Durham appear to have played the 
role of "political midwife" in assisting in the 
consolidation of the public utilities industry.
The relationship between consolidation in the economy and in
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the polity was not one of coincidence. The politicos and 
the plutocrats were allied together because it was in their 
mutual interest to do so and, moreover, the former were not 
subservient to the latter. Not everyone welcomed this 
development in Philadelphia political affairs. Indeed, such 
an alliance prompted widespread opposition, and it is to the 
opponents of the "Organisation" that we turn next.
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9. The Non-Partisan Reform Movement
Between the introduction of the Bullitt City Charter in 1887 
and the re-emergence of a competitive two party system in 
1933, the most serious threat to the "Organisation's" 
hegemony in Philadelphia politics was presented by the non­
partisan reform movement. On the governmental level the 
"Organisation" was challenged by successive "public 
watchdog" committees such as the Citizens' Municipal 
Association (C.M.A., 1886-1906) and the Committee of Seventy 
(1904, to the present day), while in the electoral arena 
its supremacy was contested by a series of committees and 
third parties sponsored by non-partisan reformers.^ These 
included the Citizens' Committee of Fifty for a New 
Philadelphia (1890-92); the Citizens' Committee of 95 for 
Good City Government (1895); the Anti-Combine Committee 
(1895); the Municipal League (1891-1904); the Union Party 
(1901); the City Party (1905-7); and the Keystone Party 
(191 0-1 5).2
These reform groups differed from their predecessors, such 
as the C.M.R.A. and the Committee of One Hundred, in a 
number of respects which might be termed organisational 
breadth, depth, coherence and duration. That is, in short, 
they tended to be larger in size, far better organised, more 
representative and durable in that they usually persisted 
over the course of several elections and legislative 
sessions. They also differed from earlier reform
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organisations, as we shall see later, in terms of their 
composition, their objectives and their solutions to 
municipal problems.
Citing the C.M.A. and the Municipal League of Philadelphia
as examples, Kenneth Fox has recently suggested that these
city reform organisations of the late nineteenth century,
represented a new kind of elite activism. Unlike 
the committees of notables that often formed in 
the 1870's to fight specific campaigns against 
municipal corruption, the purpose of these new 
organisations was to lay foundations for major 
political movements of the future.
...... During the 1 880's, ad hoc committees became
less popular; reform effort went increasingly into 
founding permanent organisations.
........The new clubs and leagues had large
memberships, sound organisational structure and a 
dedication to achievement rather than to elite 
organising for its own sake.^
The Municipal League for example, conscious that "the
trouble in the past has been that reform movements have been
too sporadic and too spasmodic,"^ deliberately set out to
imitate the Republican machine's organisational structure
and to build up "a municipal party governed upon the same
general principles as national p a r t i e s . A s  the League's
Board of Managers reasoned,
when we realise how thoroughly the regular 
politicians are entrenched; how completely they 
are organised; how well they are supplied with the 
"sinews of war", those interested in developing 
the city along the highest possible lines and 
evolving a higher standard must leave no stone 
unturned to advance their cause, and must be as 
compactly organised as the "regulars".
Organisation then must be the "keynote" of the 
League and as this progresses the prospects of 
its ultimate success will grow brighter.°
305
In short, the "Organisation” was to "be overcome by 
organisation."7 Indeed, organisation became the League's 
"watchword" to such an extent that "at its tenth 
anniversary (in 1901) it recognised that to accomplish 
permanent results it must adopt as its guiding policy 'all 
at it and always at it'
The Municipal League's organisation, like that of the
Republican party, paralleled the city's governmental
structure. It included bodies representing the electoral
division, the ward and the city at large. Overall authority
rested in a Central Board of Managers which was composed of
twenty-five members elected at large and one delegate
elected from each of the city's w a r d s . W i t h i n  five years,
the League built up a membership in excess of five thousand,
a considerable feat given that, unlike the Republican
machine, "we have nothing to offer our workers except the
satisfaction that comes from labouring in a cause based upon
fundamentally right principles.  ^ In its thirteen year
life-span the League participated in twenty local elections
with a varying degree of s u c c e s s . " T h e  best and most
fruitful of all its work" however, as the Board of Managers
pointed out at the League's tenth anniversary celebration,
was "not the mere election of candidates" but rather that it
has organised the city for reform. It has made 
visible and effective a reform vote that without 
its aid, would have eddied hither and thither.... 
...[Unlike] the Committee of One Hundred...which 
should have been a permanent force for good [but 
instead] dissolved and left no organisation behind, 
the Municipal League in this city has struck its 
roots deep.^ ^
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The Committee of Seventy, the City Party and the Keystone
Party were the heirs and beneficiaries of the "local reform
tradition" established by the Municipal League. In November
1904, the Committee of Seventy for instance "took up the
League's work under a fresh name and with fresh blood, and
along somewhat broader and more general l i n e s . L i k e  the
League, the Committee was committed to the view that
the machine cannot be destroyed by one victory at 
the polls....its influence can be held in check 
only by organised effort conducted on intelligent 
business principles.
Accordingly, committee members contributed not only
sufficient funds to finance election campaigns but also to
establish a Bureau of Information which would "provide the
information the public needs to promote fair and efficient
governance in Philadelphia."^^ In "keeping watch and ward
over public interests"^^ with regard to election and
municipal laws and to the conduct of public officials, the
Committee of Seventy, over the last eighty years, has
faithfully fulfilled the aims of its founders who, back in
January 1905, had planned to establish "an organisation of a
permanent character whose purpose shall be to aid in
securing good government in Philadelphia."^®
In its early days the Committee of Seventy, by organising 
the City Party, played a major role in directing the wave of 
reform insurgency that swept the city in May 1905, following 
Durham's proposal to lease the city's gas works to the 
"U.G.I.".^^ The City Party itself inherited the Municipal 
League's organisation in the wards and divisions throughout 
the city and managed to defeat the regular "Organisation"
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ticket in the county elections in November 1905.^^ Six 
years later the nonpartisans celebrated an even more 
stunning victory over the "Organisation", when their 
Keystone Party candidate Rudolph Blankenburg defeated George 
H. Earle in the mayoral e l e c t i o n . in both the 1905 and 
1911 campaigns over 40,000 citizens participated in the 
primary elections for these two third parties, a level of 
support which easily outweighed the 24,000 "genuine" votes 
that the Democratic party could barely muster even in a 
general election.
In terms both of electoral strength and political 
organisation then, party politics in Philadelphia at the 
turn of the century was dominated by an over-riding cleavage 
between well organised machine and reform forces. We have 
already accounted for the centralisation of the Republican 
"Organisation" in Philadelphia, but it is still necessary 
for us to explain how the founders of the non-partisan 
reform movement were able to seize the initiative among 
those who opposed the machine and gain a substantial 
following. Or, put another way, how can we account for the 
emergence of the nonpartisan reformers as the main 
opposition to the Republican machine?
In the first instance, this development can be attributed to 
the institutionalisation of the "Organisation" under 
Durham's leadership. The establishment of a reliable system 
of discipline within the Republican machine, combined with 
the "Organisation's" ability to control the electorate,
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enabled party leaders to exercise a virtual monopoly over
the recruitment of candidates to public office. This
internal consolidation of power, alongside the
"Organisation's" emergence as the central force in the
government and politics of Philadelphia, also had important
consequences for the city's men of substance. In the first
place they were not only driven out of the Republican party
organisation, but were also (given that the Democrats were a
"kept minority") forced into abandoning the alternative
major party as well, and thereby compelled to seek reform
outside of traditional party lines. These men of substance
did not, as one might infer from Sam Bass Warner Jr., E.
Digby Baltzell, Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson,
withdraw of their own accord. In his reflections on the
City Party's campaign of 1905, for instance, Franklin S.
Edmonds, Chairman of the City Committee (and himself, a
young lawyer and college professor) suggested that
the most serious error of the Organisation in its 
political history was [its] absolute neglect of..
...the young men of independence and spirit whose 
ideals of political life have been formed largely 
upon the models suggested by Theodore Roosevelt 
and Joseph W. Folk. [This] large group of young 
men [have] found all the doors to political 
activity closed by the Organisation and its 
agents.
Indeed for many years in Philadelphia, at the 
primary election only the officeholders have voted: 
the party machinery in divisions has been 
controlled by the officeholders; the nominating 
conventions have been attended by the officeholders 
and the independent has been told he must either 
"go along" or be impotent as a political factor.
The consolidation of Quay and Durham's regime had another 
consequence which was shocking to men of substance in
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Philadelphia. I suggested in the last chapter that the 
creation of a centralised and dominant party organisation 
served the interests of some very important elements of the 
city’s business community. But if the existence of such a 
structure was a collective "good" for those such as the 
utility monopolists and local contractors allied to it, it 
was a collective "bad" - a menace - for those who were not. 
In its report "to formulate a plan of Organisation for the 
Promotion of Good Government in Philadelphia" for instance, 
the Committee of Seven, appointed by the Citizens' Meeting 
of December 19, 1904, identified precisely the consequences 
of "machine rule" and "the evil condition which it is sought 
to remedy."
The evil from which the city is suffering is not so 
much lack of ability in its employees as the 
existence, separate and apart from its government, 
of an unofficial organisation, sometimes called 
"The Machine", established ostensibly for 
political purposes, but really for private profit, 
and which depends for its power and influence on:
First.- Its absolute control of the appointment of 
all municipal officers and employees, and the 
fixing of their salaries.
Second.- Its control of the police, so that it may, 
in return for votes and money, protect criminals 
and allow citizens to evade the law in special 
instances.
Third.- Its control of election, so that its 
candidates may be elected at the polls.
Fourth.- Its control of contracts and of grants of 
public franchises.
This organisation tends to demoralise to a greater 
or less extent every branch of municipal work. It 
decreases the efficiency of every department, 
because in the case of conflict between the 
interest of the city and the interest of "The 
Machine", the latter must prevail. It multiplies 
offices. It makes loyalty and service to "The 
Machine", rather than ability and honesty, the
31 0
test of fitness. It enormously increases the cost 
of carrying on the business of the city, and it 
decreases the returns to the citizens from such 
cost.
It lowers the standards of public and private 
morality by bringing all classes of citizens into 
constant and familiar contact with "graft" as a 
mode of conducting business affairs.
Its effect upon the finances of the city is 
already becoming apparent. The annual tax on 
property, when the rate and the method of 
valuation are considered together, is high and 
there is every indication that it will be higher. 
Rents will of necessity advance and in the end the 
burden will fall most heavily on that large class 
of the community who are dependent upon their 
daily labour for their support, and whose comfort 
depends upon the relation between wages and the 
cost of living.25
"Conditions" were "fast becoming intolerable," particularly 
so to a segment of the business community that was becoming 
increasingly significant in the early twentieth century.26 
That is, those dynamic elements of the new professional 
communities (such as scientific management, public health, 
public administration and political science) which had newly 
emerged in turn-of-the-century America, and which Samuel 
Hays has identified as being in the vanguard of the 
municipal reform movement.2? More recently, Kenneth Fox has 
unravelled the intricate tangle of changes in legal, 
governmental and political thought and practice which helped 
to produce a new national model of urban government in the 
early twentieth century.28 Fox identifies a national 
coalition of elite reform activists, made up of experts in 
municipal law, political scientists, progressive city 
officials and statisticians at the federal Bureau of Census, 
as being responsible for producing a new "functional mode"
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of government, that is, a national social scientific 
approach to the theory and practice of urban government.^9
In her examination of the early twentieth century non­
partisan reform movement in Philadelphia however, Bonnie Fox 
concludes that "the so-called "Philadelphia progressives" 
resembled Richard Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's, 
conducting Samuel P. Hays' dispassionate type of campaign 
.for municipal efficiency."^^ Fox's conclusion is based on 
her analysis of Blankenburg's Mayoral Election Campaign 
Committee, whose composition suggests to her that "the 
Philadelphia reformers of 1911 in fact, were the civic 
leaders of an earlier era. They had previously participated 
in movements for municipal improvement."^^
Bonnie Fox's assessment, however, stands in need of 
qualification. In my view she overstates the degree to 
which the Philadelphia progressives were "the civic leaders 
of an earlier era," and that it was "the younger members of 
the Committee of One Hundred" who became "the leaders of the 
(reform) groups that f o l l o w e d . A  comparison of the 
membership register of the Committee of One Hundred with the 
membership rolls of the various reform "groups that 
followed" for instance, reveals that 60 percent (91) of the 
Committee's members were not affiliated to any future reform 
organisation, and that an additional 27 members' commitment 
to the non-partisan cause stretched only so far as enlisting 
to join the "public watchdog" committee, the C.M.A. (see 
Appendix 2). As far as can be ascertained it is possible to 
identify only 12 (8%) out of the 153 members as being active
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participants in future non-partisan reform groups.
"Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's," constituted then, I
would suggest, only one element of the non-partisan reform
movement in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia. The problem
with Bonnie Fox's study of the Philadelphia progressives is
that it does not reveal the full range and depth of those
committed to non-partisan reform. It seems that there were
in fact two cosmopolitan "elites" simultaneously interacting
and competing for power and prestige at this time; one
comprising of Mugwumps and their descendants and the other
consisting largely of young middle class professional men.
As we saw earlier, it was Franklin S. Edmonds and "young
(professional) men of independence and spirit" like himself
who were in the forefront of the City Party's struggle
against the "Organisation" in 1905.^4 Clinton R. Woodruff
also observed, that
it is an interesting fact to note that the leaders 
of the opposition to the recent [1905] proposed 
extension of the Gas Lease were mainly young men 
who had been actively identified with the 
Municipal League and who had received their 
training in public works while identified with it.
Woodruff suggested that this development was due to the fact
that (unlike the Committee of One Hundred), the League had
been "a persistent and not an intermittent factor in the
fight for good g o v e r n m e n t I n d e e d  the League was not
only better organised but it differed "essentially from the
(self-constituted) Committee of One Hundred in being
thoroughly representative."^^ "That element of
representation in the American and republican sense" was
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reflected in the membership of the League's Central Board of 
M a n a g e r s . A n  examination of those who sat on the League's 
Board of Management between 1891 and 1904 reveals the true 
diversity of the Philadelphia non-partisan reform movement. 
The League's Managers included Mugwumps, like the retired 
Quaker businessman Charles Richardson, insurance broker 
Robert R. Corson and publisher Robert R. Dearden; 
descendants of Mugwumps, such as locomotive manufacturer 
George Burnham Jr., lawyer R. Francis Wood and reform 
pamphleteer Herbert Welsh; University of Pennsylvania 
academics like political scientists Walter J. Branson,
Edmund J. James and Leo S. Rowe, and the Dean of the Law 
School, William Draper Lewis; young lawyers such as Clinton 
R. Woodruff, Samuel B. Scott, George D. Porter and Walter S. 
Mclnnes and engineers like James Christie and James Mapes 
Dodge as well as newspaper editor George E. Mapes and a 
sprinkling of financiers, physicians, clergymen, and small 
businessmen (see Table 9.1).
The Committee of Seventy was similarly eclectic in its 
composition, as its founders deliberately intended it to 
be.39 Its members included trade unionist Alfred D.
Calvert, mechanical engineer Morris L. Cooke, drygoods 
merchant Frederic H. Strawbridge, soap manufacturer Samuel 
Fels, physician George Woodward, book publisher John C. 
Winston, banker George Norris and dye manufacturer J. Henry 
Scattergood, as well as former Mugwumps Joshua L. Bailey, 
William W. Justice, William H. Jenks, Lewis Madeira, Walter 
Wood and Francis B. Reeves, and descendants of Mugwumps like
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Table 9.1. Members of the Board of Management of the 
Municipal League of Philadelphia, 1891-1904
Name Occupation Other
Political
Affiliations*
Residence
(Ward)
Finley
Acker
grocer C.M.A., C50 
A-CC
22
John S. 
Adams
lawyer C.M.A,
Charles C. 
Binney
Walter J. 
Branson
Charles A. 
Brinley
George D. 
Bromley
Franklin N, 
Brewer
lawyer
university
professor
manufacturer
carpet
manufacturer
C.S.R.A.
C.M.A., C95 
C.S.R.A.
C.M.A., C50
retail manager, C70, C.P. 
John Wanamaker's
29
22
George 
Burnham Jr
locomotive
manufacturer
C.S.R.A., C.M.A, 
C70
James
Christie
engineer C.P. 21
Frank B. 
Clapp
Robert R. 
Corson
lawyer
tailor
C.M.A., C70
C.M.R.A., Cl 00 
C.S.R.A., C.M.A, 
C50
25
John P. 
Croasdale
lawyer C.M.A., C95
Robert R. 
Dearden
publisher U.P., C.P 32
James A. 
Develin
law
professor
C70, C.P 34
Horace A. 
Doan
traction
entrepreneur
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D. Webster 
Dougherty
Charles 
W. Dulles
Theodore 
M. Etting
Lincoln 
L. Eyre
George S. 
Fisher
Cyrus D. 
Foss Jr.
J. Roberts 
Foulke
Harry B. 
French
Ezra P. 
Gould
William H. 
Haines
Alexander
Henry
T. Comly 
Hunter
Edmund J. 
James
Joseph R. 
Keim
Joseph W. 
Kenworthy
Charles A. 
Lagen
Louis J. 
Lautenbach
lawyer
physician
Unitarian
minister
lawyer
lawyer
lawyer
financier
druggist
clergyman
hardware
manufacturer
clergyman
iron
manufacturer
university
professor
wool
manufacturer
wool
manufacturer
lawyer
physician
C.M.A., A-CC 27
C.S.R.A., C95
C.S.R.A., C.M.A.
C.M.A. 28
C.P. 10
C.M.A
C.M.A.
A-CC 27
C.S.R.A., C.M.A. 22 
C70
C.M.A.
U.P.
23
C50
C.M.A., A-CC
24
26
William D. 
Lewis
law
professor
C95, C70 22
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George E.
Mapes
Thomas
Martindale
Joseph
May
S.D. McConnell
H. Gordon 
McCouch
Walter S. 
Mclnnes
George G. 
Mercer
N. DuBois 
Miller
Samuel
Morris
Joseph P. 
Mumford
William I. 
Nichols
John E. 
Oughton
Henry L. 
Phillips
George D. 
Porter
Frank P. 
Prichard
E. Clinton 
Rhoads
Charles
Richardson
Craig D. 
Ritchie
John B. 
Roberts
editor,
The Record
grocer
clergyman
Episcopal
minister
lawyer
lawyer
lawyer
lawyer, 
banker
banker
banker
clergyman
textile
manufacturer
banker
U.P.
C.M.A.
A-CC
A-CC
32
C.P.
C.S.R.A., C.M.A, 
C50, C95
C.S.R.A.,
C50, C95
C95
C95
O.P., C.P
insurance broker, C.P. 
real estate agent
lawyer
lawyer
1 5
22
28
22
retired
businessman
lawyer
physician
C.S.R.A., C70
C50, A-CC
Cl 00, C.S.R.A. 10
C.M.A., C50, C95
C.S.R.A., C.M.A.
C.M.A., C95
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Leo S .
Rowe
Samuel B. 
Scott
W. S. Stewart
William H. 
Tenbrook
David
Wallerstein
Herbert
Welsh
Theodore
Wernwag
William 
White Jr.
R. Francis 
Wood
Clinton R. 
Woodruff
university
professor
lawyer
physician
manufacturer
lawyer
pamphleteer
importer
lawyer
lawyer
lawyer
C.P.
C95
C70
C.S.R.A., C.M.A, 
C50, C95, A-CC
C.M.A., C50 
A-CC
C.S.R.A., C.M.A,
C.S.R.A., C95
24
22
1 0 
1 5
22
22
Sources: the same as for Appendix 2.
A-CC
C50
C95
Cl 00
C70
U.P.
Anti-Combine Committee
Citizens' Committee of Fifty for a New 
Philadelphia
Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City 
Government
C.M.A. Citizens' Municipal Association
C.M.R.A. Citizens' Municipal Reform Association 
C.P. City Party
C.S.R.A. Civil Service Reform Association
Committee of One Hundred 
Committee of Seventy 
Union Party
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Francis R. Cope Jr., T. Morris Perot Jr., James Bateman Jr., 
and Coleman Sellers Jr., (see Table 9.2).
Representatives of the various elements that made up the 
local non-partisan reform movement in Philadelphia were also 
conspicuous in the national coalition of elite reform 
activists that Kenneth Fox identifies as being responsible 
for devising a new systematic approach to the problems of 
urban government. Philadelphia lawyer Clinton R. Woodruff, 
for example, acted as the secretary, treasurer and counsel 
for the local Municipal League, but also served as the first 
Secretary (1894-1920) of the national organisation as 
w e l l . 40 Similarly, Mugwump descendant and locomotive 
manufacturer George Burnham Jr., occupied simultaneously the 
Presidency of the Philadelphia Municipal League and the 
Treasuryship (1894-1919) of the National Municipal League.
In addition both Woodruff and Burnham, along with university 
professor Leo S. Rowe and Mugwump businessman Charles 
Richardson, sat on the committee which drafted the National 
Municipal League's first model city charter, published in 
1899.41
Philadelphia engineer Morris L. Cooke also provides an 
excellent example of the progressive city official which 
Kenneth Fox has argued was so important in generating 
"innovations" in urban government. A close friend, 
neighbour and professional disciple of Frederick W. Taylor, 
Cooke, in his capacity as Mayor Blankenburg's Director of 
Public Works (1912-16), "brought scientific management into 
the mainstream of municipal p r o g r e s s i v i s m . " 4 2
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Table 9.2. The Committee of Seventy, 1905-6
Name Occupation Other
Political
Affiliations*
Residence
(Ward)
Joshua L. 
Daily
John E. 
Baird
James
Bateman Jr
J . Claude 
Bedford
George I. 
Bodine
Franklin N, 
Brewer
Thomas 
Bromley Jr
John D. 
Brown
Reynolds D 
Brown
William C. 
Bullitt
George 
Burnham Jr
Alfred D. 
Calvert
Samuel
Christian
Solis J. 
Cohen
Henry H. 
Collins
Morris L. 
Cooke
dry goods 
merchant
marble
manufacturer
wool
merchant
lawyer
banker
Cl 00, C.S.R.A 
C.M.A., C50
C.M.A., U.P.
U.P., C.P
C.M.A.
retail manager M.L., C.P 
John Wanamaker's
carpet
manufacturer
lawyer
lawyer
lawyer
locomotive
manufacturer
President of 
Typographical 
Union, No.2
shoe
manufacturer
physician
cardboard
manufacturer
engineer
C.M.A.
C.M.A.
C.S.R.A,
U.P.
C.S.R.A., M.L. 
C.M.A.
C.P.
C.S.R.A., C.P.
22
34
22
Palmyra
22
Berwyn
Pa.
34
22
Bryn Mawr 
22
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Francis R. 
Cope Jr.
Neville B. 
Craig
Frank M.
Day
Henry T. 
Dechert
James A. 
Develin
Louis
Di Berardino
James M. 
Dodge
Russell
Duane
Franklin S. 
Edmonds
Frederick G. 
Elliott
Samuel S. 
Fels
Simon B. 
Fleischer
Cyrus D.
Foss Jr.
Alfred C. 
Gibson
George R. 
Goodman
Emil
Guenther
William H. 
Haines
shipping
merchant
retired
businessman
merchant
lawyer
law
professor
banker
engineer
lawyer
law
professor
22
C.P.
M.L., C.P
C.P
M.L.
C.P.
C.P.
C.P.
soap
manufacturer
yarn
manufacturer
lawyer
gas fixture 
manufacturer
printer
coal and lumber 
dealer
hardware
manufacturer
C50
M.L., C.P
C.P.
C.P.
22
27
34
22
22
1 0
C.S.R.A., M.L 
C.M.A.
1 0
22
33
29
22
Walter P. 
Hall
catering
supplier
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Clarence L. 
Harper
Joseph S. 
Harris
H. La Barre 
Jayne
Charles F. 
Jenkins
Robert D. 
Jenks
William H. 
Jenks
William W. 
Justice
J. Percy 
Keating
Mahlon N. 
Kline
C. Hartman 
Kuhn
E. Frank 
Leake
Max
Levy
Theodore J. 
Lewis
William D. 
Lewis
Lewis C. 
Madeira
Thomas
McCaffrey
Francis S. 
Mcllhenny
J. Gibson 
Mcllvaine
Henry F . 
Mitchell
insurance
broker
railway company 
director
lawyer
water company 
director
C.P.
lawyer
cotton
manufacturer
wool
merchant
lawyer, 
banker
drug
wholesaler
banker
physician
photo engravers' 
supplier
steel
manufacturer
law
professor
insurance
broker
coal
dealer
lawyer
lumber
dealer
grocer, 
banker
C.S.R.A
C.M.R.A., Cl 00 
C.S.R.A,, C.M.A,
Cl 00, C.S.R.A. 
C.M.A., C.P.
C.S.R.A., C.P.
C.M.A., C.P
C.M.A.
C.M.A., A—CC
C.S.R.A., C.M.A. 
M.L., C95 
Cl 00, C.S.R.A. 
C.P.
C.P.
1 5
22
22
22
22
22
22
36
22
East
Downington
322
George W. 
Norris
investment
banker
Harlan
Page
William H 
Pfahler
cement
manufacturer
heating
manufacturer
C.P.
C.P.
22
Frank P. 
Prichard
lawyer M.L., C.S.R.A. 
U.P.
T. Morris 
Perot
drug
wholesaler
C.M.R.A., C.M.A, 
C.S.R.A., Cl 00, 
C50
Francis B. 
Reeves
president,
Girard
National Bank
C.M.A., C.S.R.A 
Cl 00, C50, C95 
A-CC, C.P.
22
Charles
Richardson
James S. 
Rogers
J. Henry 
Scattergood
William H. 
Scott
retired
businessman
lawyer
dye
manufacturer
printer
C.M.A., C.S.R.A, 
C100, M.L., C50 
C95, A-CC
C.P.
C.M.A.
1 0
24
24
22
Coleman 
Sellers Jr.
machine
manufacturer
Theodore B. 
Stork
lawyer 22
Frederic H. 
Strawbridge
Allen
Sutherland
dry goods C.M.A.
merchant
chairman, Erie C.P.
National Bank
22
38
Ellerslie
Wallace
retired
businessman
David
Wallerstein
lawyer M.L. 22
Thomas R. 
White
lawyer 22
Asa S. 
Wing
financier C.S.R.A., C.P 27
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John C. book C.P. 22
Winston publisher
Stuart iron C.S.R.A., C.M.A. 10
Wood manufacturer C50, A-CC, C.P.
Walter iron Cl 00, C.S.R.A. 10
Wood manufacturer C.M.A., A-CC, U.P.
George physician C.P. 22
Woodward
Sources: the same as for Appendix 2 plus Boyd's Co-
Partnership and Residence Business Directory of 
Philadelphia, (Philadelphia, 1906).
* other than M.L. for Municipal League, the abbreviations 
used are the same as for Table 9.1.
If it is accepted then that the "Philadelphia progressives" 
were rather more diverse than Bonnie Fox's depiction of them 
as "Hofstadter's Mugwumps of the 1880's," it is necessary to 
explain what drew these disparate elements into a reform 
coalition aligned against the "Organisation". What did 
Mugwumps, their descendants, and dynamic elements of the 
urban business and professional communities have in common? 
One factor that pulled these various groups into a reform 
coalition was the traditional and conventional one, that of 
political "outs" combining together in an attempt to replace 
the "ins".'^^ Another factor seems to have been a common 
aversion to urban democracy as expressed in party 
government, and conversely a strong commitment to purge 
local government of party politics and transform it into an 
institution run according to the social values of the middle 
and upper classes.^4
The pursuit of governmental efficiency, as a mutual
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objective, was also an important area of co-operation among 
the various reform elements.^5 Mugwump reformers in 
Philadelphia were not mainly motivated by status anxieties 
as defined by Hofstadter and Mowry but by the threat that 
political corruption posed to the security of their private 
and business wealth.^6 in contrast, young middle class 
professional men were drawn to the reform cause, as Robert 
H. Wiebe has shown, through the "inherent dynamics" of their 
occupations rather than because of their class 
c o n n e c t i o n s . B u t  whatever the motivation that inspired 
these two elites, governmental efficiency was the common 
goal that pulled them together. That is, both wanted to 
apply the same principles (and hence the rule of the same 
forces) in the political world as those that were 
rationalising the economic order.
In tracing the changing meaning of "efficiency", Martin J. 
Schiesl has recently shown that, by the turn of the century, 
this concept no longer meant purifying local government by 
replacing "bad" officials with "good" ones, but instead 
encompassed three key objectives: the "businesslike" 
management of municipal affairs (or non-partisanship); the 
provision of a strong executive; and the separation of 
politics from administration.^® These key objectives also 
formed the basis of the recurring demands that were made by 
Philadelphia reformers at this time, in their various 
platforms, declarations of principles and programmes, which 
were designed to thwart machine government. For example, 
all the reform groups sought "the separation of municipal
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affairs from state and national politics"; "honest and fair 
elections"; "the honest, open, economical and efficient 
administration of our municipal affairs by enlightened 
methods and upon business principles"; "the sincere and 
impartial enforcement of civil service provisions of the 
City Charter"; "the absolute divorce of officeholders from 
political control"; "the granting of franchises for limited 
periods only and after proper compensation"; "the impartial 
award of contracts after due publicity and open 
competition"; and finally, "a comprehensive system of public 
improvements."49 Some reform agencies were dedicated 
entirely to improving the technical aspects of city 
administration rather than the political. The Philadelphia 
Housing Commission and the Bureau of Municipal Research, for 
instance, were both committed to promoting the efficient and 
scientific management of municipal b u s i n e s s . Prominent 
reformers and efficiency-minded businessmen such as Samuel 
Fels, George Burnham Jr., George W. Norris and Dr. George 
Woodward sat on the Board of Directors of both 
organisations.
The pursuit of, and demand for, governmental efficiency not 
only drew young professionals, old Mugwumps and their 
descendants together, but also mobilised against the machine 
additional elements of the city's business community and of 
its native middle class, because such an objective well 
served the interests of these groups. The municipal reform 
movement was able to extend its appeal still further 
because it developed an ideology of compelling force. The
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non-partisan reformers argued that the cleavages of national
politics (on issues such as the tariff) were irrelevant to
the concerns of municipal government, and should not be
permitted to cloud the enormous commonality of interests
among the propertied classes in urban politics.
Philadelphia progressive and political satirist Edmund Sage,
for example, in his novel Masters of the City (1909),
remonstrated with those who were taken in by the cry of
"party regularity", in the following manner:
Because the machine here is called Republican - 
the same as in New York it is called Democratic - 
if you are not with the Machine, you are not with 
your party. That is the answer of the Machine to 
every demand for civic betterment. You demand 
reform and the answer is: "Vote for Smith, Jones,
Brown, and the whole Republican ticket! Hurrah!"
Thousands of men do not take time to analyse this 
statement. Can high or low tariffs clean our 
streets: can silver or gold standards give us 
improved pavements; or transit; or schools; or 
poor little kids good playgrounds? What has Taft 
or Bryan or Debs to do with public bath houses or 
with well-lighted streets; the suppression of 
gambling; the proper regulation of recognised 
dangerous amusements? "Nothing", you say. Yet as 
soon as you start to talk that way, the whip is
cracked and the cry goes out: "Vote for THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY!"
The Municipal League also regarded its main role as being 
an "educational" one; that is, "to demonstrate to the public 
the advantages to be derived from the absolute separation of 
national and state politics from municipal p o l i t i c s . I t  
sought to achieve this objective by publishing a series of 
tracts and addresses on municipal affairs which argued that 
not only should the business corporation be used as a model 
for reorganising local government but also that the city was
itself in fact a corporation; "a joint-stock affair in which
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the taxpayers are the stockholders."^4 one early League
address, written by Theodore Etting in 1894, for instance,
pleaded to local "shareholders" not to sacrifice the
interests of the city for the sake of national party ties in
the following way:
the prosperity of our cities............ can only be
obtained by the entire separation of the conduct 
of city affairs from any connection with National 
or State politics.
We have from time to time had independent 
movements, which have sometimes resulted in the 
election of good men and the defeat of bad men,...
But what I wish particularly to impress upon you 
is that no endeavour heretofore has been made to 
transact the affairs of the city upon a proper 
businesslike footing. If you or I, holding a few 
shares of the stock of any company can go to its 
annual meeting and vote for its directors without 
any inquiry in regard to them other than their 
fitness or capacity, why should not that be the 
principal inquiry which should be made with regard 
to the very much larger number of shares which we 
hold in this co-operative enterprise in which we 
are engaged, the government of this city?^^
Reform efforts to persuade upright citizens that they had a 
common interest in local politics were not just restricted 
to political arguments about the relevance of partisanship 
to city affairs. There was also a moral dimension to the 
reformers’ c a m p a i g n . Woodruff for instance, insisted that 
the question of municipal government was as much a moral one 
as it was a political or economic one, while the Committee 
of Seventy stated succinctly that the "Organisation" 
maintained "its control" over the city "through a 
combination of the police, the criminal classes, and the 
election o f f i c e r s . M o r e  sensationally, the city's Law 
and Order Society, at the turn of the century, exposed the
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"corrupt alliance" that existed between the "Organisation" 
and the White Slave syndicate in Philadelphia. The 
Society's agents discovered that in return for bribes and 
illegally registered votes, the police, "unscrupulous 
officials", and "corrupt politicians" furnished aid and 
protection to white slave dens, gambling houses and speak­
easies in the city's "Tenderloin District" (wards 11, 12 and 
13).58
By publicising the links between the "Organisation" and the 
city's criminal classes, reformers such as Rudolph 
Blankenburg and newspaper editor Louis Seaber, attempted to 
warn (and at the same time, recruit into the reform 
coalition) members of the native middle class, of the threat 
posed by the city's "idle and vicious classes" to the city's 
moral and political community.^9 Such propaganda seems to 
have worked for D. Clarence Gibboney, the Law and Order 
Society's secretary and "The Terror of Philadelphia's Evil- 
Doers", was only narrowly defeated by 400 votes in the 
Republican primary election for District Attorney in 1909.^^ 
Again, two years later, Gibboney was to present the only 
serious challenge to Blankenburg in the Keystone Party's 
primary election for the Mayoralty.
In Philadelphia, as in other cities, moral and political 
reform converged and interwove to produce in electoral 
terms, as we saw in chapter 7, a substantial class-based 
core of opposition to the "Organisation"; a fitting tribute 
to the efforts of the non-partisans in convincing the 
propertied classes of their commonality of interest in local
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p o l i t i c s . H a v i n g  mobilised the city's wealthy native born 
white population into a reform coalition the non-partisans 
sought to challenge the "Organisation's" hegemony in local 
politics; how successful were they?
"CORRUPT AND CONTENTED"?
The short answer is that they were not very successful at 
all. We have seen already that in the elections to city and 
county office reformers were restricted to just two 
successes between 1887 and 1933, and even then it can be 
argued that the so-called "victories" of 1905 and 1911 were 
due more to errors of judgement made by the city "boss", and 
divisions within the "Organisation", than they were to a 
genuine commitment to reform on the part of the 
electorate.
In his analysis of reform insurgency in 1905, for instance, 
Lloyd Abernethy suggests that the City Party's victory was a 
direct consequence of a "serious blunder" made by the 
"Organisation". That is, if Durham had not "selected this 
time" to implement his plan to lease the city's gas works to 
the "U.G.I.", then "it is quite probable," Abernethy 
speculates, "that the movement, like many in the past would 
have gradually subsided. Abernethy bases his opinion
partly on the fact that the City Party owed much of its 
victory to "Mayor Weaver's laudable, if not altruistic, 
decision to bolt the machine leadership (by vetoing the gas 
bill) at the crucial moment," for the Mayor's betrayal "gave
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the movement not only more colour and respectability but the 
support of the vast city administration as well."^^
An analysis of the election returns in 1911 for the 
Republican mayoral nominee George Earle Jr., also suggests 
that Blankenburg's victory was due as much to a temporary 
split within the "Organisation", as it was to a popular 
upsurge in reform sentiment. For example, in the November 
general election which Blankenburg won by the slender 
majority of 3,333 votes, Earle polled only 131,123 votes 
which was almost 60,000 votes less than the total number of 
registered Republican voters who had participated in the 
party's primary election, the previous month.^6 in that 
particular election, Earle, the Penrose-backed nominee, had 
narrowly outpolled William Vare by 105,455 votes to 82,256, 
in a bitterly fought contest.
Earle's subsequent poor performance in the contest against 
Blankenburg, it seems, was due to the fact that the Vare 
brothers were (contrary to William Vare's later claims) 
unable to bury their differences with Penrose, and therefore 
"cut" the Republican ticket in the general e l e c t i o n .^8 The 
brothers' lack of enthusiasm for Earle's candidacy is 
reflected in the ward returns made by their home base (South 
Philadelphia) in the two elections. For example, in the 
Republican primary election, Vare managed to secure 88.5 
percent, 83.9 percent, and 92.6 percent of the vote in the 
first, twenty-sixth and thirty-ninth wards respectively, yet 
in the general election these three wards furnished Earle
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with only 60.6 percent, 50.9 percent and 55.8 percent of 
their respective total votes - a reduction of over one-third 
for the Republican nominee.^9 Overall Earle received just 
60.8 percent of the total vote in South Philadelphia which 
was 10 percent less than Reyburn (70.9%) had achieved in 
1907, and almost 20 percent less than Weaver (81.9%) and 
Smith (79.0%) managed in the 1903 and 1916 mayoral 
e l e c t i o n s . E a r l e ' s  reduced majority in South 
-Philadelphia, combined with the increased pluralities that 
Blankenburg enjoyed in North and West Philadelphia, resulted 
in the "Old Dutch Cleanser" being elected to the Mayoralty 
by the narrowest of margins.
It can also be argued that the gains that the reform 
"victories" of 1905 and 1911 secured were not as great as 
contemporary reformers believed them to be. For instance, 
the most significant and "permanent result of the 
Philadelphia upheaval of 1905-6," from a reform viewpoint, 
resulted from the special session of the state legislature 
held in spring 1906, which enacted a series of reforms that 
Progressives had considered long o v e r d u e . I n  the wake of 
electoral defeats for the Republican party in November 1905, 
not only in Philadelphia but also statewide, party leader 
Boies Penrose had responded promptly to reform pressure for 
a special session of the legislature, in the hope that he 
would be able to woo the insurgents back to the G.O.P. The 
major measures passed by the thirty day special session 
provided for the personal registration of voters; a stricter 
civil service code (Shern Law) to prohibit political
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activity by city employees; a civil service (Gable) bill to 
establish a bona fide merit system in Philadelphia; a 
corrupt practices act requiring candidates to file reports 
of campaign receipts and expenditures and a uniform system 
of primary elections for all candidates for city and county 
offices.
This list of reforms, although impressive, did not result in 
^ "revolution in Philadelphia politics" as Clinton R. 
Woodruff hoped, nor bring about "the end of the oligarchy" 
as George Woodward predicted because, unfortunately for the 
reformers, these new laws were not administered as they 
intended them to be.74 Under the Personal Registration Act 
of 1906, for instance, lists of qualified voters in each of 
the city's election divisions were to be drawn up by four 
registrars (two each from the majority and minority 
parties), selected by a Registration Commission, which was 
in turn appointed by the state Governor. This measure, by 
replacing the existing voter registration system conducted 
by "assessors" elected at party primary elections, was 
designed to curb the "Organisation's" extra-legal practice 
of registration fraud.75 "Organisation" control over the 
system did not wane however, for 90 percent of the persons 
recommended by the Republican machine to act as registrars 
were appointed by the Commission, and with the eclipse of 
the Democratic party, the "Organisation" soon exercised 
influence over minority registrars as well. Consequently 
registration abuse continued to flourish in the city.75
The attempt to establish a bona fide merit system in
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Philadelphia, by placing the power of appointment to public
office in the hands of a three member commission selected by
the Mayor, was also unsuccessful. This was because the
chief executive (apart from Weaver between 1905 and 1907)
invariably remained loyal to the " O r g a n i s a t i o n " . ^7 That the
good intentions behind the Gable civil service reform bill
of 1906 were not fulfilled is suggested by the report
published in 1919, by the Womens' League for Good Government
(W.L.G.G.), during its campaign for a new city charter. In
its Facts About Philadelphia, the W.L.G.G. argued in favour
of transferring the power of appointment from the Mayor to
the City Council, since under the existing system,
the Mayor appoints the Civil Service Commission 
and can therefore control it politically. A Civil 
Service Commission to examine the Mayor's 
appointees which is itself appointed by the Mayor 
is a laughable absurdity and is merely a fiction 
to appease the public.7°
Again, the effort to prohibit political activity by city 
employees, by forbidding them from soliciting political 
assessments and from "taking an active part in politics," 
proved to be an abject failure in practice. This was 
because under the new civil service code the provision for 
enforcing the Shern Law lay in the hands of the employee's 
superior officer, that is, the heads of each of the city's 
departments. In practice, these "Organisation" stalwarts 
simply either ignored the Shern Law or refused to enforce 
it.79 The Committee of Seventy, for instance, was 
frequently inundated with complaints about the political 
activity of officeholders, and in particular the actions of
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police officers. In just one single election campaign 
alone, that of 1911, the Committee investigated over 1500 
alleged violations of the Shern Act. The Committee, in 
turn, filed complaints against police officers and other 
city employees with the appropriate head of department "but 
no action was ever taken against the o f f e n d e r s . "^0
Morris L. Cooke, Blankenburg‘s Director of Public Works, 
also discovered on taking office that approximately 94 
percent of the city's employees paid political assessments 
to the Republican "Organisation" even though "it was, and is 
against the law to solicit these subscriptions."®^ Given 
that the Shern Law had "remained a dead letter until you 
(Blankenburg) came into office," Cooke and the other 
departmental heads of government set about eliminating the 
solicitation of "voluntary contributions" by city employees, 
and disciplining any officeholder found guilty of "taking an 
active part in p o l i t i c s . O n c e  Blankenburg left office, 
however, there was a gradual resumption of political 
activity by public officeholders and also of the
practice of levying political assessments from city 
employees.
Finally, the Corrupt Practices Act, like the Shern law, was 
also ignored or poorly enforced, while the Uniform Primary 
Act, which in theory placed the selection of party 
candidates for public office on a fairer and more 
competitive basis, did not in practice affect the ability of 
the city "boss" to control Republican party nominations.®®
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These various reforms then, although welcomed by Woodruff, 
as "representing a very substantial measure of progress in 
the direction of protecting the fundamental liberties of the 
people and advancing the cause of decent and effective 
government," subsequently failed to "end the Oligarchy" 
because they were not effectively implemented.®^ Local 
interest in reform following the special session, moreover, 
noticeably and characteristically waned, as Penrose and 
Durham had hoped. Mayor Weaver defected back to the 
"Organisation" in November 1906, and the City party itself 
dissolved quickly therafter.®^ Charles E. Carpenter, 
Chairman of the City Party's Campaign Committee when it won 
the election of November 1905, even endorsed Republican 
candidate John E. Reyburn for the Mayoralty in February, 
1907, along with the rest of the "Organisation" ticket.®®
Again, with regard to the reform "victory" of 1911, 
Blankenburg's term of office was not the roaring success
O Q
that contemporary reformers suggested it to be.° Indeed 
the fact that Blankenburg kept his campaign promise, that 
his administration would be a non-partisan one committed to 
putting city operations on a business basis, alienated his 
supporters, as much as it did the "Organisation".^® For 
example, most reform advocates welcomed the inclusion in the 
Mayor's cabinet of such able and dedicated professional men 
as Morris L. Cooke (Public Works), George D. Porter (Public 
Safety), George W. Norris (Wharves, Docks and Ferries), 
Herman Loeb (Supplies) and A. Merrit Taylor (Transit), 
particularly since they were all committed to developing an
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efficient program of public services.
Cooke for instance, finding that there was only one trained 
engineer among 1,000 employees in the Highways Bureau, 
replaced inept political appointees with technical experts. 
He also modernised office routine and initiated on-the-job 
training, paid vacations, loan schemes and other benefits 
designed to meet the needs of the department's 4,000 workers 
and their f a m i l i e s . I n d e e d  Cooke confided to the Mayor 
(and Blankenburg subsequently agreed with him) that "without 
a doubt the biggest single change brought about in this 
department during your administration will be in the status 
of the individual e m p l o y e e . C o o k e  also ended collusion 
between public officials and contractors (as did all 
Blankenburg's departmental heads), and drew up standard 
specifications and awarded city contracts to the "lowest and 
best" bidder, only after open bidding for public work.^4 
was also upon Cooke's insistence that municipal complaint 
books were made available in various locations across the 
city and all grievances promptly investigated.^^
Cooke's cabinet colleagues also matched his enthusiasm for 
efficiency in their respective departments. George D. 
Porter, for example, determined to insulate the police and 
fire departments from machine influence, set up a training 
school for recruits and abolished the political assessment 
of employees in both departments.^^ In total, it has been 
estimated that the Blankenburg administration saved the city 
$5,000,000.97 Yet in spite of such public economy and 
improvements in city services like increased expenditure on
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local schools, and the reconstruction of Philadelphia 
General Hospital; the increase in municipal wharves for 
ocean trade; the abolition of hazardous grade crossings, and 
a blueprint for the construction of the Broad Street subway; 
Blankenburg's administration failed to satisfy not only the 
electorate (which rejected the Mayor's protege George D. 
Porter when he ran for the Mayoralty in 1916), but also its
supporters.98 why?
Firstly, and ironically, it seems that Blankenburg's 
decision to honour his campaign pledge to respect the civil 
service system and prohibit political activity by municipal 
employees, alienated the Keystone party workers who had 
helped to elect him to office. Dismissing him as a 
"Benedict Arnold, an ingrate," these job hungry Keystoners 
deserted Blankenburg, thereby depriving his administration 
of the support of what had initially been his most committed 
f o l l o w e r s .99 Blankenburg's reluctance to provide the Bull 
Moosers (or Washington Party, as the Roosevelt progressives 
were known in Pennsylvania) with patronage positions after 
1912, also served to increase dissension within local reform 
ranks and diffuse still further the support for his 
administration.^ ^ 0
Secondly, and conversely, Blankenburg's failure to keep a 
campaign promise (that of, lowering gas prices) disappointed 
not only consumers but also disillusioned some of his 
staunchest supporters such as the reform newspaper, the 
North A m e r i c a n . 9^1 Thirdly, Blankenburg's ability to win
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public support was constrained by the actions of the 
"Organisation"-controlled City Council which thwarted those 
mayoral proposals that required legislative a c t i o n . ^^2 p o r  
example, a new housing code was crippled by the counciImen's 
refusal to vote adequate funds to ensure its enforcement.^^3 
Similarly, during the economic recession of 1914-15, the 
City Council also refused to vote funds for Blankenburg's 
modest public works program to help the unemployed. An 
attempt to lower food costs by initiating a system of 
trolley freights to bring cheaper Delaware Valley produce 
into the city was also blocked by the City C o u n c i l . ^^4 &
final example of legislative obstruction is provided by 
Blankenburg's continual failure to persuade the Councils' 
Finance Committee to raise additional public revenue (and 
thereby permit a reduction in gas prices) through a
combination of tax reform, new levies and an increase in the
size of the city's debt l i m i t . ^^5
If such measures had been implemented rather than blocked 
then Porter's prospects of election as Blankenburg's 
successor would have been more realistic. As it turned out, 
the essentially administrative achievements of Blankenburg's 
term of office held insufficient appeal to the city's voters 
to justify them electing the former Director of Public 
Safety to the Mayoralty in November 1915. It should also be
added that some of Blankenburg's reforms were only 
achievements of a short term nature. For example, open 
bidding for city contracts did not prevent the Vare and 
McNichol firms from continuing to receive most of the city's
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business during Blankenburg's term of office, and under his 
successor, Mayor Thomas B. Smith, there was a return to 
"business as usual" (that is, collusion between city 
officials and contractors) for the "Contractor Bosses". 
Similarly, the "emancipation" of the individual employee 
"from the galling yoke of the political g a n g s t e r , "^^7 which 
Blankenburg regarded as "the greatest single change affected 
by my administration" was, as we have seen, only a reality 
for the length of his term of office.
Porter's defeat in the Mayoralty contest of 1915 
precipitated the disbanding of the non-partisan (Franklin) 
party which he and his supporters had formed during the 
campaign, and the defection of the insurgents back to the 
Republican fold.^^8 The Franklin Party was in fact the last 
of the independent reform parties to challenge the 
"Organisation's" hegemony in local politics. Thereafter, as 
we saw in the last chapter, all reform activity remained 
within party ranks, even though this meant the continued 
ascendancy of the "Organisation" in Philadelphia political 
l i f e . T09 Indeed, the major advances towards political 
reform in the post-Blankenburg era - the introduction of a 
new city charter in 1919 and Bill Vare's downfall as city 
"boss" in June 1934 - were not the achievements of 
reformers, but more the result of internal dissension within 
the "Organisation".
The new city charter for Philadelphia approved by the state 
legislature in 1919, for example, was essentially a product 
of the occasional party factional warfare that broke out
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between the Vare brothers and state Republican leader Boies 
Penrose. Penrose supported the charter proposal in the hope 
that by establishing more accountability and responsibility 
in Philadelphia's system of government, not least in the 
creation of a unicameral legislature, it would also threaten 
the Vares* power base in the "Neck" of the city.^^^ Indeed, 
reformer Clinton R. Woodruff identified "U.S. Senator Boies 
Penrose" as being "the greatest single factor in securing 
the passage of the bill."^^^ In a recent review of 
Philadelphia city government, the Committee of Seventy has 
also suggested that "the 1919 charter was more a victory of 
Penrose over Vare than of reformers over corruption.^^
Similarly, although contemporary political scientist John T. 
Salter identified a number of factors: personal ill-health, 
errors of judgement, the onset of the Great Depression, and 
the re-emergence of a two party system in local politics in 
1933, as being responsible for the downfall of William Vare 
as city "boss" in June 1934, he concluded that the "final 
destruction of Vare over the Republican Central Campaign 
Committee was brought about by a palace intrigue rather than 
a revolt from the p e o p l e . T h e  final question that 
presents itself then is: Why were "the people" so supine in 
the face of the "Organisation's" hegemony in local politics; 
Why were the non-partisan reformers not more successful in 
their efforts; Was Philadelphia as "corrupt and contented" 
as Steffens claimed it to be?
Leading reformer and contemporary political scientist
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Professor Frank Goodnow certainly seemed to believe it was, 
for he suggested, after reviewing Steffens' writings, that 
Philadelphia appeared to be the prominent exception to the 
rule that bad city government resulted from undesirable 
social and economic conditions, rather than from failings of 
human n a t u r e . ^ O t h e r  local contemporary reformers such as 
Rudolph Blankenburg, Theophilus Baker, Herbert Welsh and 
Clinton R. Woodruff would, as we saw in the last chapter, 
also have agreed with Goodnow's assessment that in 
Philadelphia "something in the moral character of the people 
militated against good city government. ^^ And yet, as we 
also noted earlier, public apathy and indifference was not 
only a short-lived phenomenon in the city but merely one of 
a number of factors: such as the demise of the Democratic 
party, the local strength of Republican partisanship, the 
"Organisation's" control of the election machinery, its 
astute campaign methods, and its provision of a "personal 
service" to the individual voter, that accounted for the 
Republican machine's electoral supremacy in Philadelphia 
between 1887 and 1933.^^^
There is also I would suggest one other factor which 
contributed to the "Organisation's" electoral success and 
which should be added to the above list and that is, the 
reformers were themselves unfaithful to the principle of 
non-partisanship. Although in theory, the non-partisans 
were committed to separating municipal affairs from state 
and national politics, their behaviour in practice indicates 
that they were not all fully convinced of their own
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propaganda. Indeed the reformers seem to have been 
persistently divided (a weakness exploited by the 
"Organisation") over whether to pursue reform within the 
Republican party, or outside of traditional party lines.
The Committee of Fifty and the Citizens' Committee of 95 for 
example, both split up during the mayoral election campaigns 
of 1891 and 1895 respectively, because they were "hopelessly 
divided" over which candidate they should support in the 
c o n t e s t . ^ I n  the 1895 election campaign, in fact, a 
splinter group from the Citizens' Committee formed "The 
Business Men's Republican Association" in order to endorse 
Martin and Porter's candidate for the Mayoralty, rather than 
support the Anti-Combine's nominee, the distinguished 
Democrat and ex-Governor, Robert E. Pattison.^^®
Many City Party members, as noted earlier, also seem to have 
been insincere in their commitment to non-partisan reform, 
for once the measures guaranteeing "reform within the party" 
had been passed by the Special Session of the state 
legislature in 1906, the reform party virtually collapsed as 
the bulk of its members followed the example of the 
chairman of its Campaign Committee and defected back to the 
Republican party.
In 1911, the reformers were again divided between those who 
participated in the Keystone primary and were genuinely 
committed to the principle of non-partisanship in local 
affairs, and those who took "advantage of the (1906) primary 
act" and supported Dimner Beeber, "the only Republican 
candidate and Platform of Absolute Independence" in the
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Republican primary e l e c t i o n . ^^0 over one-third (35) of the 
hundred members of the Republican Nomination League that 
endorsed Beeber had been conspicuous non-partisan reformers 
prior to the 1911 campaign, in such groups as the Municipal 
League, City Party and Committee of Seventy. They included 
such familiar reform figures as George Burnham Jr., Dr. 
George Woodward, John C. Winston, Frederic H. Strawbridge, 
Thomas Raeburn White and Franklin S. Edmonds (see Table 
9.3) .
What this recurring division within the reform movement over 
the issue of partisanship in local affairs suggests, in my 
view, is that many reform activists found it as difficult as 
the "average Philadelphian" to overcome, as John C. Winston 
put it, the "political trance" induced "by the purring cry 
of party regularity;" that is, to resist their "natural" 
inclination to vote Republican, even when it came to 
municipal e l e c t i o n s . i n d e e d  in the post-Blankenburg era, 
as we have seen, all reform activity remained within party 
ranks. Independent Republicans tended to be more Republican 
than Independent, in that they battled with the 
"Organisation" only at party primaries and not in general 
elections.  ^22
"Good city government" proved elusive in turn-of-the-century 
Philadelphia then, I would suggest, not because of "sinful 
c o n t e n t m e n t " ^ o r  failings of human nature, or because of 
undesirable social and economic conditions in the "City of 
Homes", but because of the city's "hopeless addiction to
344
Table 9.3. Non-Partisan Reformers who joined The Republican
Nomination League, 1911
Name Previous Non-Partisan Affiliation
Municipal
League
City
Party
Committee 
of Seventy
Richard L. Austin 
Reynolds D. Brown 
Samuel J. Buck 
William Burnham 
George Burnham Jr.
B. Frank Clapp 
James M. Dodge 
Franklin S. Edmonds 
V. Frank Gable 
Francis Goodhue 
Emil Guenther 
William H. Haines 
Clarence L. Harper 
Alexander Henry 
E. C. Irwin 
Arthur H. Lea 
Max Levy
Francis A. Lewis 
William M. Longstreth 
J. Gibson Mcllvaine 
Walter S. Mclnnes 
John H. Musser Jr. 
William R. Nicholson
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David C. Nimlet *
Horace T. Potts *
Owen J . Roberts *
William H. Scott *
Haseltine Smith *
Frederic H. Strawbridge *
Albert E. Turner *
.Thomas R. White *
Asa S. Wing * *
John C. Winston * *
Stuart Wood * * *
George Woodward * *
Sources: Republican Nomination League, Advantage of the
Primary Act, 1911; Municipal League, Annual Report of the 
goard of Managers, 1891-2 to 1902-3; Committee of Seventy, 
Sixth Report of the Executive Board, May 8, 1906, pp.2 0-23; 
idem, Report of the Executive Board, March 20, 1912, pp.30- 
34; City Party, Hand-Book, 1905, pp.8-19; all these 
pamphlets were published in Philadelphia and are held at the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
Republicanism", an affliction that affected reformers as 
much as the "average P h i l a d e l p h i a n " . ^^4 ironically, 
therefore, it was the partisanship of the non-partisans that 
not only underpinned the "Organisation's" hegemony in local 
politics, but was also responsible, as much as any of the 
factors listed above, for Philadelphia being what Steffens 
regarded as "the worst governed city in the country.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to examine, using the 
Republican "Organisation” in Philadelphia as the model for 
inquiry, certain issues concerning the urban political 
machine which in my view have not been satisfactorily 
resolved in the existing literature on the subject; namely, 
fundamental questions such as. How can we account for the 
emergence of the urban political machine? Can we draw valid 
distinctions between so-called "bosses"? Which sections of 
the urban population supported the machine, and why? What 
functions has the machine fulfilled in the American city?
What answers, then, have been provided, and what conclusions 
can be drawn, from this analysis of the development of party 
organisation in Philadelphia? In the first place, this 
study has demonstrated that, contrary to the claims of 
contemporary reform observers and later historians, a fully 
fledged political machine did not in fact emerge in 
Philadelphia until the turn of this century. This 
development in the city's politics, was not, in my view, a 
direct consequence of the influx of "new" immigrants into 
Philadelphia at this time even though, as the conventional 
wisdom points out, such newcomers were (along with the poor 
and black population of the inner city) especially 
susceptible to the inducements offered by machine 
politicians, and in spite of the fact that the Republican 
"Organisation" did indeed acquire the characteristic
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electoral basis that one would expect of the classic 
political machine.
Although the conventional view of the political machine 
appears to be confirmed by the election data reported in 
Chapter 1, the appearance is, I suggest, illusory, for as
this study has shown, the creation of a centralised
political structure in Philadelphia came about as a result 
of a series of innovations initiated by state and local 
party leaders which transformed the way in which the 
Republican party organisation functioned at both the state 
and the city level by the turn of the century. Its 
establishment, it was also argued, was in the interest of, 
and apparently supported by, a major segment of the 
Philadelphia business community; namely, a clique of utility 
financiers anxious to reap the benefits that the
centralisation of local political power would bring to their
own efforts to consolidate control of the city's public 
utilities industry. By the time that "new" immigrants began 
arriving in Philadelphia in significant numbers the 
Republican "Organisation" was already established as the 
central force in the government and politics of the city. 
That the "Organisation" subsequently exhibited the 
characteristic electoral base of political machines, as 
portrayed by conventional wisdom, was because it operated as 
a political structure that assimilated most of the city's 
sub-groups as they arrived in Philadelphia.
The Republican political machine in Philadelphia, then, was
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not the creation of the immigrant masses or a product of 
immigrant culture, nor the political expression of life in 
the inner city; it emerged as a consequence of changes, 
orchestrated by the party leadership, in the organisation 
and structure of the city's political life. Changes which 
met the interests of local political and economic elites, 
rather than the "needs" of the urban poor and the immigrant 
masses. In seeking to account for the emergence of the 
political machine then, this study suggests that one should 
focus not just as the traditional accounts do on the 
linkages at the base of the political system (between that 
is machine politicians and the members of their mass 
following), but also on those at the top. It also confirms 
the view that any explanation to be deemed sufficiently 
adequate must account not only for the "style" of machine 
politics (that is, the nature of political attachments) but 
also for changes in the "structure" and organisation of this 
system of politics.
Examining the actual functioning of the party organisation 
to determine whether it operated as its centralised and 
hierarchical structure suggests also helps us to overcome a 
major weakness of conventional theories of the political 
machine, and that is their collective failure to draw 
meaningful distinctions between various so-called "bosses". 
Rather than neatly lumping various party leaders together 
under the label "boss" this study, by identifying the 
differences in the degree of clout exercised by James 
McManes and Israel Durham, for instance, has illustrated the
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wisdom of asking such questions as, to what extent did the 
"boss" control: his followers in party office; the 
distribution of patronage; the membership and decisions of 
the party organisation's local units; the party nominations 
for public office; the behaviour of elected officials 
nominally affiliated to him; the passage of legislation 
through City Council?
Only by finding the answers to such questions is it possible 
to determine to what extent "boss" is an appropriate term 
for a particular party leader. Indeed, it is only by 
defining the precise extent of the party leader's sphere of 
influence that we can avoid the distortion of historical 
reality inherent in the .traditional accounts of machine 
politics, and in addition increase our understanding of the 
role played by the "boss", not only within the party 
organisation, but also in city government.
This study has also suggested that the received wisdom on 
machine politics is equally unsatisfactory in furnishing an 
explanation for the functions of the political machine, as 
it is for its emergence in the American city. In 
particular, I have argued that Robert Merton's functional 
model of the machine (the theory at the root of the current 
preference for bosses over reformers in the literature on 
urban politics) does not provide an accurate or adequate 
explanation for the functions performed by the "boss" and 
his machine.
While accepting that the machine did provide, as in the case
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of the "Organisation", a "personal service" to some city 
inhabitants, this aspect of machine activity has, in my 
view, been exaggerated not only by Merton but also by 
scholars such as Oscar Handlin, Eric McKitrick, Elmer 
Cornwell, Alexander Callow, Seymour Mandelbaum, Zane L. 
Miller, and John Allswang. These apologists for machine 
politics have consistently failed to acknowledge that the 
petty welfare system operated by the party organisation does 
not offset the unpalatable truth (from their viewpoint) that 
the machine, by giving as much aid to those interests who 
got rich off the urban poor, was essentially exploitative of 
its firmest supporters. They have also failed to recognise 
that since political man was independent of, and not 
subservient to, economic man (at least in the case of turn 
of the century Philadelphia) these business interests were 
themselves in turn (potentially) subject to exploitation by 
the machine.
More importantly, these scholars have misled us from 
recognising that the self-serving machine, rather than being 
the natural functional substitute for government as they 
suggest, did in fact function as a blight on the system of 
government in American cities. That is, it was destructive 
of functioning government for the vast majority of 
immigrants and poor people who needed such government the 
most. Thus the machine's role in the city, this study 
suggests, has been of a dysfunctional nature.
Since this study argues that the only real "needs" that the 
machine served were those of its own and of its
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plutocratic allies in the local business community, and not 
those of the urban immigrant poor, it suggests that the 
positive image of bossism that now prevails in the 
literature on urban politics is unjustified. In suggesting 
that the "boss" no longer deserves his "good guy" 
reputation, however, I am not arguing for a return to the 
prejudicies of the progressive era, when reformers were 
depicted as the "good guys" and "bosses" the "bad guys" in 
urban politics. Rather it is my contention that the balance 
needs to be redressed; that is, historians should recognise 
that while reformers may not necessarily have been "bad 
guys" in the urban drama, "bosses" invariably were, more 
often than not.
In my view, then, those scholars who wish to abandon the 
boss-reformer synthesis in order "to rewrite the history of 
urban politics and government along new lines," will need to 
reconsider the role that the "boss" has played in the 
American city, because it is not possible to generate 
alternative ways of viewing urban politics successfully 
unless such initiatives are based on a clear and accurate 
understanding of the emergence of the political machine and 
the functions that it has fulfilled. Only on this basis, I 
maintain, will it be possible to recast the central issue of 
urban politics satisfactorily, and thereby "restore rats, 
fires, taxes, diseases, schools, jobs, crime, transportation 
and utilities to their rightful places as the central 
realities of urban life."^
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Appendix 1 :
The Citizens Municipal Reform Association: Membership, 
Residence, Occupation and other Affiliations
Name Occupation C.M.R.A.^ Reform Union Board Resid
of -ence 
Trade (Ward)
Club League^ 
William B. glue CC 22
Adamson m/fer
Lehman P. m/fer CC 0
Ashmead
Matthew locomotive CC M 6 3 M 2
Baird m/fer
(2nd c
Clement lawyer M M 63 39
Biddle
(39th)
T.A. china CC
Boyd m/fer
Matthew J. m/fer WR 18
Brady
Henry lawyer CC
Budd
George lawyer Sec.
Bull
George L. merchant WR M 6 3 Sec. 7
Buzby
Archibald m/fer CC M
Campbell FC
Joseph painter WR 14
Chapman
George W. newspaper M M 63 M 8
Childs publisher
George M. wool M M 63 M
Coates m/fer
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. Reform
Club
Union
League
Board
of
Trade
Resid
-ence
(Ward)
Lemuel
Coffin
dry goods 
merchant
FC
Benj. B. 
Comegys
banker M M 63 M 27
Edwin R. 
Cope
paper
m/fer
CC
Francis R. 
Cope
shipping
merchant
CC 22
John C. 
Copper
publisher WR 1 3
Robert R. 
Corson
tailor Sec. 
FC
25
Theo. de W 
Cuyler
. lawyer M M 8
James
Devereux
shipping
merchant
WR 5
Samuel
Dickson
lawyer CC
James
Dougherty
m/fer M M 63 0
Anthony J.
Drexel
(6th)
investment
banker
FC V-P 63 M 27
J . Hughes 
Edwards
lawyer EC
CC
John
Farnum
dry goods 
merchant
FC
Joseph C. 
Ferguson
lawyer WR 1 9
Samuel F . 
Flood
lawyer CC
Richard
Garsed
yarn
m/fer
EC
CC
23
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. Reform Union Board Resid
Club League of -ence
Trade (Ward)
J. J.
Gumpper
hotel
proprietor
WR 1 1
Henry
Hagert
lawyer M M
Edward S 
Handy
hardware 
m/f er
CC M
Edward
Hoopes
metal
m/fer
FC
John
Hulme
notary
public
FC
Barton
Jenks
textile
m/fer
M M 63 M
William H. 
Jenks
cotton
m/fer
.M M 63 0
Henry C.
Lea
(27th)
publisher, V-P
scholar EC
Pr. 63 M 24
Henry C. 
Lewis
goods
haulager
M O 63
Joshua B. 
Lippincott 
(18th)
publisher CC V-P 63 0
Amos R. 
Little
dry goods 
merchant
M M 63 M 22
William
Massey
brewer M O 75 O
William
Matthews
m/fer M M
J. Vaughan 
Merrick
iron
m/fer
CC 21
William H. 
Merrick
E. Spencer 
Miller
m/fer
lawyer
M
M
M
M 63
22
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A, Reform Union Board Resid
Club League of -ence
Trade (Ward)
Israel W. 
Morris
E.
Morwitz
Charles
Mcllvaine
Caleb H. 
Needles
John S. 
Newbold Jr.
Col. James 
Page
Joseph E. 
Patterson
T. Morris 
Perot
Thomas 
Potter Jr.
William S. 
Price
William H. 
Rawle
John J. 
Ridgway
Edward
Robins
Coleman
Sellers
Nathan P. 
Shortridge
R. Rundle 
Smith
Thomas
Sparks
coal
owner
publisher
dye
m/fer
druggist
banker
lawyer
banker
maltster
oilcloth 
m/f er
merchant
lawyer 
lawyer 
stockbroker 
m/f er
railroad
executive
lawyer
lead
m/fer
M
WR
EC
CC
EC
CC
M
EC
CC
CC
M
M
M
EC
CC
EC
CC
WR
M
Pr
CC
FC
63 M
M
M
M
0
M
M
M
M
M
M
V-P
63
63
63
63
64
65
74
63
M
O
M
0
27
24
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Name Occupation C .M.R.A. Reform Union 
Club League
Board
of
Trade
Resid
-ence
(Ward)
Thomas H. 
Speakman
lawyer CC 1 0
James
Starr
lawyer M M 64
William B. 
Stephens
cotton goods 
merchant
WR 21
Henry B. 
Tatham
lead pipe 
m/fer
CC
FC
0
Joseph H. 
Trotter
broker FC
Ellerslie
Wallace
physician CC
Samuel
Walsh
physician WR 3
Thomas
Webster
cigar-
maker
EC
CC
John
Welsh
merchant M 0 0
George D. 
Wetherill
drug
wholesaler
WR 8
John P. 
Wetherill
merchant, 
importer
M 63 0 8
Charles
Wheeler
(5th)
iron 
m/f er
Tr. 0 63 0 8
Henry
Winsor
shipping
merchant
FC 69 0 8
Sources: Citizens' Municipal Reform Association, Committee
and Membership, 1871-72, (Philadelphia, 1871); Gopsill's 
Philadelphia City Directory for 1872 (Philadelphia, 1872);
An American Business Aristocracy (New
Philadelphia and
E. Digby Baltzell,
York, 1958), chs.5-7; The North American,
Popular Philadelphians (Philadelphia, 1891); Howard F. 
Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, Philadelphia's Political 
Machine, 1865-1887 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1970), pp.53-4.
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^ The list of members of the C.M.R.A. has been restricted
to those individuals who can be identified as having been
prominent activists within the group, that is, generally, 
those men of substance who served as ward representatives or 
officers of the association.
^ The figure in this column refers to the year that the
particular individual became a member of the Union League.
 ^ The figure in parentheses indicates the position of the
member in the table of the wealthiest individuals in the 
city in 1864.
CC Central Council (elected at large)
EC Executive Committee
FC Finance Committee
M Member
0 Officer
Pr. President
Sec. Secretary
Tr. Treasurer
V-P Vice-President
WR Ward Representative
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Appendix 2:
The Committee of One Hundred: Membership, Residence, 
Occupation and other Affiliations
Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence 
Groups (Ward)
Charles^B. glue 
Adamson m/fer
George N. dry goods 
Allen merchant
M M C50, C95 22
William clothing
Allen m/fer
M 28
Williag insurance
Arrott broker
M 1 5
John T.  ^ coal 
Audenreid owner
M
John bagging
Bailey m/fer
Joshua^L. dry goods
Bailey merchant
Joel J 
Baily
hosiery
merchant
Robert V. druggist 
Barber
M
M
M
0 C50, A-CC 20
0 C50, C70
0 C50, A-CC 9
Thomas W. lawyer 
Barlow
M C95 28
Henry ÿ. sugar
Bartol refiner
Willia^ B. m/fer of 
Bement machinery
Henry
Bettle
wool
merchant
M
C95 27
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
Charles H. banker 
Biles
M 23
Rudolph .yarn
Blankenburg m/fer
M M C50, UP 
KP
James  ^ dry goods 
Bonbright wholesaler
lawyerPeter
Boyd
William^
Brockie’
shipping
merchant
M
M
M
0
1 0
22
Alexander banker 
Brown
M
George
Burnham
locomotive 
m/fer
0 C50, C95 15
Henry S. 
Butcher
oil company 
president
M
George L . merchant 
Buzby
Morris
Carpenter
WR M
J. Hays 
Carson
conveyancer 27
William H. leather 
Castle m/fer
M 1 3
Samuel coal
Castner Jr. merchant
M
Adam A.  ^ builder 
Catanacht
M 30
Thoma:
Child
j eweller
Edward W. banker 
Clark
M 22
Edward H. cotton 
Coates m/fer
M 22
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
Lemuel^
Coffin'
dry goods 
merchant
FC M M
Charles
Cohen
wholesale
stationer
M
Benj. 
Comegys
banker M 27
Edwig R. 
Cope
paper
m/fer
CC M
Robert^R.
Corson
tailor Sec
FC
M 0 C50, ML 25
John Ç 
Craig
merchandise
broker
M 24
Matthew g 
Crawford
retired
gentleman
28
George
Cresson
m/fer of 
machinery
M
Samuel
Croft
confectioner 24
James
Dobson
carpet 
m/fer
Anthony J 
Drexel
investment
banker
FC M 27
William
Dunlap
George H.^ lawyer 
Earle Sr.
M M
George H. 
Earle Jr.
lawyer 1 5
William^
Ellison
clothing
wholesaler
Henry^O.
Evans
retired
merchant
William
Exley
flour
merchant
1 6
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
George 
Farr Jr.
John
Field
j eweller
wholesaler
M
M M C95
W.. W. ^ugar
Frazier Jr. refiner
O M
Clayton
French
dry goods 
wholesaler
M M
Philip C 
Garrett
retired
m/fer
O M C50 22
David
Garrison
Jabez^
Gates
lumber
merchant
grocer
M
M
29
22
Henry g, 
Gibson
liquor
wholesaler
M
John E. 
Graeff
coal
owner
M M
James g 
Graham
coffee
jobber
27
R.H.
Griffith
farmer
Fred. photo-
Gutekunst grapher
M 22
Job
Hambleton
William builder 
Harkness Jr.
M 0 C50, CP 26
Charles
Harrah
steel 
m/fer
O 1 4
Thomas S, 
Harrison
lead 
m/fer
M M C50
Thomas 
Hart Jr.
M
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence 
Groups (Ward)
Eli
Hartley
R.Edgar  ^ gold leaf M O  8
Hastings m/fer
Samuel wholesaler 12
Hecht
F . Oden  ^ trimmings M 27
Horstmann m/fer
William lawyer M 8
Hunt Jr.
John A. physician 3
Hunter
Nathaniel E. real estate M M C95, A-CC
Janney broker
29
Eben Ç. wholesale 29
Jayne druggist
William H. cotton M M M  C70 9
Jenks m/fer
Joseph de F. lawyer 27
Junker
Theodor^ wool M M C95 22
Justice merchant
William W. wool M M CP, C70 22
Justice merchant
Godfrey baker M M  10
Keebler
Charley C. iron 15
Knight m/fer
J. K. physician
Knorr
Hen^y C. publisher, V-P V-P M 24
Lea scholar
Thomas lawyer 0 M 8
beaming
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
Edmund
Lewis
wool
merchant
M
Henry^
Lewis
Amos R. 
Little
dry goods 
merchant
dry goods 
merchant
M
M
M M 22
Edward D, 
Lockwood
envelope
m/fer
M 1 5
J. Freg 
Loeble
m/fer of 
mincemeat
Edward ^locomotive 
Longstreth m/fer
M M 1 5
Lewis C, 
Madeira
insurance
broker
M C70
James A. 
Main
James,
Mason
blacking 
m/fer
M M 20
George coal
McCreary operator
George
McKelway
druggist 1 0
John .gun
McLaughlin dealer
M 1 5
Theodore
Megargee
paper 
m/fer
M 28
William
Mencke
clothing
m/fer
M C50 1 0
Merle
Middleton
manager M 1 3
John T. 
Monroe
shoe 
m/fer
M 22
Thomas^G. physician 
Morton
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
Aquila  ^
Nebeker
Morris
Newberger
H.M. * 
Oliver
Joseph  ^
Parrish
T. Morris 
Perot
James  ^
Peters
druggist
clothier
shoe
m/fer
lawyer
maltster
hardware
merchant
Horace^W. m/fer of
Pitkin
Thomas
govt, goods 
oilcloth
Potter Jr. m/fer
William
Potter
Robert
Purvis
Francis
Reeves
oilcloth 
m/fer
B
Charles
Richardson
Charles^
Roberts
wholesale
grocer
capitalist
glass 
m/fer
Charley H. banker 
Rogers
Seville wool
Schofield m/fer
Henry
Scott
lawyer
M
M
M
M
O
M
M
M
M
M
0
M
0
M
M
M C50, CP
O C50
0 C50
O
M
O
O
CP
C50
1 2
1 5
28
27
22
1 5
C50, A-CC 22 
C I O , CP, KP
C50, A-CC 10 
C95, ML, C70
22
21
Samuel
Scott
dry goods 
merchant
M 27
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
David wool
Scull Jr. m/fer
Thomas M. 
Seeds
hat
merchant
M M C50
Oswald ÿniv.
Seidensticker professor
William^
Sellers'
Fred.
Shelton'
Benj. H
steel
m/fer
banker
glass
Showmaker importer
Alexander lawyer 
Simpson
John A.
Siner
M
M
M
M
M
C95
1 0
1 5
22
Clermont
Smith
Fred. W. 
Snyder
Edward A. 
Souder
conveyancer
shipping
merchant
0 C50, UP
M
1 2
27
James^
Spear
Charles,
Spencer
stove
m/fer
hosiery 
m/fer
William G. clothier 
Steel
John S. 
Stevens
builder
Justus dry goods
Strawbridge merchant
Alfred^C. importer 
Thomas of gems
M
M
C50
M
M
M
0 C50
22
24
1 4
22
28
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence
Groups (Ward)
Henry C. 
Thompson
lawyer
Constantine
Thorne
William^H. importer 
Trotter of metals
M
John ] 
Veree
iron & steel 
m/fer
John dry goods
Wanamaker merchant
M
George,
Watson
builder 1 3
John C. 
Watt
cotton 
goods m/fer
M 24
Chris. drug
Wetherill importer
Charles^ ironmaster, Tr 
Wheeler banker
0
Edward
Whelen
retired M M
Alexande^ wool 
Whilldin merchant
M 29
George
Whitney
Ellis
Williams
Thomas
Williams
lawyer
physician
M
M M A-CC 1 3
Henry
Winsor
shipping
merchant
FC M
Edward R. iron 
Wood m/fer
M
Walter
Wood
iron 
m/fer
0 0 A-CC, UP 10 
C70, KP
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Name Occupation C.M.R.A. C.S.R.A. C.M.A. Non- Resid-
Partisan ence 
Groups (Ward)
Willjam 
Wood
textile
m/fer
M 1 5
James A. 
Wright
shipping
merchant
M M C50 22
Sources: Committee of One Hundred (undated leaflet listing
members of the Committee and their residence); George 
Vickers, The Fall of Bossism: A History of the Committee of 
One Hundred and the Reform Movement in Philadelphia and 
Pennsylvania v. 1, (Philadelphia, 1883); Citizens' Municipal 
Reform Association, Committee and Membership, 1871-72; Civil 
Service Reform Association, Annual Report of the Executive 
Committee, 1882-1888; Citizens' Municipal Association,
Constitution, By-Laws and List of Members, 1886, 1891, 1895;
Citizens' Committee of Fifty, First Annual Report, 1892; The 
Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City Government, 1895, 
Herbert Welsh Papers; Municipal League, Annual Report of the 
Board of Managers, 1891-2 to 1902-3; Anti-Combine Committee, 
For Good Government, 1895, p.1; North American, Aug. 31, 
1901; Record, Sept. 21, 1901, Israel Durham Scrapbook (for 
details of the Union Party); Committee of Seventy, Sixth 
Report of the Executive Board, May 8, 1906, pp.20-23; City 
Party, Hand-Book, 1905, pp.8-19; Keystone Party, City 
Committee, Oct. 24, 1912; Gopsill's Philadelphia City
Directory, 1882-1911; The North American, Philadelphia and
Popular Philadelphians (Philadelphia, 1891); all the 
pamphlets listed above were published in Philadelphia and 
are held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
* indicates that the individual was a member of the
original committee that was set up in November 1880.
Reform Groups:
A-CC
C95
C.M.A.
C.M.R.A.
CP
C.S.R.A.
C50
Anti-Combine Committee
Citizens' Committee of 95 for Good City 
Government
Citizens' Municipal Association 
Citizens' Municipal Reform Association 
City Party
Civil Service Reform Association 
Committee of Fifty for a New Philadelphia
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070 Committee of Seventy
KP Keystone Party
ML Municipal League
UP Union Party
Position :
CC Central Council
EC Executive Committee
FC Finance Committee
M Member
0 Officer
Pr. President
Sec. Secretary
Tr. Treasurer
V-P Vice-President
WR Ward Representative
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Notes
All the pamphlets and annual reports cited are held by the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania and were published in 
Philadelphia, unless otherwise stated.
Introduction
1 Insights into the nature of the Republican 
"Organisation" have been provided (from a reform 
perspective) by contemporary observers such as: Lincoln 
Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York, 1904), pp. 
193-229; Louis Seaber, "Philadelphia's Machine in 
Action,-" Independent 58 ( 1 905), pp. 584-7; Clinton R. 
Woodruff, "Philadelphia's Revolution," Yale Review (May 
1906), pp. 8-23; Austin F. MacDonald, "Philadelphia's 
Political Machine in Action," National Municipal Review 
15 (Jan. 1926), pp. 28-35; Thomas R. White, "The 
Philadelphia System" Forum 77 (1927), pp. 678-688; 
however there is still no account of the machine during 
the period (1887-1933) of its ascendancy over the 
city's polity.
Indeed, except for Howard F. Gillette's Corrupt and 
Contented; Philadelphia's Political Machine, 1865-1887, 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970) 
which provides a detailed analysis of the various 
formations that contested for political power in the 
city prior to the enactment of the Bullitt Bill as the 
new city charter in 1887, and two "participant 
observer" studies - John T. Salter, Boss Rule,
Portraits in City Politics (New York, 1935); David H. 
Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Pennslyvania, 1935) - conducted at the very time (1933) 
when the "Organisation" lost control of the city, 
scholars have ignored the "institutionalisation" of 
machine politics in what was, then, the third largest 
city in the country.
2 Steffens, Shame of the Cities, pp. 195, 193.
3 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 
(Glencoe, 111., 1949), pp. 71-81.
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Chapter 1. A Literature Review of the Urban Political 
Machine
1 Michael H. Frisch, "OYEZ, OYEZ, OYEZ The Recurring 
Case of Plunkett v. Steffens," Journal of Urban History 
7 (Feb. 1981), p. 206. George Washington Plunkitt 
(1842-1924) was a district leader for the infamous 
Democratic machine that dominated New York city's 
government and politics at the turn of the century.
His "statesman-like" views on (and defence of) the 
political machine are colourfully articulated and 
recorded in William L. Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany 
Hall (New York, 1905).
2 Jon C. Teaford, "Finis for Tweed and Steffens:
Rewriting the History of Urban Rule," Reviews in 
American History 10 (Dec. 1982), p. 135. For an 
overall perspective on the study of urban politics and 
government see also Michael H. Ebner, "Urban History:
Retrospect and Prospect," Journal of American History
68 (June 1981), pp. 69-84.
3 David P. Thelen, "Urban Politics: Beyond Bosses and 
Reformers," Reviews in American History 7 (Sept. 1979), 
p .406.
4 Ibid., p. 409.
5 Teaford, "Finis for Tweed," p. 136.
6 Thelen, "Urban Politics," p.412.
7 For recent works that do in fact present alternative 
ways of viewing urban politics see Martin J. Schiesl, 
The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration 
and Reform in America, 1880-1920 (Berkeley, 1977); 
Kenneth Fox, Better City Government: Innovation in 
American Urban Politics, 1850-1937 (Philadelphia,
1977); Ronald P. Formisano and Constance K. Burns 
(eds.), Boston 1700-1980: The Evolution of Urban 
Politics (Westport, Conn., 1984).
That the political machine is still of enduring 
interest to scholars see Scott Greer (ed). Ethnics, 
Machines and the American Urban Future (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1981); Harvey Boulay and Alan Di Gaetano, "Why 
Did Political Machines Disappear?" Journal of Urban 
History 12 (Nov. 1985), pp. 25-49.
8 For a detailed list of this early reform literature see 
Eric L. McKitrick, "The Study of Corruption," Political 
Science Quarterly 72 (Dec. 1957), pp. 502-3.
9 Thelen, "Urban Politics," p.407.
10 Edwin O'Connor, The Last Hurrah (Boston, 1956), p. 73.
11 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 71-81. 
For an assessment of the significance and validity of 
O'Connor's thesis see Boulay and Di Gaetano, "Political 
Machines," pp. 32-33.
12 Ibid., p.71.
13 Elmer Cornwell, Jr., "Bosses, Machines and Ethnic 
Groups," Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Sciences 353 (May 1964), pp. 27-39.
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14 Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New York (New York, 
1965), p. 58.
15 Alexander B. Callow, Jr., (ed.). The City Boss in 
America: An Interpretive Reader (New York, 1976), p. 6. 
For a broader version of Callow's argument see his book 
on The Tweed Ring (New York, 1966). Leo Hershkowitz, 
Tweed's New York: Another Look (Garden City, N. Y .
1977) also makes the same point.
16 Zane L. Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati: Urban Politics 
in the Progressive Era (New York, 1968).
17 John M. Allswang, Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters:
An American Symbiosis (Port Washington, N. Y., 1977).
18 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to
F.D.R. (New York, 1955); Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics 
of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive 
Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (Oct. 1964), pp. 
157-169.
19 Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 40-1, 234-240;
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p. 9.
20 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the
Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 221-9.
21 Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 71-81; 
Richard C. Wade, "Urbanisation" in C. Vann Woodward 
(ed.). The Comparative Approach to American History 
(New York, 1968), pp. 187-205; Oscar Handlin, The 
Uprooted (Boston, 1951), pp. 201-226; William F. Whyte, 
Street Corner Society (Chicago, 1943).
22 James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1972), p. 107; Banfield and 
Wilson, City Politics, pp. 115-121; Edward C. Banfield, 
Political Influence (New York, 1961), ch. 11; Raymond 
Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1974), pp. 99-106; Fred Greenstein, "The Changing 
Pattern of Urban Party Politics," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 353 
(May 1964), p. 3. Banfield and Wilson have provided 
perhaps the most widely accepted definition of machine 
politics, characterising the machine as "a party 
organisation that depends crucially upon inducements 
that are both specific and material." It follows that 
the machine "is apolitical: it is interested only in
making and distributing income........ to those who run
it and work for it. Political principle is foreign to 
it and represents a danger and a threat to it." Hence 
machine politics is associated with corruption and 
patronage. As specific material inducements are never 
plentiful enough however, machine politics is also 
associated with personalistic leadership and the 
friendship and loyalty of the clubhouse. Thus it is 
the artful combination of clubhouse solidarity and 
material rewards which creates a well disciplined and 
centralised political organisation reaching from city 
hall to the city's wards and precincts and claiming a 
majority of the city's electorate. (Banfield and 
Wilson, Ibid.).
23 Martin Shefter, "The Electoral Foundations of the
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Political Machine: New York City, 1884-1897," in Joel 
H. Silbey, Allan G. Bogue, and William H. Flanigan 
(eds.). The History of American Electoral Behaviour 
(Princeton, N. J., 1978), pp. 266-280, 292-298.
24 Banfield, Political Influence, p. 309.
25 John T. Salter, The People's Choice: Philadelphia's 
William S. Vare (New York, 1971), p. 9.
2 6 Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham, 
N. C. , 1 930), p. 194, 218.
27 Hays, "Politics of Reform," pp. 157-169; Melvin G. 
Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. Pingree and Urban 
Politics (New York, 1969); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph 
of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American 
History, 1900-1916 (Princeton, N. J., 1963); James 
Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State 
1900-1918 (Boston, 1968); John D. Buenker, Urban 
Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York, 1973). J. 
Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of 
Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 49 (Sept. 
1962), pp. 231-241; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for 
Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967); David P. Thelen, 
"Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," 
Journal of American History 56 (Sept. 1969), pp. 323- 
341 .
28 Sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Private City: Philadelphia in 
Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 
86-91.
29 Public Ledger, Oct. 7, 1901, Israel W. Durham 
Scrapbook, Historical Society of Pennsylvania 
(hereafter, HSP). All newspapers cited were published 
in Philadelphia unless otherwise stated.
30 Kenneth D. Wald, "The Electoral Base of Political 
Machines: A Deviant Case Analysis," Urban Affairs 
Quarterly 16 (Sept. 1980), pp. 2-29.
31 Shefter, "The Electoral Foundations of the Political 
Machine," pp. 263-298.
Part A. The Politics of Individualism and Ring Rule in the 
Pre-Machine Era, 1867-1887
The nature of state party politics at the time of the 
Civil War, it should also be pointed out, bore a 
striking resemblance to the character of political life 
which prevailed in Philadelphia. That is, prior to 
Simon Cameron's emergence as the undisputed leader of 
the state Republican party in 1873, party politics in 
Pennsylvania, as in the urban polity, was not dominated 
by an over-riding cleavage between well-organised 
machine and reform forces.
William Gienapp and James Huston's analysis of the 
break-up of the Jacksonian-Whig party system in 
Pennsylvania for example reveals that personal
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rivalries were responsible, as much as disputes over 
policy or different orientations to politics, for the 
cleavages between the individual political actors and 
formations who contended for power within the main 
parties. See William E. Gienapp, "Nebraska, Nativism 
and Rum: The Failure of Fusion in Pennsylvania, 1854," 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
(hereafter, PMHB) 109 (Oct. 1985), pp. 426-7, 450-1, 
469-70; James L. Huston, "The Demise of the 
Pennsylvania American Party, 1854-1858," PMHB 109 (Oct 
1985), pp. 482-3.
The same can equally be said of the factionalism which 
marred the ascendancy of the Republican party in 
Pennsylvania. See Brooks M. Kelly, "Simon Cameron and 
the Senatorial Nomination of 1867," PMHB 88 (1963), 
pp. 375-392; John D. Stewart, "The Deal for 
Philadelphia: Simon Cameron and the Genesis of a 
Political Machine, 1867-1872," Journal of Lancaster 
County Historical Society 77 (1973), pp. 41-52; Philip 
S. Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, A History of Pennsylvania 
(New York, 1973), pp. 254-262, 317-321; James A. Kehl, 
Boss Rule in the Gilded Age: Matt Quay of Pennsylvania 
(Pittsburgh, 1981), p. 21; Rudolph Blankenburg, "Forty 
Years in the Wilderness; Or, Masters and Rulers of The 
Freemen of Pennsylvania," Arena 33 (Jan. 1905), pp. 4- 
5, 8; Herbert Welsh, "The Degradation of Pennsylvania 
Politics," Forum (Nov. 1891), pp. 3-4; for details of 
the power struggle between former protectionist 
Democrat, Simon Cameron and ex-Whig, Andrew Gregg 
Curtin for control of the state Republican party 
organisation; a battle for leadership which dogged the 
party for almost the first twenty years of its 
existence and one in which the protagonists found it 
necessary to bribe their nominal followers (with 
favours and cash payments) in order to secure and 
maintain their co-operation.
Chapter 2. The Emergence of the Career Politician
1 Edgar P. Richardson, "The Athens of America, 1800-
1825," in Russell F. Weigley (ed.), Philadelphia: A
300-Year History (New York, 1982), p. 208.
2 Theodore Hershberg (ed.), Philadelphia: Work, Space, 
Family and Group Experience, (New York, 1981), pp. 121 
2 .
3 Michael Frisch, Town into City: Springfield, 
Massachusetts and the Meaning of Community, 1840-1880 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1972), ch. 2.
4 Warner, Private City, pp. 15-16.
5 Ibid., pp. 9-11; Edward P. Allinson and Boies Penrose,
The City Government of Philadelphia (Baltimore, 1887),
pp. 15-34.
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6 Ronald P. Formisano, "Boston, 1800-1840: From 
Deferential-Participant to Party Politics," in 
Formisano and Burns (eds.), Boston 1700-1980, pp. 29- 
57.
7 Richardson, "The Athens of America," p. 223; E. Digby 
Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a 
National Upper Class (Glencoe, 111., 1958), pp. 87-8.
8 Warner, Private City, pp. 102-6; Richardson, "The 
Athens of America," pp. 226-30.
9 Warner, Private City, pp. 111-7; Nicholas B.
Wainwright, "The Age of Nicholas Biddle, 1825-1841," in 
Weigley (ed.), Philadelphia: A 300-Year History, p.
297.
10 Warner, Private City, pp. 10-16, 79; Richardson, "The 
Athens of America," pp. 208-223, 234-245; Wainwright, 
"The Age of Nicholas Biddle," pp. 258-285.
11 Warner, Private City, p. 80.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., pp. 80-2; E. Digby Baltzell, An American 
Business Aristocracy (New York, 1958), p. 114.
14 Bruce Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs in Southwark: 
The 1840's," in Allen F. Davis and Mark H. Haller 
(eds.), The People's of Philadelphia: A History of 
Ethnic Groups and Lower Class Life, 1790-1940 
(Philadelphia, 1973), pp. 75-6; David R. Johnson,
"Crime Patterns in Philadelphia, 1840-70," p. 99, of 
the same book.
15 Formisano and Burns (eds.), Boston, 1700-1980, p. 262; 
Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, pp. 87-8.
16 Abraham Ritter, Philadelphia and Her Merchants 
(Philadelphia, 1860), p. 46, quoted in Edgar 
Richardson, "The Athens of America," p. 223.
17 Laurie, "Fire Companies and Gangs," pp. 75-6; Johnson, 
"Crime Patterns," p. 99.
18 Bruce Laurie, Working People of Philadelphia, 1800-1850 
(Philadelphia, 1980), pp. 85-104; Wainwright, "The Age 
of Nicholas Biddle," pp. 279-80; Elizabeth M. Geffen, 
"Industrial Development and Social Crisis, 1841-1854," 
in Weigley (ed.), Philadelphia: A 300-Year History, pp. 
338-9.
19 Theodore Hershberg, "Free Blacks in Antebellum 
Philadelphia: A Study of Ex-Slaves, Freeborn, and 
Socioeconomic Decline" in Hershberg (ed.) Philadelphia : 
Work, Space, Family and Group Experience, pp. 368,
370; Warner, Private City, pp. 125-157; Michael 
Feldberg, The Philadelphia Riots of 1844: A Study of 
Ethnic Conflict (Westport, Conn., 1975).
20 Warner, Private City, pp. 89-90; Harry C. Wilcox, 
"William McMullen, Nineteenth-Century Political Boss," 
PMHB 110 (July 1986), p. 394; Citizens' Municipal 
Reform Association (hereafter, CMRA), Address, Sept.
20, 1871.
21 Warner, Private City, p.82.
22 Ibid., p. 85.
23 Ibid., pp. 85-6 .
24 Gillette, Corrupt and Contented, pp. 45-8.
25 Daguerrotype Sketches of the Members of the First
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Common Council after Consolidation for 1854 and 1855,
1 855.
26 Ibid.
27 Inquirer, Nov. 18, 1874. For details of Councilman who 
were jobbers and contractors and who abused their 
public office for personal profit, see Gillette,
Corrupt and Contented, p. 46, and Maxwell Whiteman, 
Gentlemen in Crisis: The First Century of the Union 
League of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 106-7.
28 A full list of the members of the Republican City 
Executive Committee in 1857 and also of officers of the 
individual ward associations is contained in The 
Republican Manual containing information in Relation to 
the Government of the Republican Party in the City of 
Philadelphia, 1857, pp. 31-33, 134-140.
29 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, v.II (New York, 
1914), pp. 406-7. Bryce's analysis was based on 
information he received from the Philadelphia 
publisher, historian and civic reformer, Henry Charles 
Lea; see Edward S. Bradley, Henry Charles Lea: A 
Biography (Philadelphia, 1931), pp. 179-80.
30 George Vickers, The Fall of Bossism: A History of the 
Committee of One Hundred and the Reform Movement in 
Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, v.I (Philadelphia,
1883), pp. 64-66. The Republican party's success, to 
which Vickers refers had, it should be noted little to 
do with its appeals to anti-slavery sentiment in the 
city. The party's first mayoral candidate in fact 
polled just 1 percent of the vote in the 1856 election; 
a result perhaps not too surprising however in view of 
the city's well-established commercial links with the 
South (reflected in the dominant pro-Southern 
sympathies among Philadelphia's ruling elite) and the 
local strength of anti-Negro feelings (exhibited in the 
remarkable deterioration in the socio-economic decline 
of the city's ante-bellum black community). (See 
William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia,
1856-1865 (Philadelphia, 1965), pp. 12-13, 183-4; 
Russell F. Weigley, "The Border City in Civil War, 
1854-1865," in Weigley (ed.), Philadelphia: A 300-Year 
History, pp. 384-88, 390, 392-3; Whiteman, Gentlemen in 
Crisis, pp. 1, 5-6; Hershberg, "Free Blacks in 
Antebellum Philadelphia," pp. 368, 370).
The Republicans only attracted wide-scale support in 
the city when, in the wake of the Panic of 1857, the 
party joined with local Know-Nothings to form a new 
(People's Party) coalition, the lynch-pin of which was ; 
programme advocating high protective tariffs, the 
protection of "American Labour" and popular 
sovereignty. By committing themselves to this broader 
programme Republicans were able to dispel not only 
their earlier image of single-minded devotion to anti- 
slaveryism, but also to elect (and subsequently re­
elect in 1860, '62 and '64) one of their own leaders,
abolitionist Alexander Henry, as mayor in 1858.
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It seems in fact that it was protectionism (and in 
particular the argument that the interests of labour 
and capital and indeed of the city as a whole would be 
mutually advanced under the shield of a protective 
tariff), rather than concessions to nativism or anti- 
Catholicism, which had the most enduring appeal to the 
local electorate. In this respect, the Republicans 
were the beneficiaries of, and natural heirs to, the 
Whig tradition in the city, for it was the latter who, 
through their "American System", had initially 
advocated high tariff protection for American 
industries. (See Huston, "The Demise of the 
Pennsylvania American Party," pp. 478-81, 490-1; Bruce 
Collins, "The Democrats' Loss of Pennsylvania in 1858," 
PMHB 109 (Oct. 1985), pp. 499, 520-26, 535; Weigley, 
"The Border City," pp. 389-92; Amy Bridges, A City in 
the Republic: Ante-bellum New York and the origins of 
machine politics (New York, 1984), pp. 28-29, 67, 155).
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